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INTRODUCTION

A reassessment of United States’ constitutional constraints on
state-level foreign policy is sorely needed. State engagement in for1
eign policy was rarely significant until the 1960s. Since that time,
state involvement has rapidly expanded in both sheer magnitude and
2
the types of activities undertaken. The most prominent and problematic among these state and local activities in the past fifty-plus years
has been three waves of state and local sanction initiatives targeting
countries ruled by regimes with repugnant human rights policies. In
the mid-1980s, over half of the states and at least 100 localities
adopted sanctions legislation against South Africa, most often in the
form of divestment requirements for state or city pension funds, procurement restrictions applicable to companies active in South Africa,
3
or both. In the late 1990s, many states and localities targeted Burma
(officially known as the Union of Myanmar), a country ruled by an
undemocratic military regime with a repugnant human rights record
that has included the killing of as many as several thousand prodemocracy demonstrators. More recently, states and localities have
targeted the Sudanese government for its participation in the genocide in the Darfur region of the country. Divestment requirements
and procurement sanctions continue to be tools of choice for states
and localities seeking to use their substantial market leverage to
change the behavior of these foreign governments. Unless halted
through the faithful application of constitutional constraints by state
and local officials, globalization and technological developments that
increase access to and the exchange of information concerning con-

1
See, e.g., Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors
in International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF
SUBNATIONAL UNITS 5, 5 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); Earl
Fry, The United States of America, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS 283, 283 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds.,
1990).
2
See generally John M. Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State
and Local Role in U.S Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 105,
105 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) (noting that not since the Republic’s earliest decades
had states attempted to engage directly and actively in foreign affairs in order to advance individual policy positions).
3
Id. at 111.
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ditions and policies in foreign countries will likely facilitate the trend
4
of increased state and local involvement in foreign affairs.
Constraints on state-level foreign policy flow from the Supremacy Clause (in the form of the preemption doctrine), the Foreign
Commerce Clause (in the form of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause), and the amalgam of clauses allocating foreign affairs powers
to federal actors and denying them to the states (in the form of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine). In 1968, the Supreme Court in
Zschernig v. Miller for the first time relied upon the dormant foreign
5
affairs doctrine to invalidate a state law in an as-applied challenge.
This doctrine prohibits certain state foreign policy actions even in instances in which such state actions are not preempted by affirmative
acts of the federal government (i.e., where the foreign policy powers
of the federal government lie dormant or unutilized). The dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is rooted in an exclusive federal government
6
foreign affairs power. By definition, if a power is exclusive to the
federal government, then states are denied such power irrespective of
whether the federal government has utilized its power. The Court
has declared the foreign relations power to be exclusive to the federal
government since the early 1800s, and a multi-modal interpretation
of the Constitution supports a significant degree of federal exclusivity
7
over foreign affairs.
All three major waves of state and local sanction efforts—those
involving South Africa in the 1980s, Burma in the 1990s, and Sudan
in the 2000s—led to litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
state and local legislation. The litigation involved challenges to state
and local laws under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, as well as
preemption and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Additional

4

See Matthew Schaefer, The “Grey Areas” and “Yellow Zones” of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation and Intrusion to
Escape an Era of Misguided “New Federalism,” 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 35 (1998).
5
389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). Some commentators have used slightly different labels. See, e.g., Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (referring to the “dormant
foreign affairs power”); Johanna Medelson, Foreign Policy by Federalism: The Reagan
Years, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 81, 89 (1989) (referring to a “dormant foreign
affairs clause”). I believe that use of the term “dormant foreign affairs clause” is inappropriate because the doctrine does not derive from a single clause nor does the
Constitution grant a general foreign affairs power to the federal government in any
single clause.
6
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436.
7
See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 550 (1840) (“From the very nature
and organization of the general or national government, it is vested with the sole jurisdiction over all matters of a national character, and of external concern.”).
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state measures outside of these major sanction initiatives have also
8
been challenged in the courts since Zschernig. Lower federal and
state courts, however, have struggled to apply Zschernig’s test, which
asks whether a state action has “more than ‘some incidental or indi9
rect effect’” on foreign relations, given the test is not particularly
well-suited for courts to independently analyze. In the past decade,
the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in two cases, Crosby v. National
10
Foreign Trade Council and American Insurance Association v. Garamen11
di, involving state level foreign policy sanctions, but the Court’s opinions have not provided the clarity needed by lower courts, state actors, local actors, or federal actors. These Supreme Court rulings
followed closely on the heels of significant academic criticism of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine—writings that challenged the or12
thodoxy of federal government exclusivity in foreign affairs.
In the first case, Crosby, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
law that provided a negative ten percent procurement preference
13
against companies active in Burma. In its opinion, the Court relied
14
solely on “obstacles conflict” preemption and did not rule on two
additional grounds that the First Circuit had relied upon to strike the
law down: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The choice to rely solely on preemption incorrectly fueled speculation by some that the academic assault on
15
Zschernig succeeded. Additionally, some incorrectly characterized
the ruling as narrow and read it as only providing preemption of state

8

See infra Part VIII.E.2 (chart).
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
10
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
11
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
12
See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 436 n.64
(2d ed. 1996); Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1618–20 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1223, 1225 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Foreign Relations] (“The purpose of this
essay is to present a coherent explanation of why the doctrine was once appropriate,
even imperative, but fast becoming obsolete.”); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro, States and Immigration] (arguing for a lack of federal exclusivity over immigration
matters since the foreign affairs underpinning of such exclusivity is no longer valid).
13
Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
14
Id. at 384–85.
15
Cf. Carlos Manual Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1261
(2001) (arguing that “a declaration of victory by the critics of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine would be premature” in response to the Court’s opinion in Crosby).
9
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law where a federal sanctions law specifically targeted the same coun16
try as the state law or as only impacting procurement sanctions.
In the second case, Garamendi, the Court invalidated a California
law requiring insurers operating in the state to disclose preHolocaust-era insurance policies sold in Europe in order to continue
17
operating in the state. But the Court provided a rather muddled
analysis. The majority approvingly cited Zschernig, breathing life back
into the doctrine for those that incorrectly believed Crosby left it criti18
cally wounded. The Garamendi opinion, however, arguably mischa19
racterized Zschernig as a field preemption case and ultimately
seemed to rely more on Crosby-styled obstacles conflict preemption as
20
the grounds for its decision.
For their part, state and local governments read the opinions as
continuing to allow state-level foreign policy sanctions (or at a minimum used the doctrinal confusion as an opportunity to pass such
measures) as evidenced by the recent enactment of laws targeting
Sudan. While a lower federal court partially invalidated Sudan21
sanctions legislation enacted by Illinois in 2007, a new issue was
raised when Congress subsequently purported to authorize state and
local divestment measures targeting Sudan in response to the litiga22
tion. The Congressional authorization occurred in spite of the President questioning the constitutionality of such authorization in his
23
signing statement of the legislation. In sum, the academic criticism
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the Supreme Court’s hesitance to rely clearly upon it, and Congress’s purported attempt to authorize state actions otherwise running afoul of the doctrine, have left
16

See Daniel M. Price, John P. Hannah & Marinn F. Carlson, Crosby v. NFTC and
the Future of State and Local Sanctions, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 37, 40 (2001).
The omission of [dormant foreign affairs doctrine and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause] holdings, however, at least theoretically leaves
open the possibility [state sanctions] could pass constitutional muster,
provided no federal statute addressed the same issue. This conceptual
space is what advocates of local foreign policy initiatives may seek to
exploit.
Id. The authors think this reading by state and local officials is incorrect.
17
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
18
Id. at 417–18.
19
Id. at 419.
20
Id. at 421.
21
NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
22
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121
Stat. 2516.
23
Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007,
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007).
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confusion and questions surrounding the doctrine. Further, because
states and localities continue primarily to utilize procurement restrictions and divestment requirements in major sanctions initiatives, the
failure of the Supreme Court to rule on the availability of a market
participant exception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine in the
face of conflicting lower court opinions has created further uncertainty. Thus, the lack of clarity for state, local and federal officials,
lower courts, and businesses, first created by the Zschernig opinion,
has arguably worsened considerably in the past decade.
This reassessment of U.S. constitutional constraints on state level
foreign policy will focus on (re)justifying, refining, and distinguishing
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The (re)justification for the
doctrine is twofold. First, all major policy considerations argue
against state involvement in foreign affairs absent federal approval.
Ultimately, even those policy goals that at first glance appear to support state involvement in foreign affairs do not require state involvement in order to be achieved. These policy arguments do not
mandate a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. As critics of the doctrine
point out, the federal government can always preempt harmful state
24
activities. Preemption by the federal government, however, is an
imperfect device in eliminating state engagement in foreign affairs
and gives less clear guidance to state and local actors. Further, relying on preemption is arguably less intellectually honest given unclear
congressional intent regarding preemption of state and local sanctions measures in many instances. Most importantly, the various
modes of constitutional interpretation, although providing somewhat
conflicting signals, nevertheless support an exclusive foreign affairs
power in the federal government and its corollary, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
The refinement of the doctrine is necessary because both courts
and scholars have struggled to establish a doctrinal test for analyzing
state actions that pays fealty to the Court’s Zschernig opinion, suits the
competence of courts, and allows for independent application by
state and local officials. In establishing the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine in the Zschernig case, the Supreme Court appeared to create
a threshold-effects test asking whether the state action has “more
than ‘some incidental or indirect effect’” on U.S. foreign relations or
25
a foreign nation. The origins of the test, however, are somewhat ac-

24

See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1679.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 517 (1947)).
25
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26

cidental. Moreover, such a standard is not particularly well-suited
for independent determinations by the courts, nor is it particularly
well-suited for independent application by state and local officials.
Many commentators analyzing the doctrine have failed to support
their chosen standard of review and have strayed from any standard
arguably articulated by the courts. For instance, many commentators
have mistakenly called for a balancing test relying on an analogy to
27
the dormant Commerce Clause. But courts struggle enough to independently determine the effect a state law has on foreign affairs
without being called upon to balance that effect against the achievement of a legitimate local purpose. Fortunately, there is also language in Zschernig that indicates that the Court was concerned with
28
the purpose of the state action. Indeed, many lower courts have
turned to purpose review as an additional test or sub-test in their ap29
plication of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Purpose review,
while admittedly not unproblematic, is the most appropriate doctrinal test. Specifically, the test for reviewing the legality of state actions
should be phrased as follows:
The dormant foreign affairs doctrine prohibits states from engaging in foreign policy. States engage in foreign policy when they
take measures having a foreign-policy purpose. A foreign-policy
30
purpose is evident when the primary purpose of the state action is to
31
change or criticize a policy of a foreign government, or governments.

26

See infra Part IV.B–C.
See, e.g., Glenn S. McRoberts, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Towards a Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 11 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 639, 652 (1989); John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 306 (1965).
28
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437.
29
See discussion infra Parts III.D.3, VII.E.
30
See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652 (initially examining state actions for such
a primary purpose but then engaging in balancing analysis). In the context of the
dormant Commerce Clause, Don Regan has supported a motive-review standard that
would only ask whether a protectionist purpose “substantially contributed” to enactment of the state law. See Don Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1148–49 (1986).
While I have no great concerns about adopting this lesser standard, I do not think
the choice between these two standards will matter very often under the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. In other words, I think the choice between a “primary purpose” and “purpose that substantially contributed” standard is probably more important under the dormant Commerce Clause because state laws often mix a protectionist purpose with a legitimate local purpose. I also think the standard can be higher
under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine since the policing problems of state activities faced by the federal government are less significant. See also discussion infra Part
IV.D–E.
31
Some readers may wonder why state actions “supporting or encouraging” a
foreign government’s behavior or policies are also not captured by the doctrinal
27
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Such a test, it should be noted, will not prevent many activities
states currently engage in that some broader definitions may define
as foreign policy or foreign affairs. In sum, the adoption of purpose
review is not intended to be revolutionary, but rather, it is appropriately adapted to respond to a multi-modal interpretation of the
Constitution. Additionally, and importantly, no market participant
exception should be available under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The justifications for the doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause simply do not apply in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Third, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must be distinguished from preemption analysis and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Commentators often use the term preemption or
preempt in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This
unduly confuses the two doctrines. Preemption doctrine has always
been understood to flow from the Supremacy Clause plus an affirma32
tive federal act. Similarly, the relationship between the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
is not well-understood. A complete understanding of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine requires distinguishing it from these other
doctrines.
It is important to realize that the tasks of justifying, refining, and
distinguishing the dormant foreign affairs doctrine are not exogenous to one another. For instance, justifying the existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine on policy grounds requires distinguishing the doctrine from preemption. As another example, refining the
test under the doctrine to preclude balancing by courts requires distinguishing the doctrine from the dormant Commerce Clause. It is
for this reason that this Article cannot be neatly divided up into addressing these three undertakings of justification, refinement, and
distinction in succession. Although this Article follows this order as
much as possible, some intermixing of these three undertakings is
necessary.
Throughout this Article it is also important to bear in mind that
the relevant question is not whether pariah states or rogue governments deserve condemnation or sanctions, but rather, the question is
tests. But adding these to the doctrinal test is probably unnecessary for several reasons. First, it is my sense that states are relatively less engaged in this manner towards
foreign governments. Second, foreign governments will not take offense, and thus
they will not retaliate or threaten retaliation against such actions. Third, the Framer’s were particularly concerned with state actions that would affront foreign governments and lead to potential retaliation.
32
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
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which level of government is to decide upon the timing, manner,
form, and degree of the condemnation and sanction. The efficient
working of democracy and government, the predictability needed by
corporations and their workers in an interdependent world, and our
nation’s ability to influence foreign nations all demand a clearer understanding of the Constitution’s limits on state and local government engagement in foreign policy. Indeed, a reassessment is necessary from the point of view of state government officials, federal
government officials, and the courts.
First, there is evidence that some state legislators and governors
have abandoned their role in constitutional interpretation, particularly as it relates to constraints on their powers in foreign affairs. One
only need look towards the statements of Massachusetts state assemblyman Byron Rushing regarding Massachusetts’ Burma law in which
he declared, “Our Constitution is older than the country’s. We can
33
do these things.” A serious effort to faithfully interpret the U.S.
Constitution must be undertaken by all state officials, but unfortunately it is not. Self-imposed constraints by state officials are necessary because state and lower federal courts rarely have cases presented to them. The lack of cases results from collective action
problems faced by businesses injured by state foreign policy, even
though these collective action problems have been overcome more
34
frequently in the past decade, and the political reluctance of the executive branch. Second, the federal political branches need a clearer
understanding of constitutional limits on state foreign policy so that
they know whether addressing preemption of state legislation in federal foreign affairs legislation is necessary, and alternatively, whether
and in what instances they can authorize state and local foreign policy sanctions measures. Third, the Supreme Court could greatly assist
federal, state, and local government officials and lower federal and
state courts by confirming the continued existence of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. More importantly, the Court should clarify
the doctrinal test under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the
distinctions between it and other doctrines. Even without such Supreme Court clarification, lower courts in large numbers continue to
apply the dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with a significant emphasis on purpose review), and thus state and local officials must rely on

33

A State’s Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32.
See Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L
L. 821, 831 (1989); Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 590–91 (1993).
34
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these lower court opinions to aid in the independent examination of
their own actions.
Part II of this Article examines the policy arguments both for
and against state-level foreign policies. These prudential arguments
fall into five general categories: fairness/retaliation, efficiency/expertise, democratization, effectiveness, and the new post-Cold
War geopolitical environment. The ends desired in allowing active
state-level foreign policies can be achieved even in an environment in
which states face severe restrictions on establishing their own foreign
policies. In short, state-level foreign policies are not sound as a prudential matter.
Part III engages in a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions on foreign affairs. The text of the Constitution explicitly prohibits the states from engaging in foreign relations in certain ways. The real question, however, is whether limits exist beyond
these explicit textual prohibitions. The multi-modal interpretation of
the Constitution undertaken in this Part admits that there are conflicting indications in the text and drafting history of the Constitution
but still finds plenty of support for the existence of a dormant foreign
affairs doctrine.
Part IV focuses on an analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in
the Zschernig case. This Part of the Article examines the three possible doctrinal tests under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine: threshold effects, balancing, and purpose review. This Article expresses a
strong preference for purpose review because courts are best able to
engage in this type of review independent of the views of the executive branch and foreign governments. Purpose review will lead to
more consistent results among lower courts, it better respects traditional areas of state regulation and federal political branch views on
whether certain international obligations should be self-executing,
and, most importantly, it provides the best guidance to state and local
officials assessing the constitutionality of their own actions.
Part V continues the discussion of the test that should be
adopted under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine by examining a
potential market participant exception to the doctrine. A marketparticipant exception should be rejected under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine because justifications for the exception under the
dormant Commerce Clause are inapplicable in the context of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Part VI distinguishes the dormant foreign affairs doctrine from
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. In particular, the discussion
reduces the additional prongs of analysis undertaken in dormant
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Foreign Commerce Clause cases to their bare bones and draws lessons for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Part VII explores whether federal actors can authorize actions by
the states that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. It is well-established that Congress can authorize actions by the states that otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, but authorizations of state actions otherwise violating the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine will often require approval by both
Congress and the President. But some actions, specifically those in
areas of federal power that are not only exclusive but non-delegable,
could never be authorized.
Part VIII critically examines the Supreme Court’s rulings in Crosby and Garamendi that have created confusion and a lack of clarity. It
also looks at post-Garamendi lower court cases. These cases reveal a
degree of confusion regarding the doctrine among some lower courts
but also indicate that a majority of lower courts continue to apply the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with heavy emphasis on purpose
review).
Part IX discusses the relative importance of courts vis-à-vis state
officials in applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The reality
is that courts do not have the opportunity to constrain the states in
many instances. Many businesses are simply not anxious to risk a
public backlash by challenging state-level foreign policy measures in
35
court. While the National Foreign Trade Council, a coalition of over
300 businesses engaged in international trade, has overcome the fear
of being a plaintiff in a couple of instances, faithful application of
constitutional constraints by state officials and representatives is ultimately required. Such faithfulness could be enhanced through Supreme Court clarification as lower courts’ opinions have jurisdictional limits.
Part X examines whether the Supreme Court’s own rules of
judicial restraint would prevent the Court from providing further
clarity in a future case. A review of the cases suggests the Court could
properly base a ruling on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine even
when preemption grounds are also present.
Part XI concludes that the Supreme Court’s reliance on, and
clarification of, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purposereview test would allow state and local officials to discharge their responsibilities to act in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.

35

See Fenton, supra note 34, at 590–91.
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II. FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
STATE-LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY
A. Retaliation and Unfairness
The most readily apparent policy argument against states engaging in foreign policy is found in The Federalist Papers. It is a con36
cern related to fairness and retaliation. Is it fair to the forty-nine
other states if a foreign nation crafts sanctions against the United
States as a whole in response to one state’s foreign policy legislation?
Clearly the answer is no. Is it actually the case that retaliation will fall
upon the United States as a whole rather than the state engaging in
foreign affairs in such instances? Critics of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine note that there are examples in recent trade disputes where
retaliation has been targeted against a particular sub-national entity.
Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that at least the important nations of the world know the “difference between Washington and
37
Sacramento.” In other words, foreign countries will not hold the rest
of the United States responsible for the actions of California. The existence of multi-jurisdictional enterprises, however, leads to possible
avoidance of such targeted retaliation, subsequently making targeted
38
retaliation less attractive to aggrieved states. Additionally, it is often
tough to target sanctions against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction
39
with no spill-over effects. Indeed, there are a host of strategic considerations a foreign state will consider in deciding whether to target
sanctions against the state enacting foreign policy legislation or to do
so more broadly against the United States. Moreover, even if sanctions are targeted against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction, it is
possible relations between the United States and the foreign nation
will be spoiled on other matters or that the foreign nation will use the
40
dispute as leverage in other negotiations. Retaliation occurs in subtle as well as overt forms. For example, with regard to these more
subtle forms, is it fair to the other forty-nine states if a foreign nation
is less forthcoming in some international negotiations (or, in cooperating on the war on terror) as a result of one state’s engagement of
foreign policy?
36

See Moore, supra note 27, at 251.
Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 169.
38
See Matthew Schaefer, Federal States in the Broader World, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 37–
39 (2001); see also David Golove, The Implications of Crosby for Federal Exclusivity in Foreign Affairs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 152, 156–58 (2003).
39
See Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37–39; see also Golove, supra note 38, at 156–158.
40
See id.
37
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Rebuttals that will flow to the arguments above are easy to imagine but ultimately are not compelling. First, one may argue that retaliation against the United States as a whole or retaliation against a
particular state are remote possibilities. Foreign countries are simply
not anxious to retaliate against the United States, even for international law violations, due to the economic, political, and military
41
power of the United States. For smaller foreign nations, such retaliation is almost surely to be ineffective. Such an argument, however,
presumes a narrow definition of retaliation. Retaliation may come in
subtle forms and be manifest in a souring of cooperation rather than
explicit sanctions. In other words, the power of the United States is a
large, but still a limited and fungible commodity. If some of that
power is “spent” preventing retaliation that might otherwise occur in
response to a state-level foreign policy, then less of that power is
available to be utilized for the interests of the nation as a whole.
Second, one can question the unfairness of retaliation against
the nation as a whole in a situation in which a majority of states, say
twenty-six, have enacted the foreign policy legislation (e.g., Massachusetts-styled Burma laws) or, to take even a more extreme example,
forty-nine states have enacted such legislation. Is it unfair to the other twenty-four states that have not, or in the extreme example the
single state that has not, enacted such legislation if retaliation falls
upon the nation as a whole? The answer is that it is still unfair, although one might find the extreme situation somewhat less unfair. It
seems that if a majority of states could enact a particular type of sanctions legislation against a particular foreign country, such legislation
could be enacted at the federal level (or at least legislation authorizing the state legislation could be passed by Congress). But history has
shown that this need not always be the case. In the mid-1980s, state
sanctions against South Africa were widespread despite the inability
of the federal government to initially enact comprehensive sanctions
42
due to executive branch opposition. The real question in these hypotheticals should be whether it is unfair to the twenty-four states or
the one state abstaining from foreign policy action when the federal
government has not authorized action by the states? It remains unfair because it circumvents the officials within the level of govern-

41
See, e.g., William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51,
103 (1987) (noting the lack of power behind sanctions imposed by smaller countries).
42
See Fenton, supra note 34, at 564.
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ment that should be responsible for making such decisions, and it
also circumvents the separation of power constraints in the Constitution for the making of U.S. foreign policy. This statement, however,
necessitates support from other modes of constitutional interpretation. While currently focusing on the prudential mode of interpretation, the various modes that are utilized are clearly linked together in
some respects. For example, the whole question of unfairness can be
considered in the procedural sense of notice. If our other modes of
constitutional interpretation, including text, structure, original intent, and doctrinal, tend to support the conclusion that the Constitution allows states to enact such legislation and this was the compact
created among the states or the people (a question, which I will not
delve into), then one can argue there is no unfairness. This is, however, not the case. Part III of this Article will demonstrate that nearly
all modes of constitutional interpretation ultimately support the con44
clusion that states are prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs.
Thus, even these “tougher” cases remain unfair to the abstaining
states.
B. Efficiency and Expertise
State-level foreign policy arguments based on efficiency and expertise are similar to economic arguments concerning the division of
labor. In short, it may make more sense for one level of government
to focus on certain matters and leave other levels of government to
focus on entirely separate matters. Indeed, two types of federalism
are frequently distinguished: coordinate and cooperative. Coordinate federalism, similar to dual federalism, divides power between
45
two levels of government by topic matter. Coordinate federalism
consists of a static allocation of responsibility between the two levels
46
of government.
In contrast, cooperative federalism emphasizes
concurrent jurisdiction and shared responsibility over all matters in
47
the federal and sub-federal governments. As a simple matter of efficiency, it seems as though some subject matters should be left to one
level of government. Specialization and expertise can be developed
at that level of government. Indeed, expertise in foreign policy clearly resides much more in the federal government than in state gov43

See Bilder, supra note 34, at 827 (noting state officials are not elected to conduct foreign policy).
44
See infra Part III.
45
See WILLIAM STEWART, CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 55, 65–68 (1984).
46
Id.
47
See id. at 51–54.
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ernments. Federal government representatives have access to more
complete and timely information and analysis, particularly that which
48
is confidential. While this federal advantage over the states has been
reduced somewhat by technological developments, an information
49
and “institutional know-how” gap remains. This is not to say that
states have no expertise at all in foreign affairs and that this expertise
has not grown in recent years, particularly in trade matters such as
50
export promotion. Proponents of regulatory competition may also
offer a rebuttal to efficiency-based arguments, specifically that competition between jurisdictions can create efficient results by creating
the optimal regulatory environment. Foreign policy, however, is a
poor choice for regulatory competition between the states since a
state-level experiment will be influenced by the foreign policy choices
51
of other states, the federal government, and other nations. Because
it will be impossible to eliminate the effects of these other influences
through regression analysis, there will be no basis for judging the
52
state experiment a success. Moreover, the costs of experimentation
in foreign affairs are likely to fall upon other states as discussed
53
above.
C. Democratization
Proponents of state engagement of foreign policy most frequently rely on the argument that it “democratizes” foreign policy. Instead
of having foreign policy decided in secret by elite bureaucrats, the argument proceeds, state-level foreign policy increases citizen aware48
See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828 (noting a contrary argument can be made that
many issues do not require special expertise or information). I, however, question
Professor Bilder’s contrary argument. States can gain access to human rights conditions in various countries and know that such treatment is wrong or morally indefensible; however, selecting a policy to change those conditions and the policies of
governments in those countries is a more complex matter.
49
Cf. id. (“[S]tate and local governments lack the expertise, information and resources . . . about complex international relations issues.”).
50
As an aside, by engaging in export and investment promotion activities, a state
does not run afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as will be discussed below.
See infra Part VI.
51
See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 373 (1999); Schaefer, supra note 4, at 52. But see John Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Politics
and the Nation-State: Conflict and Cooperation, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 56 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990) (arguing that preventing competition in foreign affairs is anti-democratic) [hereinafter Kincaid, Constituent].
52
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 373; Schaefer, supra note 4 at 52.
53
See infra Part II.A.
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ness, access, and influence in the foreign policy process. This effect
may be enhanced because citizens, it is argued, have greater access to
55
local government structures vis-à-vis federal government structures.
Such an argument is problematic in several respects. First, one
might question whether foreign policy is truly made in secret anymore. In an information-technology era, only the most sensitive national security secrets typically escape the public’s eyes and ears, and
even then only for a limited period of time. Even if one believes that
foreign policy is still too secretive, the “democratic” solution lies in an
56
activist Congress.
Second, is it truly the case that state government involvement in
foreign affairs will help democratize foreign policy? State government officials are unlikely to properly weigh the potential effects of
57
their actions on other states in the nation. Does Massachusetts care
if European retaliation (even subtle forms like interference with other negotiations) in response to the Burma law falls on other states?
State government representatives are likely to weigh (or at least have
greater competence to weigh) the costs and benefits to their state only, and this is why states are denied a priori certain powers in the Con58
stitution. Citizens in these other states have no say in the decisionmaking process, although states may have an ultimate recourse in
persuading the federal government to set aside other matters under
consideration and preempt the state measure. Additionally, statelevel foreign policy can lead to a lack of accountability. Indeed, this
is a frequent criticism of cooperative federalism in which federal and
59
state governments simultaneously regulate in the same field. If the
60
policy fails, citizens do not know who to hold responsible.
Third, one might also question as an empirical matter whether
state foreign policies are the result of democracy at work or rather
the result of the imperfections within the democratic system. Indeed,
polling data indicates that the general public does not believe that
sub-national government involvement in foreign affairs is appropri54

See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828–29; John Kincaid, Consumership Versus Citizenship: Is There Wiggle Room for Local Regulation in the Global Economy?, in FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 27, 27–28 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); Kincaid, Constituent, supra note 51, at 73.
55
See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828–29.
56
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 372.
57
See id. at 372.
58
See id. at 372–74.
59
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009).
60
Id.

SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

218

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/8/2011 3:50 PM

[Vol. 41:201

61

ate. Therefore, many assume that foreign affairs issues are a federal
government responsibility, and are less likely to pay attention to foreign affairs when voting in state elections. Public choice theory may
have a measure of descriptive force in the enactment of state and local foreign policy sanctions. Public choice theory posits that politicians act in the interests of reelection and that concentrated interest
groups will have great influence on politicians because of the smaller
transaction costs of organizing (and hence contributing to reelection
62
campaigns) vis-à-vis the general public. Although anecdotal, there is
some support for the relevance of public choice theory in explaining
the passage of the Massachusetts Burma law, which appears to have
63
been passed in response to the calls of one particular lobbyist.
Lastly, because state governments may maintain First Amend64
ment rights and individual politicians certainly do, commentators
argue that state engagement in foreign policy serves some of the
65
same purposes as the First Amendment. But states need not engage
in foreign policy to express their views on federal foreign policies.
Other avenues for the expression of a state’s opposition to federal
foreign policy or recommendations for future policies exist: state resolutions transmitted to the federal government, resolutions of state
government organizations, and statements of individual politicians.
D. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of foreign policy is a difficult assessment to
make. Is U.S. foreign policy more effective with state involvement?
Proponents of state involvement argue that state sanctions were critical to changing the apartheid policies of South Africa. Significant

61

See Kline, supra note 2, at 114 n.19.
See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 18–21 (1996).
63
Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling
Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20.
64
See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1637, 1638 (2006).
65
Bilder, supra note 34, at 829 (arguing that some state foreign policy activities
“implicate significant freedom of speech and petition values”); Andrea McCardle, In
Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values
into Foreign Policy Making, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 840 (1989) (arguing that “state and
local government measures intended specifically to communicate foreign policy positions to the national government and influence the direction of that policy, implement the expressive and associational interests of the citizenry and should be presumptively protected under the 1st Amendment”); Matthew Potterfield, State and
Local Foreign Policy Initiatives & Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (1999).
62
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change in the policies of South Africa, however, did not occur until
comprehensive federal sanctions were enacted and other nations in
the international community joined in imposing sanctions. At best,
one can claim the states placed pressure on the first domino (i.e., the
federal government), which in turn provided the pressure to knock
down the other dominos (i.e., other nations) in the sanctions chain.
Such pressure, however, could have come in other forms and
through other means. In fact, state engagement in foreign policy
may deflect interest group pressure away from the federal government and thus impede the pace at which comprehensive and effective federal and multilateral sanctions can be imposed. This could
allow foreign states to continue engaging in reprehensible behavior
66
longer than they would otherwise.
Other arguments might also be put forth claiming positive benefits for U.S. foreign policy through state involvement. For example,
one argument for state involvement is analogous to a “good cop/bad
cop” situation. The federal government plays “good cop” and follows
a policy of “engagement” with a particular foreign nation, while the
states play “bad cop” and pass sanction legislation. The problem with
such a scenario is that the “bad cop” may turn the foreign nation off
from any talks with the federal government. Second, one might also
argue that state sanctions provide extra punch to federal foreign policy measures when both seek to accomplish the same goal. The existence of state measures, however, interferes with the manner, form,
and degree of federal sanctions and reduces flexibility to respond to
changing conditions. Unless it preempts all such action or if the
Constitution prevents such action, the federal government cannot
predict or depend upon what level of state sanctions will be in place
at any one time. If it takes federal action to control the level of state
sanctions, then only one “cop” is involved. If the policy adopted is to
use less force as progress is made by the foreign country, it will be
hard to achieve because both the state and federal government will
need to act. State legislatures may not be in session every year, they
may have very short legislative sessions, and/or they may have other
pressing business. Moreover, state governments may make different
judgments about when progress is achieved on the issue and refuse to
scale back sanctions even though the federal government has done

66

See Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 173–74 (indicating that this is
actually beneficial in the immigration context that poor immigration policies are only adopted in a few states rather than the nation as a whole because state involvement
can act as a safety valve).
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so. Again, such problems can be avoided by preemptive federal action, but at that point only one “cop” is working.
Lastly, recent studies indicate that even unilateral sanctions by
67
the United States as a whole are largely ineffective. If sanctions by
the U.S. federal government are largely ineffective, sanctions by various states are unlikely to achieve results. It would be more effective if
the federal government imposed sanctions and authorized state and
68
local sanctions targeting the identical conduct in a manner that
would allow the federal government to also enlist other countries in
the sanction regime.
E. Geopolitical Changes: End of the Cold War
69

Some scholars suggest that Zschernig is a Cold War relic and that
the end of the Cold War is grounds for eliminating the dormant for70
eign affairs doctrine. In the view of these scholars, there is now
room for state level foreign policies because there is no longer a draconian penalty—complete destruction in response to a state-level foreign policy. One can argue, however, that the risks of severe retaliation in response to a state-level foreign policy are greater today than
71
they were during the Cold War. Clearly, the Soviets were not going
to respond to minor irritants like insults by state court judges, the actions at issue in Zschernig, with a draconian penalty such as nuclear
72
war. Today, there are horizontal proliferation concerns, and the rationality of rogue state leaders differs from the ex-Soviet leaders under a regime of Mutually Assured Destruction. In an era of asymmetric warfare, retaliation takes many forms, especially hard-to-detect
forms, such as cyber warfare, the spreading of false rumors to injure
financial markets and economies, or even low-cost measures used to
73
jam or interfere with satellite communications. Thus, a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine makes even more sense in a post-Cold War
geopolitical environment than during the Cold War.
67
See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 128
(1994).
68
See discussion infra Part IX.
69
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671.
70
See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1259; Spiro, States and Immigration,
supra note 12, at 175.
71
Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1312; see Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35–37. Vazquez
does not say risks are greater today than during the Cold War; rather, he says that he
“does not share Spiro’s belief that the stakes are significantly lower today.” Vazquez,
supra note 15, at 1312.
72
See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35–37.
73
See id.
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III. JUSTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF A DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE THROUGH A MULTI-MODAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
If state and local sanctions are unwise as a policy matter, one effective legal constraint is the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which
recognizes the federal government’s foreign affairs powers as exclusive. Of course, critics of the doctrine assert that the federal government can always preempt harmful or disruptive state laws (i.e., federal government policing of harmful state and local foreign policies is
74
sufficient). This debate raises the question of whether the foreign
affairs powers of the federal government are indeed exclusive or rather only plenary but to some large degree, shared or concurrent. A
multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution, utilizing text, structure, Framer’s intent, and doctrinal modes of interpretation, despite
75
some conflicting signals, still strongly suggests federal exclusivity.
A. Constitutional Text & Structure
The text of the Constitution does not contain the terms foreign
affairs or foreign policy. Nor does it grant a general foreign affairs
power. Instead, the Constitution assigns the federal government cer76
tain enumerated powers relating to foreign affairs. Additionally, the
states are specifically prohibited under the Constitution from engag77
ing in some of these same activities by Article I, Section 10. Some
scholars have criticized the existence of the dormant foreign affairs

74

Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647 (2007); see also Goldsmith, supra note 12,
at 1681–87. But see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1253 (“[T]he politics of
particular controversies will too often cut against disciplining a state . . . .”).
75
See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (analyzing forms of constitutional power).
76
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619–20.
The Constitution establishes plenary federal power by four means. Article I, Section 10 bars states from performing certain foreign affairs
functions, such as treaty-making. Article I, Section 8 and Article II
broadly authorize the federal political branches to conduct foreign relations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and executive agreements. Article VI establishes that these federal enactments
are supreme over state law. And Article III extends the federal judicial
power to cases involving these federal enactments and to other transnational controversies. Taken together, these provisions give the federal
political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations
without interference or limitation by the states.
Id.
77
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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doctrine as not having a textual basis in the Constitution. The argument is two-fold. First, the Constitution did not grant the federal
government a general affairs power, but instead, it granted only a li79
mited number of enumerated powers to the federal government.
Second, the textualist critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
argue that there would be no need to prohibit a limited number of
state activities in Article I, Section 10 if the federal government’s for80
eign affairs powers were exclusive.
However, no one seriously questions that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers are plenary; thus, any alleged gaps in
the textual allocations of powers to federal actors are not considered
gaps in substance. Instead, the textual gaps probably arose simply
because the Framers wanted to divide foreign affairs powers between
the executive and legislative branches, thus preventing the allocation
of a general foreign affairs power to either and necessitating specific
81
grants of power to each. This leaves, however, the question of why
the Framers found it necessary to deny certain powers to the States in
Article I, Section 10 if they understood the foreign affairs powers to
be exclusive. Critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine point out
82
that Eighteenth Century drafting did not favor such repetition. Article I, Section 10 reads as follows:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce
of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports,
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the
Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a for78

See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 342 (“[N]o one has clearly identified the part of
the Constitution producing these results.”).
79
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619.
80
See id. at 1642.
81
See id. at 1619.
82
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 386–87.
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eign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
83
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

It is well accepted, as shown below, that the Framers were concerned with state intrusions in foreign affairs, and one way the Framer’s emphasized federal exclusivity was by granting a power to the
84
federal government and denying it to the states. If the allocation of
powers to the federal government is plenary and many of the prohibitions on the states exercising certain powers parallel those same federal powers, then this text and structure support at least a degree of
federal exclusivity. In other words, if the supposed gaps in federal
powers do not prevent those powers from being plenary, then any alleged gaps in state denials of power should also not be read in such a
narrow fashion so as to preclude federal exclusivity beyond particular
prohibitions in Article I, Section 10. Additionally, a close reading of
Article I, Section 10 reveals the necessity of the second and third paragraphs since those paragraphs do not provide blanket bans on state
actions but instead require Congressional authorizations prior to
states taking certain actions. They both begin with the words: “No
85
state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . .” Further, much of
what is found in the first paragraph of Article I, Section 10 is not a
denial of parallel powers allocated to the federal government—
although there are a few, such as the denial to states of the right to
enter into a Treaty—but rather, this language places prohibitions on
the states that are parallel to the prohibitions placed on the federal
Congress. In this light, it is difficult even as a textual matter to interpret Article I, Section 10 as standing for the proposition that the
federal government’s foreign affairs powers are not exclusive beyond
the specific bans in Article I.
Other textual based arguments against a dormant foreign affairs
doctrine abound. For example, some argue that since the Constitution allows the states to enter into compacts and agreements with foreign powers with the approval of Congress, it necessarily foresees
states entering into negotiations with foreign nations; thus, states
86
could engage in foreign affairs prior to the Congressional approval.
For instance, under such an argument, a state governor could enter
into negotiations with Burma or the Sudan to conclude a human
rights agreement. Such a limited textual reading, however, ignores
83

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
See infra Part III.B.
85
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
86
See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies,
86 FOREIGN POL’Y 158, 163 (1992).
84
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and is contrary to the interpretation one would reach after engaging
in other modes of constitutional interpretation. There are strong indications that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional a
87
state’s entering into negotiations on a topic of that nature. Indeed,
scholars have argued for a dormant Treaty Power preventing states
from directly negotiating with a foreign country and even prohibiting
88
state actions involving indirect negotiations, such as passing a sanctions law, which is viewed as a negotiating offer of “if you change your
behavior, we will no longer sanction you.” Such an argument was
created to lodge much of what is currently found in the dormant foreign affairs doctrine in a specific textual allocation of power to the
federal government, namely the Treaty Clause. One potential complication with declaring the existence of a dormant foreign affairs
doctrine, as mentioned above, is that no general foreign affairs power
89
is granted to the federal government. One might argue that dormant doctrines can only develop for specific clauses, hence the argument for a dormant Treaty Clause to replace much of what is cov90
ered by the more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But this
type of argument overlooks the importance of structure and intent in
constitutional interpretation. The collection of grants of power to
the federal government in the Constitution related to foreign affairs
give the federal government authority to regulate on all matters of

87
See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (“Nor has California entered the
forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country.”) (citing U.S. v. CurtissWright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1936)). Additionally, while the Logan Act may
preempt such negotiations, it is unlikely that anyone would want to proclaim that in
the absence of the Logan Act a state could negotiate with a foreign power on any
topic. See 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006). It is true that states have entered into negotiations
and even concluded agreements with other sub-federal jurisdictions without the consent of Congress. See Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV.
1071 (2008) (analyzing state agreements with foreign countries in absence of Congressional consent and the role of the Executive in such situations). In fact, the
Court has held that only those agreements infringing on the “just supremacy of the
United States” require Congressional approval. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 519 (1893); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S.
452, 468–69 (1978). But legally binding agreements clearly would need approval. In
any event, the Court has interpreted and must interpret the Compacts Clause by relying on other modes of interpretation beyond its text. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking
the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2010).
88
See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1134 (2000).
89
See discussion supra Parts II.A.
90
Indeed, courts have occasionally referred to a dormant war power, derived only from those clauses dealing with war and military matters. See, e.g., Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d. 954, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2010).
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91

foreign affairs. Again, there are no significant suggestions among
scholars or courts that there is a gap in the foreign affairs powers of
the federal government. Interpretation of all of these powers individually and collectively leads to the conclusion that the foreign affairs
powers, at least to a significant degree, are exclusive to the federal
government. Federal exclusivity necessitates a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. A dormant doctrine is the necessary partner of federal
exclusivity. If federal power over certain matters is exclusive, then
state intrusions are prohibited even where the federal government
has not spoken (i.e., the power lays dormant).
Finally, one critic of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has
pointed out that the clause granting federal courts jurisdiction over
“controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for92
eign states, Citizens or Subjects” necessarily assumes interaction be93
tween the states and foreign states. While it is likely that the main
concern of the Founders was cases involving foreign citizens and not
cases between a State and a foreign nation, the clause, nevertheless,
was drafted in this particular manner and another formulation could
have excluded the possibility altogether of a case involving a state and
a foreign state. To infer that this clause allows states to engage in
foreign affairs, however, stands the purpose of the clause on its head.
The jurisdictional clause does not mention what the nature of the interaction between states and foreign states would entail. Those issues
are covered in other clauses and provided for in the structure of the
Constitution.
B. Original Understanding
The clause that gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits between an American state and a foreign state is but another example
of the structural framework apparent in the Constitution of keeping
the actions of one state from endangering the nation as a whole. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 80:
To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are
its proper objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the Judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions
of cases: . . . 4th. to all those which involve the peace of the Confederacy . . . .
91
92
93

See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1621.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Shuman, supra note 86, at 163.
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The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace
of the whole, ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign Powers for the
conduct of its members. . . . As the denial or perversion of justice
by the sentences of courts, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the Federal Judiciary ought to
have cognizance of all causes in which citizens of other countries
are concerned. . . . So great a proportion of the controversies in
which foreigners are parties involve, national questions, that it is
by far most safe, and most expedient, to refer all those in which
94
they are concerned to the national tribunals.

While state-level foreign policy was not the subject of robust de95
bate during the formation of the U.S. Constitution, this relative lack
of attention was not the result of a lack of concern among the Framers about the potential ramifications of separate state-level foreign
policies. Rather, it was clear to the Framers that foreign affairs, more
so perhaps than any other power, needed to be an exclusive federal
96
power. In Federalist No. 42, James Madison refers to a
class of powers lodged in the General Government, consists of
those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, [and
other particular powers].
This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of
the Federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any re97
spect, it clearly ought to be in respect of other nations.

One of the listed specific powers is the power to define and punish
98
offenses against the law of nations. Madison noted that the Articles
of Confederation “contain[ed] no provision for the case of offenses
against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of
any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign na99
tions.” There is no explicit prohibition in the Constitution, however, against states defining and punishing such offenses. Nevertheless,
it is clear that such a prohibition on state activity could be found by
implication.

94

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 434–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.,
1898).
95
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 416.
96
See id. at 345.
97
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 231–32 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
98
Id.
99
See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 398 (2000) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison)).
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The Framers envisioned instances in which a grant of power to
the federal government, although not explicitly made exclusive,
100
would necessarily have to operate as an exclusive power. Federalist
No. 32 lays out the criteria for when exclusivity of federal power
101
should be implied. Exclusivity would exist in three cases:
[1] where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the union; [2] where it granted, in one instance, an
authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the states from
exercising the like authority; and [3] where it granted an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be
102
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.

Categories two and three are relevant to any discussion of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. As discussed above, in the analysis of
Article I, Section 10, a strong argument can be made that the Framers utilized category two to make at least some foreign relations
103
powers exclusive to the federal government.
Turning to category
three, Hamilton uses as an example of this category the clause of the
Constitution that declares that Congress “shall have the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United
104
States.”
Hamilton states that this must necessarily be exclusive because if each state had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could
105
not be a uniform rule. Thus, the question becomes whether an exclusive federal power, and thus an implied prohibition on state activities in the area, can be found even in the absence of some strong language such as “uniform.” The general test elaborated for category
three above indicates that this can indeed occur.
Nevertheless, some scholars have found category three inapplicable to foreign affairs because most complaints over state actions in
the field are based on “expedience and convenience” rather than the
argument that such actions are “absolutely and totally contradictory
106
and repugnant” to the exercise of federal authority. This is a judgment call, however, and is likely true only if we examine the impact of
the state actions rather than the purposes. One could well find that
state laws that impact foreign affairs without intending to do so would

100
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.,
1898).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See discussion supra Part III.A.
104
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
105
Id.
106
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 409–10.
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not be absolutely repugnant to federal-foreign-affairs authority but
that state actions with a foreign policy purpose (i.e., those seeking to
change or criticize the behavior of a foreign government) are absolutely repugnant to the federal authority.
C. Doctrinal and Historical Arguments
Those scholars opposing a dormant foreign affairs doctrine preCrosby and pre-Garamendi pointed out that the first 181 years of our
constitutional history did not contain such a doctrine and that the
Supreme Court had never, prior to Garamendi, revisited the doctrine
107
since its 1968 Zschernig opinion.
The Court, however, hinted at
such a doctrine well before Zschernig and implicitly supported such a
doctrine with its recognition that foreign affairs was an “exclusive”
federal domain in numerous opinions for well over a century before
108
Zschernig.
The origins of the Court’s view of exclusive federal foreign affairs powers dates back to an 1840s case in which Vermont
109
sought to negotiate the extradition of a criminal back to Canada.
Additionally, in a little recognized case, the Court considered a claim

107

See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1649; Ramsey, supra note 51, at 419.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942) (“[C]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to
any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”); see also id. at 244
(“Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1937)
(“Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. . . . In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”);
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–05 (1893) (“[G]reat mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to
foreign countries, are one nation . . . for national purposes, embracing our relations
with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 354 (1879) (“[S]o to the common government which grew out of
this prevailing necessity was granted exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs.”).
109
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 550–51 (1840).
From the very nature and organization of the general or national
government, it is vested with the sole jurisdiction over all matters of a
national character, and of external concern. The states, by the adoption of the existing Constitution, have become divested of all their national attributes, except such as relate purely to their internal concerns.
They are not known to foreign governments as states . . . . In short, as
to all such matters, we are one and indivisible; precisely the same as if
we had no separate states, nor any authorities in the country except
those of the Union.
. . . [T]hus is the whole subject of the foreign relations of the country placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of the
Union.
Id.
108
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine ten years after Zschernig.
Thus, the Court implicitly admitted the continuing vitality of the doctrine, although in that case the court ultimately rejected the claim
because the state measure had “insignificant international conse111
quences.” Scholars opposed to Zschernig also point to the 1941 case,
112
Hines v. Davidowitz, in which the Supreme Court explored but ulti113
mately hedged on finding a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Yet,
the Court’s opinion in Hines is one of many that contains an indication that the foreign affairs powers of the federal government are exclusive. Moreover, the Court clearly indicated in the 1947 case of
Clark v. Allen that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine was available to
strike down a state law impinging too greatly on U.S. foreign rela114
tions.
Additionally, the ready availability of the preemption doctrine in most cases involving a challenge to state laws in the foreign
affairs realm, and the Supreme Court’s preference for relying on
preemption grounds in its opinions, may readily explain why the Supreme Court generally finds it unnecessary to rely on the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine.
There is an additional, and perhaps stronger, rebuttal to the argument as to why the dormant foreign affairs doctrine was not relied
upon by the Supreme Court until 1968. As discussed in the introduction, state involvement in foreign affairs has only existed to a significant degree in the past five decades, or at the very least, it has been
more prevalent in the past five decades and increased throughout
115
this time period. There was no significant state involvement in foreign affairs prior to the second half of this century of the type that a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, involving purpose review as opposed to threshold effects or balancing tests, would capture. While
one can list numerous state measures throughout our nation’s history
116
that caused diplomatic protests, most of these measures did not carry the primary purpose of changing or criticizing foreign government
117
policies. State laws imposing a tax on the arrival of foreigners were

110

Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
Id. at 180.
112
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
113
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
825, 855–56 (2004).
114
331 U.S. 503, 516–17 (1947).
115
See also Kline, supra note 2, at 106–07; Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37.
116
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653–58.
117
See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 298 (1849).
111
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not enacted with the primary purpose to change or criticize the poli118
cies of foreign governments. The prosecution of a British agent for
119
murder in connection with the Caroline incident was not done with
the primary purpose of changing or criticizing the policies of the
120
British government.
Several Southern States in the early to mid1800s adopted Negro Seamen Acts, which required imprisonment of
121
While these acts caused “a persistent
black seamen upon arrival.
diplomatic embarrassment,” the changing of foreign government pol122
icies was not their primary purpose. Similarly, the primary purpose
of Anti-Alien Acts passed by the states in the late 1800s and early
1900s, at least those that did not single out aliens from particular na123
tions, was not intended to change foreign government policies.
124
State Buy-American Procurement Laws enacted in the 1930s similarly did not have the primary purpose of changing foreign government policies; rather, these laws were meant to protect in-state and
125
U.S. industries. Thus, few, if any, historical examples pointed to by
scholars are glaring examples of the absence of a dormant foreign af126
fairs doctrine because such claims were not even made in these cases. They simply did not deal with state actions whose primary purpose was to change or criticize the policies of foreign governments.
The absence of dormant-foreign-affairs-doctrine-styled-claims in these
early cases might simply indicate that federal “exclusive” powers over
118

See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 54 n.115
(2005) (“measure aimed at deterring the indigent”).
119
See People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
120
See Impunity of Agents in International Law, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, September 22, 1993, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v05i2a10p_0001.htm (indicating the United
States ultimately viewed the Caroline incident as a public sovereign act and thus immune but that New York State considered it an act of an individual for murder rather
than an act of the British government and thus, rejected the habeas petition of the
British agent).
121
See The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102, 1103 (D. Mass. 1844).
122
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833, 1873–77 (1993) (sparked by fears of insurrection if black seamen were allowed “to wander at liberty”).
123
See Nicholas Montario, The Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 176–77 (2007) (stating that anti-alien fervor behind
laws was due to job concerns not changing foreign government policies).
124
See James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Conformance with the
Standards of the GATT Procurement Code, 13 U. PENN. J. INT’L BUS. L. 57, 71 (1991).
125
See id.; see also Lawrence Hughes, Buy North American: A Revision to FTA Buy
America Requirements, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 207, 208 (1995) (asserting the purpose of the
Buy America Acts was “to require the federal government to spend taxpayers’ dollars
only on goods produced in the United States”).
126
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653.
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foreign affairs only prohibited state actions with a primary foreign
policy purpose rather than actions having a direct and significant impact on U.S. foreign relations. Additionally, it might indicate that
lawyers were comfortable with the strength of their other claims,
preemption or otherwise.
To be fair, there are examples of state laws enacted prior to the
1960s that involved a primary purpose to change or criticize foreign
government policies. For example, states passed what are commonly
referred to as “sense of the legislature” resolutions on foreign affairs
127
issues as early as the turn of the Nineteenth Century.
These types
of resolutions, however, are not necessarily captured by the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose standard of review, as will be
128
discussed below.
Additionally, the states enacted reciprocity statutes addressing inheritance matters in the 1940s that only allowed an
alien to inherit property in a state if the alien’s home nation allowed
129
U.S. citizens to inherit property. Such statutes arguably have as one
130
of their purposes the changing of foreign government policies. Supreme Court precedent, however, has upheld such statutes, at least
131
with respect to facial challenges, and a purpose-review test can be
respectful of prior precedent in this regard. For instance, it can be
plausibly argued that such statutes do not seek to change foreign
government policy but have as their primary purpose reciprocity (or
equal treatment) in and of itself. Thus, one need not draw the inference that the doctrine is of questionable validity because these state
actions causing diplomatic controversy occurred throughout our nation’s history without plaintiffs challenging such actions under a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Instead, one might reasonably conclude that this history simply
suggests that the scope of the doctrine is limited to those actions that
have a foreign policy purpose. Indeed, under this reading of history
and law, it is unsurprising that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
was not formally relied upon until the 1960s. Significant state actions
with a foreign policy purpose began around this time. For instance,
127

See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 264–65
(1922).
128
See infra Part IV.
129
See generally Note, Reciprocal Inheritance Statutes and Federal Powers, 56 YALE L.J.
150 (1946) (describing 1940s state statutes regarding non-resident property acquisition and the subsequent court challenges).
130
See Moore, supra note 27, at 309 (noting an additional purpose of state statute’s
of this type during this time frame may have been to keep property out of enemy
hands during World War II).
131
See infra Part IV.B.
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in 1963, Florida enacted a law that prohibited the issuance of fishing
licenses for fishing in the territorial waters of the state to any vessel
owned by a foreign state, or national thereof, which subscribed to
132
communism.
Other states enacted statutes discriminating against
133
goods from communist countries around this time.
IV. DOCTRINAL TEST UNDER THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE: MAKE IT PURPOSE REVIEW
While the existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is wellfounded in modes of constitutional interpretation, “scholars and
judges have continued to puzzle over [Zschernig’s] reasoning and
scope, and, in particular, over precisely where and how the courts
should draw the line between constitutionally permissible and prohi134
bited state and local action.”
While the starting point in any examination of the test to be adopted under the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine is the Zschernig case, that case can only be understood (or at
135
least is best understood) in the context of Clark v. Allen, a 1947 U.S.
Supreme Court case analyzing a similar state statute twenty-one years
136
prior to Zschernig, and Hines v. Davidowitz, a 1941 case in which the
Supreme Court flirted with establishing a dormant foreign affairs
137
doctrine rationale. Zschernig borrowed its most often cited test from
138
the Clark opinion and approvingly cited to Hines.
A. Hines v. Davidowitz
In the foreign affairs field, at least as broadly defined since it
might also be considered to fall in the immigration field, the most
139
well-known pre-Crosby preemption case is Hines v Davidowitz. Hines
140
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act. The
132
Enforcement of the Florida statute by state authorities against Cuban fisherman created a significant international incident. Cuba raised the issue at the United
Nations and cut off the water supply to the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay. See
Moore, supra note 27, at 312–14 (discussing the statute, enforcement of statute, and
international repercussions of enforcement).
133
See, e.g., Gustavo Otalvora, Note, From Stalin to Bin Laden: Comparing Yesteryear’s
Anti-Communist Statutes with the Public Employer Provision of the Ohio Patriot Act, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1303, 1318–20 (2010).
134
Bilder, supra note 34, at 825–26.
135
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
136
312 U.S. 52 (1912).
137
See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649.
138
Zschernig, 398 U.S. at 432–33.
139
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
140
Id. at 59.
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Court in Hines came close to grounding its opinion in a dormant foreign affairs doctrine, although the Court’s holding is ultimately based
on preemption analysis.
It is important to ask what we should make of the Court’s “flirta141
tion” with the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. At various points in
its opinion, the Court indicated that foreign affairs powers were ex142
clusive to the federal government. For instance, it stated that “our
system of government is such that the interests of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interests of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting
143
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”
In
other portions of its opinion, the Court merely refers to the “supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, includ144
ing power over immigration, naturalization and deportation.” The
Court also stated:
Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest limits . . . . [O]ur conclusion is that appellee is correct in
his contention that the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously existing concurrent power of the state and nation, but that whatever
145
power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.

Even this statement indicates a large measure of exclusivity in foreign
relations. Later in its opinion, the Court again hedged on whether a
dormant limitation was at issue: “And whether or not registration of
aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one
uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might
146
validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.”
Ultimately, the failure of the Court to adopt a dormant foreign
affairs doctrine rationale does not damage the support for such a
doctrine in this article because the law at issue in Hines would not run
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine when employing purpose review. Additionally, Hines might be best thought of as an immigration case rather than a foreign affairs related case.

141
See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649 (“However, even in Hines, the Court discussed at length the federal foreign affairs powers and flirted with the dormant foreign affairs analysis.”).
142
Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
145
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
146
Id. at 73.
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B. Clark v. Allen
147

In Clark v. Allen, the California statute at issue provided that a
non-resident alien could inherit real or personal property within California “under the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens
of the United States” only if U.S. citizens enjoyed a reciprocal right to
inherit such property as residents and citizens of the alien’s country
148
of inhabitance.
In enacting the statute, the California Legislature
stated:
Because the foreign governments guilty of [confiscating inheritances of U.S. citizens] constitute[d] a direct threat to the Government of the United States, it [was] immediately necessary that
the property and money of citizens dying in [the United States]
should remain in the [United States] and not be sent to such foreign countries to be used for the purposes of waging a war that
eventually may be directed against the Government of the United
149
States.

The federal Trading with the Enemy Act would have prevented the
proceeds of any inheritance going to countries with which the United
150
States was at war. The district court struck down the California law
on two separate grounds: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and
“occupation of the field” preemption by the Trading with the Enemy
151
Act. In the portion of its opinion dealing with the exclusive federal
power over foreign relations, the district court seemed to hinge its
decision on the purpose of the statute—in other words, the goal
152
sought to be achieved by the statute.
The court noted the “ex153
The
pressed design was to fix a policy of international relations.”
district court did not examine any actual effects of the statute on foreign countries or U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it noted that “if the limitation of the powers of the state were not sustained in principle,
evils now incapable of definition, would result from state entry into
154
the Federal field.”

147

331 U.S. 503 (1947).
Law of July 1, 1941, CAL. PROB. CODE, §§ 259, 259.1, 259.2, invalidated by Clark,
331 U.S. at 517.
149
Id. at § 259.2 (as reprinted in Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850, 853 (N.D. Cal.
1943)).
150
See 50 U.S.C. § 616 (2006).
151
Crowley, 52 F. Supp. at 854.
152
Id. at 853.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 855.
148
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
respondents seemed to argue for a dormant “war powers” doctrine
156
rather than a more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Specifically, the respondents argued that the Constitution had granted
the federal government the right to capture enemy property and that
157
the California statute interfered with this exclusive power.
The
Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the respondents’ argument as illogi158
If the California statute were valid in denying the property
cal.
rights through inheritance, then the property was not enemy proper159
ty but property of California.
The Ninth Circuit also worried that
the war powers of the federal government could affect “almost every
160
field of private right on the basis of necessity.”
If this great reservoir of Federal power is ipso facto a denial of any
power to the States in that reservoir, whether or not a war is being
waged or such powers are being exercised, then the power of the
161
states is thrown into the utmost uncertainty and confusion.

Such a statement certainly calls into question the existence of a
broader dormant foreign affairs doctrine. It is not necessarily the
case, however, that dormant prohibitions on the states are completely
co-extensive with federal powers to affirmatively act. Dormant Com162
merce Clause jurisprudence clearly speaks to this point. Additionally, the cases that the Ninth Circuit cited in support of its statement
that the federal government under its war powers could affect “almost every field of private right on the basis of necessity” have since
163
been discredited.
The Supreme Court partially overturned the Ninth Circuit’s de164
The Supreme Court found that the California statute was
cision.
preempted with respect to real property by the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights between Germany and the United
155

Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, 663 (9th Cir. 1946).
Id. at 659.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 660.
161
Allen, 156 F.2d at 660.
162
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422–23 (1946); Richard A.
Paschal, Congressional Power to Change Constitutional Law: Three Lacunae, 77 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1053, 1124 (2009).
163
Allen, 156 F.2d at 660. For instance, the Allen court cited Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which has generally been discredited by commentators.
Id.
164
Clark v. Arizona, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
156
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165

States. With respect to personal property, the California statute was
valid because it was not an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into
166
the field of foreign affairs. After noting that the state measure was
not preempted and did not violate a specific provision of the Constitution, the Court stated: “What California has done will have some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of
167
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line.”
Thus, Clark indicates that there is a “forbidden line” preventing a
state’s intrusion into foreign affairs. It also suggests that this line
might be drawn by determining whether the state law only has an “in168
cidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.”
While the Court
spent little time in its opinion justifying or considering this test, it unfortunately has assumed great importance in later cases. Because the
Court gave such short treatment to its dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis, one would hope the statement would not forever foreclose the adoption of other, or at least additional, tests by the Court.
Admittedly, the Clark Court had an opportunity to adopt a purposereview standard. Petitioners argued that reciprocity statutes were “in
substance invitations to foreign countries to trade inheritance rights
abroad for inheritance rights in these states” and thus infringed the
169
federal government’s sole negotiating authority.
Indeed, this ar170
gument seems most akin to a dormant Treaty Clause argument.
Most of the petitioners’ argument, however, focused on the effect of
such statutes on foreign relations, rather than the purposes of the
171
law.
Respondents’ argument also focused primarily on the effects
test and laid out the test that Justice Douglas ultimately incorporated
172
into his opinion. Specifically, the respondents argued that it would
be a novel and startling proposition to rule that a state statute “is
invalid merely because that state action has some incidental or indi173
rect effect in foreign countries.”

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 517.
Id. at 516–18.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Brief of Petitioner at 70, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1138.
Brief for the Petitioner at 72–73, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
Brief for Respondents at 63–64, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
Id. at 59.
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C. Zschernig v. Miller
Zschernig v. Miller came before the Supreme Court twenty-one
174
years after Clark v. Allen. Zschernig, like Clark, dealt with an inherit175
ance reciprocity statute. The Oregon statute at issue also contained
two additional criteria beyond reciprocity in order for a non-resident
alien to inherit real or personal property: (1) “the right of U.S. citizens to receive payment here in the United States of funds from estates in the foreign country;” and (2) “the right of non-resident aliens
176
to receive proceeds of Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’” The
statute was not challenged on its face, although these two additional
criteria may have made the statute distinguishable from the one in
177
Clark, particularly if the Court had adopted a purpose-review test.
178
Instead, the statute was challenged as applied.
The Court stated
that the statute at issue in Clark involved the state probate courts in
179
“no more than a routine reading of foreign laws.” The Court, however, found in the application of the Oregon statute and in the “reciprocity area under inheritance statutes” generally, that:
the probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into
the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations—whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights,
whether the so-called “rights” are merely dispensations turning
upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the
representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives
of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether
there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign sys180
tem of law any element of confiscation.

The Court struck down the Oregon statute as applied, finding that it
had “more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun181
tries.’” Before turning to the Court’s elaboration of a doctrinal test,
it is important to realize that the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice
Douglas, was grounded in dormant foreign affairs doctrine, rather
than preemption analysis:
174

389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 430.
176
ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
177
The reason for this is that only communist countries would subject proceeds to
confiscation (although other countries may have subjected proceeds to high taxes).
Thus, the statute can be viewed as seeking to change communist governments’ behavior with respect to treatment of the proceeds. See supra Part IV.B.
178
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
179
Id. at 433.
180
Id. at 432–33.
181
Id. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
175
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[W]e conclude that the history and operation of this Oregon statute make clear that [the statute] is an intrusion by the State into
the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress. . . . The several States, of course, have
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates.
But those regulations must give way if they impair the effective
exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy. . . . Where those laws conflict with a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy. . . .
Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb for182
eign relations.

The Court did not find the Oregon statute preempted by treaty or by
legislation but nonetheless invalidated it for disturbing foreign rela183
tions.
With regard to the doctrinal test elaborated by the Court for the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, one can discern numerous possible
tests from Justice Douglas’s Zschernig opinion, beyond the “more than
184
some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.” These tests
include:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

182

Does the state action have a “great potential for disruption”
of U.S. foreign relations or “embarrassment” to the United
185
States or a foreign country?
Does the state action “affect[] international relations in a
186
persistent and subtle way”?
Does the state action have a “direct impact upon foreign relations” and might it “adversely affect the power of the cen187
tral government to deal with [foreign affairs] problems”?
Does the state action “impair the effective exercise of the Na188
tion’s foreign policy”?
Does the state action threaten to create an international con189
troversy or retaliation?

Id. at 432, 440, 441.
Id. at 441.
184
Clark, 331 U.S. at 517; see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (explaining how the
California statute at issue in Clark would have only “some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries”).
185
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
186
Id. at 440.
187
Id. at 441.
188
Id. at 440.
189
Id. at 441 (“Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign
relations. . . . Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest
moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to
another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
183
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Each of these tests laid out in Justice Douglas’s opinion appears
to focus on the impact or effects of a particular state action, rather
than the purpose of the state law. The Court’s opinion, however, also
gives some credence to the establishment of a purpose-based test.
Justice Douglas stated that “[a]s one reads the Oregon decisions, it
seems that foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the
190
‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata” and that the California decisions “radiate some of the attitudes of the ‘cold war,’
where the search is for the ‘democracy quotient’ of a foreign re191
gime.” These statements indicate the Court’s concern that the statutes as applied served a foreign policy purpose. Importantly, the
Court specifically pointed out that although the district court in Clark
had found the statute at issue unconstitutional based upon its purpose, that unconstitutional purpose was not argued before it in
192
Clark. As discussed above, this is largely true; the briefs in Clark focused almost exclusively on effects rather than purpose, and to the
extent that purpose was argued, the argument focused on implied
negotiations with foreign countries or something more akin to a
193
dormant Treaty Clause.
The Court noted that in Clark the statute
was only challenged on its face and at that time it had “no reason to
suspect that the California statute in Clark was to be applied as anything other than a general reciprocity provision requiring just match194
ing of laws.” Additionally, Justice Douglas stated: “The Oregon law
does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if each State,
speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own
195
foreign policy.”
Thus, it is possible to read Zschernig as striking
down the statute as applied for a foreign policy purpose as well.
The fact that one finds at least some support for purpose review
is not a surprise when one examines the parties’ arguments in Zschernig, as well as a little known dissent by Justice Douglas, the author of
both Zschernig and Clark, in the intervening period. The heirs of the
estate at issue in Zschernig argued threshold effects, relying on Clark v.
196
Allen.
The State of Oregon’s brief found the threshold-effects test
comfortable terrain upon which to defend the state law, arguing that
the heirs could only speculate as to such effects and that the U.S. So190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at 437.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 433, n.5.
See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433, n.5.
Id. at 441.
Brief for Appellants at 58–62, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No 21).
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licitor General had confirmed the State Department’s view that such
197
statutes did not interfere with foreign relations. Only in their reply
brief did the heirs finally argue for a purpose-based standard of review, arguing that the purpose of the law was the same as the purpose
of the California law at issue in Clark, namely to prevent funds from
going to unfriendly nations (and thus, by denying such funds, seeking to change the behavior of those nations)—the same purpose the
district court in Clark had relied upon in invalidating California’s re198
ciprocity statute.
Oregon’s additional statutory conditions, including proving that proceeds of an estate would not be subject to confiscation, would only have provided further proof of this legislative
199
purpose.
The heirs’ reply brief also pointed to Justice Douglas’s
dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, on the basis of a
200
lack of a federal question, in the 1962 case of Ioannou v. New York.
Ioannou concerned a New York State Court of Appeals ruling
upholding the application of a New York law calling for the escheat
to the state of any estate in which the assignee would not have the
201
benefit or use of the proceeds. The statute was applied to prevent a
Czech beneficiary of an estate from giving her interest as a gift to her
202
In dissent, Justice Douglas indicated that a forniece in London.
eign policy purpose would be enough to invalidate the New York statute and its application to the Czech heir:
The issue is of importance to our foreign relations and I think
this Court should decide whether, under existing federal policy
and practice, the New York statute should be given effect. . . . We
should note jurisdiction and ask the Solicitor General to file a
brief.
. . . If New York’s purpose is to preclude unfriendly foreign
governments from obtaining funds that will assist their efforts
hostile to this Nation’s interests[,] . . . the complete prohibition of
assignments made in those countries may have some basis in reason. But, if this is the purpose behind the statute, it seemingly is
203
an attempt to regulate foreign affairs.

197

Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434.
Brief in response to Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon, and Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–6, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429
(1968) (No 21).
199
Id. at 5–6.
200
Id. at 3. Ioannou is located at 371 U.S. 30 (1964).
201
Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 30 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
202
Id. at 34.
203
Id. at 32–34 (citations omitted).
198
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To be fair, Douglas’s dissent in Ioannou also laid out several additional effects-based tests that were later utilized in his Zschernig opinion: “The present restraints are not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain as those others would be. Yet they affect international
204
relations in a persistent and subtle way.” Nonetheless, there is little
doubt that Douglas’s opinion in Zschernig can be read to at least support purpose review as an additional test.
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Zschernig, joined by Justice Brennan, also displays a clear reliance on dormant foreign affairs
205
power doctrine rather than preemption analysis. Additionally, the
opinion lends support to purpose review because it places emphasis
206
on the evaluation and disapproval of foreign government policies.
Indeed, Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan would have struck down
the Oregon statute on its face, rather than only as applied:
All three [conditions in the Oregon statute] launch the State
upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal
competence. Any realistic attempt to apply any of the three criteria would necessarily involve the Oregon courts in an evaluation,
either expressed or implied, of the administration of foreign law,
the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of
foreign governments. Of course, state courts must routinely construe foreign law in the resolution of controversies properly before them, but here the courts of Oregon are thrust into these inquiries only because the Oregon Legislature has framed its
inheritance laws to the prejudice of nations whose policies it disapproves,
and thus has trespassed upon an area where the Constitution contemplates that only the National Government shall operate. For
local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are
but one people, one nation, one power. Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no
less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign re207
lations be left entirely free from local interference.

Thus, Justice Stewart’s concurrence makes clear that the realm
of foreign affairs is exclusively federal, and the Justices subscribing to
Justice Stewart’s opinion read Hines as well as earlier cases to establish
this federal exclusivity.

204
205
206
207

Id. at 32.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442–43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Not all of the justices agreed with the use of this doctrine. Justice Harlan’s concurrence expressed concern over the dormant for208
eign affairs doctrine grounds relied upon by the other six Justices.
Although he concurred in the result, he would only have struck down
the statute for its conflict with the treaty between Germany and the
209
United States.
D. Assessing the Possible Doctrinal Tests
1.

Threshold-Effects Test

As discussed above, the threshold-effects test draws significant
210
support from the language of Zschernig.
The Court, however, borrowed the “more than incidental and indirect effects” test from suggestions in Clark, and Clark’s purported adoption of the test was
somewhat accidental, given the arguments the parties made before
211
the Court.
Yet there are much stronger reasons for rejecting this
test than the fact that it has its origins in Clark.
First, a threshold-effects test does not suit courts particularly
212
well.
Are courts particularly adept at assessing the impact a state
measure will have on a foreign country or on U.S. foreign policy?
Certainly, a court can hear evidence on the impact in a foreign country. As to the impact on U.S. foreign policy, it seems that courts are
less adept at making such determinations than the federal govern213
ment. The courts, however, have feared that deferring to executive
branch views in amicus briefs would leave the fate of litigants solely in
the hands of the executive branch and injure the independence of
214
the judiciary. There are historical examples in the foreign relations
arena that warrant skepticism of the executive branch’s ability to independently apply a legal test—in this instance, a threshold-effects
test—in a consistent and apolitical fashion. For example, one reason
that immunity decisions regarding foreign governments were taken
208

Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 449.
210
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
212
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1699–1702; Swaine, supra note 88, at 1151–53.
213
This is true for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the executive
branch is in constant communication with foreign governments, through U.S. Embassies abroad, and has a continuous flow of intelligence information, some of which
would not be accessible to a court.
214
See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(suggesting resolution of fundamental constitutional issues cannot depend on “shifting winds” of the executive branch).
209
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out of the hands of the executive branch and placed in the hands of
the courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was the inconsistent results that occurred when courts essentially entrusted the
executive branch with application of the restrictive theory of immuni215
ty.
Courts could also seek guidance in the amicus briefs of foreign
governments that claim damaging effects on relations with the United States as a result of a state measure, or rely on evidence of actual
retaliatory measures by foreign governments, or even rely on cases
brought against the U.S. government in international tribunals, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO). But this would place the
resolution of the constitutional issue in the hands of foreign governments, a far more unacceptable result than leaving it in the hands of
216
the executive branch.
Even if courts resist suggestions in amicus briefs, it is likely that
inconsistent results will arise among lower courts considering similar
217
measures.
For example, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, a California state court struck down the California “Buy America” Act as having more than some incidental or indirect effect on
218
U.S. foreign relations under Zschernig. Conversely, in KSB Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a similar New Jersey statute, finding that
the statute did not have more than some incidental or indirect ef219
fect. The KSB Technical Sales court did note that the New Jersey statute had exceptions if domestic materials would unreasonably raise
220
costs or their purchase was otherwise impracticable.
Second, there is a potential problem with equity between the
states. If the test adopted is concerned with effect on a foreign country or foreign affairs, then a measure by Wyoming, North Dakota, or
New Hampshire is more likely to be upheld, because it is less likely to
have an effect on a foreign nation or U.S. foreign relations, than a

215

See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIAL 74-77 (3rd ed. 2009).
216
See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1153 (expressing concern over giving foreign governments a “heckler’s veto”).
217
Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969), with Trojan Techs. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913–14 (3d
Cir. 1990), and K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n,
381 A.2d 774, 784 (N.J. 1977).
218
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d at 229.
219
381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
220
Id. at 784.
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221

measure undertaken by California, New York, or Massachusetts.
This seems rather unfair and indeed almost ironic. Wyoming might
be able to enact a law sanctioning Burma’s government while California, a much larger economic actor in the world, may be denied
the ability to do so.
Third, and somewhat related, the question arises whether the
impact of each state’s measure should be examined individually or in
the aggregate. If a court only examines the impact of each state’s
measure individually, a situation would exist where, for example,
twenty states have enacted measures that are together creating an
enormous interference with U.S. foreign policy but no single meas222
ure has a “more than indirect effect.”
Additionally, the potential
inequities between large and small states would need to be addressed.
It seems that a court must aggregate the incidence of all state practices. Indeed, there is some support in Zschernig for cumulating the to223
tal incidence of a particular action taken by several states. A court,
however, would also need to go further. It would need to assess a
particular state’s foreign policy measure based on the assumption
that all fifty states enacted similar measures, whether or not other
states actually have such measures in place at the time of the challenge. Otherwise, the validity of a state’s measure will depend on
how many other similar state measures are in place at time of the litigation. For example, if a particular state enacts a Burma law similar
to Massachusetts and it is challenged in court under a thresholdeffects test, then a court unconcerned with accumulation could find
the statute does not create sufficient effects on Burma or U.S. foreign
policy to invalidate it. If in the next six to twelve months, twenty or
thirty other states enact such measures, then a new challenge to that
state’s Burma statute leads to a different result. Ultimately, however,

221
See, e.g., Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 158 n.146 (discussing
how immigration measures by those states with large alien populations are more subject to invalidation under a foreign affairs rationale because measures by those states
are more likely to cause foreign policy effects).
222
See Peter J. Spiro, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 825 (1986) [hereinafter Spiro, State
and Local] (indicating that this would have been the case if state sanctions against
South Africa were analyzed in such a fashion in the 1980s).
223
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 438 n.8 (1968); see also NFTC v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38, 53–54 (1st Cir. 1999); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT’L L. J. 443, 458 (1998)
(“[C]onsideration should also be given to the cumulative effect that a multiplicity of
such laws would have on the ability of the federal government to conduct a coherent
foreign policy.”).
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even hypothetical accumulation fails to cure the significant problems
with a threshold-effects test.
Fourth, a threshold-effects test provides little useful guidance to
state officials. State officials, much like courts, will be hard-pressed to
assess the potential impact of their actions on foreign governments or
U.S. foreign relations, let alone assess the impact of their measure in
combination with other states, real or hypothetical. Moreover, they
will face political pressures to conclude that their actions only cause
an “indirect effect” on U.S. foreign relations.
Finally, a threshold-effects test is potentially more threatening to
224
state regulation in traditional areas, such as criminal law, and potentially less respectful of federal government views on whether certain international obligations (i.e., treaty obligations) should be selfexecuting than a purpose-based test. There is, of course, some irony
here given that respect for traditional areas of state regulation, such
as testamentary disposition, was one of the reasons that a thresholdeffects test was argued for by state entities in their briefs before the
225
Supreme Court in the Clark and Zschernig cases.
Part of the problem is that many additional areas of regulation have become of interest to foreign nations in their relationship with the United States in
226
the post-WWII era.
For example, imposition of the death penalty
227
by U.S. states leads to constant diplomatic protests by other nations,
and thus one could envision an argument that such statutes have
more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign relations. But one could hardly make the argument that the primary
purpose of death penalty statutes is to change or criticize the behavior or policy of a foreign government, and thus such laws are not at
risk under a purpose-based test.
Similarly, state court unwillingness to implement a World Court
ruling requiring “review and reconsideration” by state judicial bodies
of convictions and sentences of foreign nationals not read their consular notification rights at the time of arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, has arguably caused more
than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign relations—as
evidenced by the World Court cases and diplomatic protests against
224

See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1711.
See Brief for the Respondent at 56–57, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No.
626); Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon at 7–11, Zschernig v. Miller, 390
U.S. 974 (1968) (No. 21).
226
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671.
227
See, e.g., Arizona Executes German Killer Pleas for Clemency Unheeded as State Uses Gas
Chamber, KAN. CITY STAR, March 4, 1999, at A3.
225
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228

such failures. The Supreme Court, however, in a 2008 case, Medellin v. Texas, found that World Court rulings are non-self-executing
(thus not a part of domestic law), and accordingly, they do not bind
state courts nor do they preempt state procedural default doctrine
229
rules.
The Medellin Court even found Presidential attempts to implement the World Court rulings by memorandum invalid given Se230
nate intent that such rulings be non-self-executing. If one made a
Zschernig-based argument using a threshold-effects test, such state
court activity could be ruled unconstitutional given the number of international disputes and diplomatic protests concerning the application of state procedural default doctrines in such circumstances. This
would lead to a result contrary to that which the legislative branch
desired.
2.

Balancing

Several scholars, analogizing the dormant foreign affairs doctrine to the dormant Commerce Clause, have proposed a balancing
test that would weigh the impact that a state’s measure has on foreign
relations (or a foreign country) against the state’s interest in the
231
measure. There is, of course, a question whether the balancing that
occurs under the dormant Commerce Clause is mere window dress232
ing for purpose-review. Indeed, other scholars surmised shortly after Zschernig that balancing is what courts would ultimately lean to233
But such a proposal has many flaws both as a descriptive
ward.
matter of what courts are doing and as a practical matter of what
courts should be doing under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
The Zschernig opinion lends no support to a balancing test. Moreover, a lower court proposed a balancing test on only one occasion,
and in that case the court never actually engaged in balancing be234
cause it found no effect on foreign affairs. Thus, courts have almost
228

See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) (finding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear claim
against the United States and that Mexican nationals in U.S. Custody were entitled to
review of their convictions); see also supra note 227.
229
552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008).
230
Id. at 530.
231
See Lewis, supra note 5, at 501; see also McRoberts, supra note 27, at 651 (applying balancing test after first asking whether primary purpose was to influence foreign
government conduct).
232
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1217.
233
See Henkin, supra note 12, at 164 (questioning also the need for the doctrine
altogether).
234
See State v. Bundrat, 546 P.2d 530, 542 (Ala. 1976).
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uniformly rejected the adoption of a balancing test. The rejection of
balancing by courts is appropriate since such a doctrinal test leads to
even greater problems than a threshold-effects test.
First, the Court, Justice Scalia in particular, has criticized balancing in the dormant Commerce Clause context, primarily because it
235
can lead to uncertain results. If one wonders about a court’s ability
to discern the appropriate line in a threshold-effects test, then one
can be truly skeptical of a court’s ability to balance the effect of a
state action on U.S. foreign policy or a foreign country with the right
of states to regulate matters of traditional state concern (e.g., inheritance or achievement of a legitimate local purpose). The question
whether courts have the competence to properly balance becomes
even greater when one considers that in numerous cases the constraint will be interpreted by state legislators themselves. Balancing,
like a threshold-effects test, simply does not give state legislators sufficient guidance regarding their conduct.
Second, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part V of this Article, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is analogous only to the extra “one voice” prong of analysis under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, as opposed to the facial discrimination and balancing
236
tests that occur prior to the “one voice” prong. In Japan Line, Ltd. v.
Los Angeles County, the Supreme Court identified two additional
prongs of analysis to undertake when a state tax affects foreign com237
merce as opposed to interstate commerce. First, the Court needs to
238
consider whether the state tax creates a risk of multiple taxation.
Second, the Court queries whether the state tax interferes with an
239
Some, including the
area where federal uniformity is essential.
Court itself, have termed this second prong the “speak with one
voice” test since the prong is often paraphrased as a question of
whether the state tax prevents the federal government from speaking

235
See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming that balancing the importance of the state interest against the degree of impairment to commerce is “weighing the imponderable”); see also Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that balancing leads to unpredictable results).
236
See infra Part V.
237
441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 448.
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240

with one voice. The dormant foreign affairs doctrine has been de241
scribed in terms similar to this second prong in Japan Line.
While differences and similarities between the extra prongs of
analysis under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the dor242
mant foreign affairs doctrine will be explored further below, the
crucial point here is that the Court has utilized these additional
prongs after finding a state tax would satisfy the test for the dormant
interstate Commerce Clause. Thus, the extra tests are separate from
the normal test for interstate commerce and apparently are applied
243
after any balancing has taken place. Accordingly, the Court has at
least implicitly rejected any sort of balancing under the second prong
of the Japan Line test. Therefore, support for balancing under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is further weakened.
3.

Purpose Review

Purpose review is the best available means of assessing state ac244
Under purpose
tions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
240
See, e.g., id. at 449. See also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 186 (1983).
241
See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1637.
242
See discussion infra Part VI.
243
The Japan Line tests to date have only been applied by the Supreme Court to
state taxes and not state regulations, and the interstate Commerce Clause tests for
taxes do not involve balancing. But lower courts have applied the Japan Line additional tests even to regulations after engaging in facial discrimination and balancing
tests. See Piazza’s Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 2006);
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 1998).
244
Support for purpose review can be gleaned from the articles of several scholars
and practitioners, although these articles combine purpose review with other additional tests criticized in this Article or view purpose review as a second best option to
eliminating the doctrine altogether. Professor Fenton places the greatest emphasis
on purpose review of any commentator; however, he also places continued reliance
on asking whether the state action prevents the federal government from “speaking
with one voice,” a test which this Article criticizes. See Fenton, supra note 34, at 571.
Professor Goldsmith criticizes the existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine;
however, he admits that purpose review is most appropriate if the doctrine is to exist.
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 652. Similarly, McRoberts would initially review state
laws for a primary foreign policy purpose but would secondarily examine state laws
lacking such a purpose under a balancing test. See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652.
Professor Moore appears to argue for a purpose-based test that would invalidate state
laws having a foreign policy purpose but would also engage in a balancing test weighing a state law’s effect on international relations with a legitimate local purpose,
aruging at various points for a purpose test, balancing test or a combination of the
two. See Moore, supra note 27, at 289, 306, 311, 321. Daniel M. Price and John P.
Hannah argue that a primary purpose to “singl[e] out individual foreign regimes for
condemnation; and . . . coerce changes in their domestic policies” places a state law
“well within Zschernig’s zone of constitutional impermissibility.” Price & Hannah,
supra note 223, at 460. But at other times in their article, they seem to apply an ef-
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review, courts would ask if the primary purpose of the state law is to
change or criticize the policy of a foreign government or governments. This may strike some readers as strange at first glance—even
after reading concerns raised about a threshold-effects test and balancing—because of one of the central policy justifications for excluding states from foreign policy, and a concern that the Framers
focused upon, was that state foreign policy measures could have an
effect on a foreign country, or U.S. foreign policy towards that country, and this could lead to retaliation that might befall the country as
a whole. This seems to indicate that it is indeed the effects of the
state measure that should be the preeminent concern under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But courts cannot gauge well the
effects of a state action on the achievement of U.S foreign policy
245
goals and the potential for retaliation. The best independent indicator of a state measure’s effect that does not require a court to rely
on judgments of the executive branch or, more disturbingly, foreign
governments, is its purpose. Simply put, purpose is not entirely detached from effect. Purposes are important, at least in part, because
of the likely effects. A foreign country is much less likely to cooperate
with the United States or be more likely to institute retaliatory measures against state actions that have as their explicit purpose criticism
of that foreign country’s policies or the desire to change those policies.
Other questions or concerns regarding purpose review have
been raised, particularly in the context of the dormant Commerce
Clause. First, there is the worry of mixed purposes of a state measure
or that different legislators may have different motives for approving
a measure. For instance, the Massachusetts Burma law may have
been passed by some legislators to change human rights policies in
Burma and by others to increase their chances for reelection because
it was a popular measure that polls seemed to support. This last motivation is irrelevant. Many legislators may have the ultimate goal of
246
being reelected, but this is not the relevant motive or purpose. The
relevant purpose is the goal that the legislation is designed to accom247
Having eliminated the motive of increasing chances of reeplish.
lection, one would now have to decide whether the primary purpose

fects test. Id. at 463 (“Therefore, a reviewing court should consider [state laws for]
their potential cumulative impact on the federal government’s ability to conduct a
coherent foreign policy[,]” including by examining foreign diplomatic protests).
245
See discussion infra Part VII.
246
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1149, n.98.
247
See id. at 1142–51.
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of the Burma law was to change or criticize the behavior of the Burmese government.
The next concern raised with regard to purpose or motive review in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause is the problem
of “laundered legislative history” to disguise the legislature’s true
248
purpose.
This is less likely to happen in foreign affairs legislation
than in protectionist legislation, and it is surprising how many times
even a protectionist motive is revealed in the development of legisla249
tion. In the context of protectionism, legislators are sometimes anxious to reveal their purpose in order to obtain the maximum politi250
cal rewards for favoring domestic industry. Legislators, in general,
251
will be similarly anxious to reveal their foreign policy purpose. Indeed, the Massachusetts Burma law’s sponsor, state Rep. Byron Rushing, stated upon introduction of the bill:
The Commonwealth has a history of assisting fledgling, democratic movements throughout the world. Burma calls on our support
now. The new South Africa demonstrates that economic pressure
can be effective in moving governments away from oppression.
Continued pressure from Massachusetts is necessary to vigorously
252
combat well-documented repression and intolerance in Burma.

Assuming, however, that legislators attempt to hide their purpose,
they are unlikely to be successful, even if legislators launder the legislative history. A foreign policy purpose is more likely to be evident
from the face of the statute than a protectionist purpose. Often such
253
legislation singles out a particular foreign country.
Indeed, lower
courts applying a purpose-based test have highlighted the singling
out of a particular foreign nation as a key determinant of the state ac254
tion’s purpose. Some scholars have even declared that singling out
a foreign nation should be the sole test for reviewing state actions
248

See id. at 1239.
See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik, and the World Trade
Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 350 (2002) (discussing the
WTO Reformulate Gasoline case that “involved a ‘smoking gun’ in that an EPA official testifying before Congress admitted that they wanted to give domestic refiners a
break”).
250
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1156.
251
See Spiro, State and Local, supra note 222, at 822.
252
See Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 462.
253
See, e.g., Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1367–68 (D.N.M. 1980)
(singling out Iran); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(III. 1986) (singling out South Africa).
254
See, e.g., Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1371; see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503
N.E.2d at 307 (striking down state tax law that discriminated against South African
currency on state constitutional grounds for having a foreign affairs purpose).
249
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But using singling out
as the lone test may not be wise if a state targets, for example, a large
group of countries that maintain a particular policy such that singling
out loses meaning (e.g., one that targets all foreign nations placed on
a list by the U.S. Trade Representative as providing insufficient intellectual property protection or all foreign nations lacking a free trade
agreement with the United States). Additionally, one has to be careful that a singling-out test does not give blanket immunity to generally applicable or facially neutral laws (non-foreign affairs related laws)
that may be used in a particular case or applied in a manner that has
256
a primary foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, singling out will be
present in many cases, and therefore, even without legislative history,
the foreign policy purpose of a law can often be determined by reference to its text and structure. For example, one might compare a
generally applicable state tort law being applied in a manner that
causes foreign policy effects to a specific cause of action or an extension of an applicable statute of limitations that apply only with respect
to actions arising from certain historical occurrences such as WWII
forced labor or the “Armenian genocide.” The former type of law is
more likely to survive purpose review while the latter type of provision
is more likely to be found to have a foreign policy purpose—a primary motive of changing or criticizing the behavior of certain countries.
Legislators may also attempt to disguise their purpose as protecting the moral or psychological health of their constituents from
the damage that would be caused by procuring from (or investing in)
companies active in a country with a poor human rights record. But
courts have not accepted such arguments in the context of extraterritorial legislation and are unlikely to do so in the context of dormant
255

See Vasquez, supra note 15, at 1262.
For an example of a court checking to ensure a generally applicable statute is
not in fact being used to target a particular country, see North American Salt Co. v.
Ohio Department of Transportation, 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The
court found that the Ohio law and regulations
do not provide Ohio officials with an opportunity to treat foreign nations differently based upon the ideological bent of a nation’s government, or based upon any other factor. Rather, the provisions apply
equally to all foreign nations. Nor is there any evidence in the record
that suggests that these provisions have been selectively applied to
goods mined or produced in Canada. As a result, we are unable to find
that [the Ohio laws and regulations] have any more than an indirect or
incidental effect upon the nation’s foreign affairs.
Id. For those familiar with subsidy rules in the WTO system, one might wish to analogize to the concept of de facto specificity (e.g., where a subsidy is generally available under neutral criteria but only given to or utilized by selected companies or industries).
256
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257

foreign affairs doctrine decisions.
Admittedly, there will be close
calls, and states may make a significant attempt to hide purpose. For
example, one could envision a divestment statute that calls upon
fund administrators to divest from any excessively risky investments.
The fund administrator determines that companies active in a particular foreign country with a terrible record on human rights are particularly risky investments since they might become subject to consumer boycotts. Alternatively, those companies’ assets could be
viewed as particularly subject to political risk because, for example,
the regime may grow weary of a foreign presence. If the fund administrator only divests from companies active in that particular foreign
country, we may have a situation where it must be determined if the
divestment statute as applied runs afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with purpose review. It is, however, very likely that the
fund administrator will have a series of risk calculations and projections exclusively based on the financial impact of various investments
and thus be able to demonstrate alternative support for such a decision. The argument is not that there will never be close calls under a
purpose-based test but rather that close calls are likely to be less frequent than under the other tests.
Other concerns expressed with respect to purpose review in the
context of the dormant Commerce Clause are also likely to be less
prevalent with regard to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. For
example, it is hard to imagine a particular piece of legislation being
kept in place for a foreign policy purpose, although not originally
enacted for such a purpose, in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Similarly, it seems that judges should be less timid
about concluding that state legislators have enacted legislation (or
state executive branch officials have taken certain actions) for a for258
eign policy purpose than a protectionist purpose. A court finding
that a state has acted with a foreign policy purpose is less directly offensive to other states in the nation than a finding that the state acted
with a protectionist purpose.
Purpose review also fits the competence of judges better than
the other two tests in the context of foreign affairs. It is hard to argue
257
See Spiro, supra note 222, at 834 (claiming that recognition of a state’s moral
interest as legitimate in the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context would be
unprecedented). The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, did accept such an interest in its review of the City of Baltimore’s divestment statute in the mid-1980s. See
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 746 (Md.
1989).
258
See Regan, supra note 34, at 1215 (suggesting that courts are reluctant to find a
protectionist purpose).
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that U.S. judges are somehow less adept at fleshing out legislative
purpose vis-à-vis their counterparts in other nations. In both Australia and Canada, judges undertake the task of characterizing a particular law as one either dealing with foreign affairs or one dealing with a
259
matter of state or provincial concern.
A central consideration in
the characterization is the purpose of the law or, in other words, the
260
object the law seeks to achieve.
This is normal, everyday fare for
Australian and Canadian judges. U.S. judges are no less able to flesh
out purpose and do so in many contexts outside the dormant foreign
261
affairs doctrine.
Additionally, a purpose-based test is also likely to
achieve more consistent results among lower court judges and pro262
vide the best guidance to state government officials.
An examination of lower federal court and state court decisions
in the post-Zschernig (1968) and pre-Crosby (2001) era reveals a significant number of lower courts paying fealty to the threshold-effects
test but prominently adding purpose review as a sub-factor or an independent test as well. In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, the
federal district court for New Mexico considered a challenge to a
university board of regent’s ban on Iranian students enrolling during
263
the Iranian Hostages Crises.
The court struck down the board of
regent’s measure, in part relying on the ban’s purpose: “[The Board
of] Regents’ motion is directed at one nation, Iran. Their purpose
was to make a political statement about the hostage situation in Iran
264
and retaliate against Iranian nationals here.” In Springfield Rare Coin
Galleries v. Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a dormant
foreign affairs challenge to an Illinois law excluding the South African Krugerand from a tax exemption given to currency from every
265
other country.
In striking down the law, the court stated: “[I]n
both purpose and effect, the exclusion shares important attributes
with the various measures struck down in Zschernig [and post-Zschernig
lower court cases]. . . . In this case we hold only that disapproval of
the political and social policies of a foreign nation does not provide a
259

See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 15-7 to 15-10 (5th ed. 2007);
KEVEN BOOKER, ARTHUR GLASS & ROBERT WATT, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 50 (1994).
260
See HOGG, supra note 259, at 15-7 to 15-10; see BOOKER, supra note 259, at 50.
261
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1145.
262
On this latter point, see Regan, supra note 30, at 1146–47 (arguing that motive
review provides the best guidance to state legislators in the context of the dormant
Commerce Clause).
263
495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D.N.M. 1980).
264
Id. at 1379–80.
265
503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986).
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266

valid basis for a tax classification by this state.”
In National Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, the First Circuit invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that provided a negative ten percent preference in state pro267
curements against companies active in Burma. The court paid fealty to the threshold-effects test finding that “Zschernig stands for the
principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact
268
on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”
But the first
factor the court pointed to in finding the law had more than some
incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs was that the “design
and intent of the law [was] to affect the affairs of a foreign coun269
try.”
E. Is Purpose Review Too Weak, Too Strong or Just (About) Right (i.e.
Is Purpose Review Revolutionary in Its Consequences)?
One major concern with adopting purpose review to assess state
actions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is that it will capture too many state actions. In short, there is some concern that
purpose review is too harsh, particularly with respect to non-binding
resolutions. But purpose review allows state actions that affect foreign policy or foreign countries to escape condemnation provided
that the actions do not have a foreign policy purpose. Thus, some
might alternatively argue that this makes purpose review too weak for
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. In responding to arguments
that purpose review is either a too aggressive or too lenient test under
the doctrine, one must begin by again recognizing and acknowledging that purpose is linked to a certain extent with effects. Effects may
be a small part of the evidence assessed in searching for purpose.
Nonetheless, the text and structure of enactments will probably be
sufficient in most cases to assess purpose, particularly the singling out
a particular country or group of countries in the legislation or action.
As already mentioned, legislation passed with the purpose of changing or criticizing the policies of a foreign government is more likely
to have effects on U.S. foreign policy or foreign countries than some
measure whose primary purpose is not to change or criticize a foreign
270
government’s behavior.
In most cases where a foreign policy purpose is found, effects on U.S. foreign policy or the foreign country
will also be found.
266
267
268
269
270

Id.
181 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
See discussion supra Part IV.D.3.
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But what about cases in which purpose is present but substantial
effects are not, or a case where substantial effects are present but
purpose is not? As to the latter, which I would consider a rarer state
of affairs than the former, federal government preemption is always
available. Since it is rare, the “overburdened policing” concern is not
as significant. Additionally, the failure of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine to capture state actions in this category is not troublesome
because a state legislature is not likely to have any notice or reasonable means of assessing such effects in advance. As to the former category, where purpose is present but effects are not, a measure that is
essentially ineffectual will be involved, such as a non-binding resolution.
To further explore this problem, it is appropriate to contrast the
Massachusetts Burma law imposing a negative ten percent preference
in the procurement bidding process against companies active in
Burma with the following hypothetical non-binding resolution passed
by the Massachusetts legislature:
Be it resolved:
The state of Massachusetts deplores the human rights situation
in Burma. It believes sanctions should be imposed on the
SLORC.
This resolution shall be transmitted to U.S. representatives and
senators serving the state of Massachusetts by the Governor.

Under a threshold-effects test, a procurement sanctions law is
more likely to be invalidated than a non-binding resolution. Under
purpose review, it appears at first glance that both types of laws will be
held unconstitutional. It is important to remember, however, that
the primary purpose behind the law must be a foreign policy purpose; that is, a primary purpose to change or criticize the behavior or
a policy of a foreign nation.
It could be argued that the primary purpose behind the resolution is to voice the opinion of the Massachusetts State Legislature to
the federal government. Perhaps this is drawing too fine of a line,
particularly given that state laws sanctioning companies active (in
trade or investment terms) with a rogue foreign country ultimately
are designed to change or criticize the targeted government’s behavior. One could certainly argue that the ultimate purpose is to
change the policy of the Burmese government although the intermediate purpose is somewhat different— namely, to have the federal
government enact a stronger policy towards Burma. Similarly, state
and local actions such as naming a street after a famous dissident in a
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271

foreign country, or establishing sister state or sister city relation272
273
ships, or even sending humanitarian aid would all be upheld under a purpose-based test since one could likely successfully argue that
the primary purpose of such laws is not to change or criticize the policies or behavior of a foreign government. Street naming ordinances
recognize efforts of courageous individuals, sister city/state relationships primarily are intended to enhance cultural and economic ties
274
of private actors in the sister communities, and sending aid is humanitarian in nature with the purpose to alleviate suffering. If one is
dissatisfied with making these types of distinctions among purposes
or believes that deciding upon a primary purpose is simply too close
to call, then one could consider limiting the test in four other possible ways.
First, a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based
test can be respectful of historical practice. For example, there is significant historical support for allowing “sense of” resolutions since
such resolutions date at least as far back as the turn of the Nineteenth
275
Century.
Thus, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a pur271

See Opusunju v. Guliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
Petitioners have made no reasonable showing that the naming of the
street corner will have more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect,’ if
any, on foreign affairs, that would intrude unconstitutionally on the
exclusive federal powers of the United States . . . . The name ‘Kudirat
Abiola Corner’ honors and commemorates a slain Nigerian woman
whose husband, a dissident, is jailed in Nigeria. This cannot reasonably
be deemed to be New York City ‘establish[ing] its own foreign policy,’
as petitioners argue.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
272
See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 34, at 822 (noting that over 830 cities and municipal
governments have established sister-city relationships with over 1,270 cities in 90
countries).
273
In the 1980s, Burlington, Vermont sent 560 tons of humanitarian goods, including medicine, to its sister city in Nicaragua. See Michael Shuman, Dateline Mainstreet: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL’Y 154, 161 (1986-1987).
274
See, e.g., Fry, supra note 1, at 286; see also Kline, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that
in the 1980s, political objectives emerged in sister-city relationships established between U.S. cities and communities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Palestine).
275
For a brief description of similar “sense of” resolutions at the federal level, see
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS AND
PROVISIONS (April 20, 2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98825.pdf.
A “sense of” resolution is not legally binding because it is not presented
to the President for his signature. Even if a “sense of” provision is incorporated into a bill that becomes law, such provisions merely express
the opinion of Congress or the relevant chamber. They have no formal
effect on public policy and are not considered law.
Id. at 1. For examples of modern resolutions, see Robinson, supra note 74, at 707–09.
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pose-based test need not interfere with the transmission of views from
state governments to the federal government via non-binding resolu276
tion.
Although individual politicians could transmit such views,
277
there may be benefits to allowing formal transmission. It is, however, important to keep in mind that there are some state constitutional
and statutory restrictions on transmitting state or local views on for278
eign policy via referendum.
As another example, a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test, particularly one that
accounts for historical practice, need not threaten even the vast majority of state and local government agreements with foreign governments (national or sub-national), some 340 of them over the past fifty
279
years. Agreements between states and foreign governments, either
national or sub-national, creating detailed regulatory regimes to force
a change in foreign country practices by legally binding agreement
would be the most prominent agreements threatened by a purposebased test. Agreements meeting these criteria, however, are rare, and
Congress can use its power to grant approval to save them from the
280
dormant foreign affairs doctrine should it so desire.
Most of the
agreements between states and foreign or foreign sub-national governments simply create cooperation similar to a services contract

276

Indeed, such resolutions are unlikely to be challenged in the courts anyway.
See Judith Resnick, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 77–78
(2007).
While hortatory resolutions calling for federal legislation are unlikely
to be challenged or, if challenged, are likely to be protected by the
First Amendment, implementation efforts that impose obligations
would not be so shielded. But the courts cannot reach the question
without a challenger, and it is a pattern in the case law that most challenges arise because a local action affects the commercial interests of a
person or an entity, in some instances of a network of entities.
Id.
277
See Duchacek, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that sub-federal lobbying of federal
governments has always been consistent with both democratic and federal theory and
practice).
278
See, e.g., Brant v. Beermann, 350 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1984) (finding that an advisory vote placed should not be placed on the election ballot because it was merely an
expression of public opinion); Fossella v. Dinkins, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985) (affirming a decision to strike a referendum from a ballot, in part, because it was an indirect way to influence public opinion which is against state policy).
279
For an overview of these agreements, see Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010). Professor Hollis appears to prefer using a
reinvigorated Compact Clause to exert greater control over these state agreements
and activities than controlling them through a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Id.
at 769.
280
See discussion infra Part VII.
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(e.g., bridge building projects or fire fighting plans ), announce a
common position with information sharing or studies as a follow-up
(and therefore involve no criticism or change in behavior unless negotiated for prior to reaching the common position), or establish an
ongoing relationship (similar to sister city/sister state arrangements,
282
to advance trade, investment, and tourism opportunities).
Few of
these types of agreements would appear to involve a primary purpose
of the state to change or criticize the behavior of a foreign government, either national or sub-national. They are also unlikely to
create more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign
relations. Again, even if one finds these distinctions among purposes
too difficult or arbitrary, as with non-binding resolutions, the long
history of these (mostly) non-legally binding agreements can be respected when applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test could, of
course, remain a doctrinal tool used to ensure states do not become
overzealous in using these agreements in a manner deviating from
historical practice, although more robust regulation under the Com283
pact Clause may be preferable in any event.
A second way to possibly protect non-binding resolutions from a
purpose-based test would be to only capture state measures that employ traditional tools of foreign policy. Trade and investment sanctions legislation would clearly meet this “traditional tools” test. The
question is whether non-binding resolutions would be caught within
a “traditional tools” test. Diplomatic notes transmitted to a foreign
government or the support of non-binding resolutions within international organizations might be considered “traditional tools” of foreign policy. But internal resolutions of a federal agency, or congressional committee, or a political party’s platform are not tools of
foreign policy, and state resolutions are more analogous to such resolutions. Of course, state agreements with foreign governments, although mostly representing political commitments at best, would still
281
Agreements on bridge building and fire fighting cooperation have garnered
congressional approval. See Hollis, supra note 279, at 742 nn.10–12.
282
See id. at 755–56, 768–69 (listing the major types/categories of agreements and
noting such agreements are most commonly political commitments without legal effect or institutions).
283
See id. at 805 (admitting that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine “remains” a
control device “on the table” but preferring more robust regulation by federal actors
under the Compact Clause). It may well be that a reinvigorated Compact Clause is
the best way to treat state agreements with foreign governments (both national and
sub-national) given that we typically think that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
applies to activities beyond those express limitation on the states in Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution.

SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS

2/8/2011 3:50 PM

259

be captured under a “traditional tools” test. Moreover, problems with
a “traditional tools” test could arise because tools can change over
time, and lower courts struggled with the “traditional governmental
functions” test that was used in the context of limits on the scope of
the federal government’s Commerce Clause powers in the late 1970s
284
and early 1980s.
A third possibility to try to limit difficult determinations concerning a state action’s purpose through additional filters might be to
seek to limit only those state foreign policy measures having legal effect. This limitation, however, may be overly broad or too narrow
depending on how the force of law is defined. For instance, the hypothetical non-binding resolution above directs the governor to
transmit the message to the state’s representatives in Congress. It is
unclear whether this law binds the Governor and thus has legal force.
But if this provision were excluded, then there would be no legal effect present, and the issue could be easily avoided. This limiting factor would also be an alternative or additional way to ensure that the
vast majority of state agreements with foreign governments, either national or sub-national, are not implicated by the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Fourth, and finally, in employing a purpose-based test, courts
can be respectful of prior court precedent and rulings concerning
particular state laws. For example, as discussed earlier, pure reciprocity requirements have been upheld in a variety of contexts and one
could always argue the purpose of such reciprocity requirements is
just that—reciprocity—rather than an attempt to change or criticize
the behavior of the foreign government in failing to allow U.S. nationals to inherit property or engage in certain professions in the foreign country. At least three of these four refinements or additional
filters (historical practice, legal effect, and respect for precedent)
seem quite workable should courts struggle in close cases in determining a state action’s primary purpose.

284

See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849–52 (1976) (“We hold that
insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,
they are not within the authority granted Congress.”), overruled by San Antonio Metro. Auth. v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (“We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’ Any such rule leads to inconsistent results.”).
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V. A MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE DORMANT FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DOCTRINE?
The Supreme Court has recognized a market-participant excep285
tion to dormant Commerce Clause restraints on states. Specifically,
when a state acts as a market participant, rather than a market regula286
tor, it is exempted from the constraints of the doctrine. The exception primarily creates carve-outs for state purchases of goods and ser287
vices.
In the past several years, the Roberts’ Court has created an
additional “state self-promotion” exception that allows states to favor
an in-state public entity above both in-state and out-of-state private
entities, and three justices have indicated a willingness to expand the
market-participant exception to cases where state regulation is ac288
companied by state market participation.
The Court has never formally decided whether the marketparticipant exception applies to the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause much less the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The Court,
289
290
however, has strongly hinted, and several lower courts have held,

285
See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206–10
(1983) (“Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state,
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market.”); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (“Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting
as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.”); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807–10 (1976) (“Nothing in the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, form participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”).
286
See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439.
287
I will not address a separate exception under the dormant Commerce Clause
for direct payment subsidies in this Article. Certain direct subsidies, however, will
not survive dormant Commerce Clause challenge. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994) (holding that a direct payment subsidy to in-state
milk producers was invalid because it was funded through tax on all retail milk sold,
rather than general treasury funds).
288
See Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers May Take Us: The Future of the StateSelf-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 541
(2009) [hereinafter Coenen, United Haulers] (arguing that this new exception may
have significant consequences and application in various factual contexts); Dan T.
Coenen, The Supreme Court’s Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2009) [hereinafter
Coenen, Municipal Bond Decision] (arguing against any such expansion of the marketparticipant exception for fear it will undermine the purposes of dormant Commerce
Clause).
289
See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (involving
a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause challenge where the Court still examined the
state’s claim that it was a market participant not a market regulator, implying the exception would be available under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). Four
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that the exception should exist under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Such a holding is in fact necessary if courts are serious
about preserving the exception under the dormant interstate Commerce Clause. If the exception were not recognized in foreign commerce cases, its existence would risk obliteration. This is true because in a global economy most state actions affect both interstate
and foreign commerce. A state does not have to specifically target or
discriminate against foreign commerce in order to be subject to
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause constraints. Indeed, in SouthCentral Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court subjected a
state measure that de facto required in-state processing of raw logs
sold by the state to heightened scrutiny under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause because ten percent of the raw logs subject to the
291
de facto in-state processing requirement were bound for export.
Thus, this Article presumes that the market-participant exception does exist for the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Although, as will be explored later, such an exception should only apply to the facial discrimination and balancing tests of the dormant
292
Commerce Clause, and not the additional “one voice” prong.
An
analysis of the reasons for the market-participant exception in the
dormant Commerce Clause context indicates that such an exception
should not exist for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, in spite of a

years earlier, the Court expressly declined to rule on the issue. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at
439 n.9.
290
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750–
752 (Md. 1989) (holding that conditions enforced by the city did not “have a substantial regulatory effect outside of the market in which it is participating”); Carll v.
S.C. Jobs-Econ. Dev. Auth., 327 S.E.2d 331, 337 (S.C. 1985) (holding that “[t]he
Commerce Clause does not prohibit implementation of any portion of this Act because South Carolina is a market participant and is entitled to establish guidelines
for its participation regardless of the effect on interstate or foreign commerce”);
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (N.J.
1977) (upholding state “Buy American Act” under market-participant exception and
claiming it would be ironic to hold that as a state became less parochial vis-à-vis a
“buy New Jersey” act that a state law becomes invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause). Most commentators have argued that the exception should not apply in the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context. See McArdle, supra note 65, at 831;
Mendelson, supra note 5, at 89. As discussed below, I would find the exception does
apply but not to the second additional prong of analysis that occurs under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. See infra Part V. In essence, it is really the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, and thus should be subsumed within the doctrine.
291
467 U.S. 82, 99–100 (1984).
292
See infra Part VI.B.
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293

split among lower courts on this issue. Prior to proceeding to that
analysis, two additional points regarding the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause and market-participant exception jurisprudence must be explained. First, it logically follows that if the justifications for the current (narrow) market-participant exception are not
supported within the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
neither would any expanded version of such exception be supported.
Additionally, it logically follows that the new “state self-promotion”
exception should not apply in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The state self-promotion exception is based on a “private-gains-centered notion of state protectionism,” namely that the
anti-protectionism norm of the dormant Commerce Clause allows a
state to favor public in-state entities as long as it is not discriminating
294
among private entities from inside and outside the state. The dormant foreign affairs doctrine is not concerned with protectionism so
the new effort under the state self-promotion exception to limit the
conception of protectionism has no relevance in the context of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
A. Textual
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause has a textual basis that is inferred from the grant of power to
295
Congress to “regulate” interstate and foreign commerce. While this
grant acts as a limit on state power even when Congress has not spoken, the actual text of the clause suggests it is regulatory activities ra296
ther than non-regulatory activities that are exclusive to Congress.
No such textual basis exists for establishing a market-participant ex297
ception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This is because the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is implied not from a particular
clause granting the federal government power to “regulate” foreign

293
See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d. at 748–49 (Md. 1989); See also
Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 42 (concluding that the market-participant exception would not be available under a foreign affairs challenge).
294
See Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 288, at 545.
295
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Daniel T. Coenen, Untangling the MarketParticipant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L.REV. 395, 436–37
(1989) [hereinafter Coenen, Untangling].
296
Id.
297
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1639 (stating that “in contrast to treaties, customary international law is not mentioned in either the Supremacy Clause or Article
III”).
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affairs but rather an amalgam of clauses and the structure of the Con298
stitution relating to foreign affairs.
B. Analogy to a Private Actor in the Market
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause also draws support from analogizing a state participating in
299
the market to a private actor in the market. Private actors can pick
and choose to and from whom to buy and sell their goods and services. A private company could choose to buy inputs from only in-state
suppliers, or sell its products to only in-state buyers. States, it is argued, should be treated in an “evenhanded” fashion and subject to
300
no greater restraints than private actors.
Private actors will be driven by profit maximization in choosing
buyers and sellers. It is possible that a private company might choose
to buy from a “higher-priced” in-state supplier rather than a “lowerpriced” out-of-state supplier as a profit-maximizing strategy. For example, utilizing in-state suppliers may allow for more long-term reliability in terms of a source of supply or may lead to a higher tax base
in the community and thus lower tax rates. It is questionable whether
states act on a profit-maximizing rationale; however, one can analogize to a state’s in-state procurement preference (or a subsidy to attract
investment) on a revenue-maximization basis. Although a state will
pay more for the “higher-cost” in-state goods, the extra employment
created may increase the tax base and leave the state treasury better
off as a whole.
The merits of such an argument are considerably weakened under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, however, because the analogy between state and private actors clearly breaks down with regard
to participation in foreign affairs. Nonetheless, those sympathetic to
state participation in foreign policy often point to the foreign policy
influence of large U.S.-based multinational corporations. Since U.S.based multinational corporations can suffer a reduction in profits to
ensure human rights or labor standards are met in foreign countries,
why shouldn’t states be allowed to restrict their purchasing on similar
foreign policy considerations?
First, it is not as likely that states can justify such actions as revenue-enhancing measures and thus the analogy to private actors seems
to wear thin. Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of corporations are

298
299
300

See id. at 1642.
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421.
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charged with maximizing profits and traditionally needed to justify
measures meant to encourage human rights in foreign countries in
301
such terms. Naturally, they do not make such explanations public
because to do so would negate the positive public relations image
sought by taking such steps. Second, and much more importantly,
states are in fact far different from private actors, since the Constitution limits governmental power, not private conduct. Indeed, the
Supreme Court stated—in discussing a state procurement law sanctioning labor law violators—that “government occupies a unique position of power in our society, and its conduct, regardless of form, is
rightly subject to special restraints” and “in our system States simply
302
are different from private parties and have a different role to play.”
Foreign nations are far more likely to be offended by government as
opposed to private actions. Indeed, international law holds federal
states responsible for violations of international rules by their sub303
federal governments but not for actions taken by private parties unless the government, through acts or omissions, was somehow con304
nected to the private conduct.
Thus, the chances for retaliation
and unfairness are greater with governmental action. Additionally,
the federal government employs traditional foreign policy tools like
305
procurement restrictions. To exempt state spending and state purchasing decisions from the purview of the doctrine would be to exempt traditional tools of foreign policy from the limits of the doctrine.
C. Allowing Particular Projects to Go Forward
Another reason for the market-participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause is to allow states and localities to meet
particular local needs. Without the exception, some have argued that
301

See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.,
Sept.
13,
1970,
available
at
Profits,
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf. Stakeholder models of corporate governance, questioning this traditional (narrow) duty of corporate chiefs, have
recently been revived. For a discussion, see, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and
Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 369-72 (2006). .
302
Wis. Dep’t. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
290 (1986).
303
See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Chap. II, Art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N07/590/90/PDF/N0759090.
pdf?OpenElement.
304
See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 303, Art. 8–9.
305
See WRIGHT, supra note 127, at 302–03.
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306

certain projects may not be undertaken at all.
In short, if, for example, a state could not require a certain percentage of workers on a
project to be local residents, then the project, like the building of a
road, would not go forward. This argument, to the extent it has validity, is certainly weaker in the context of state foreign affairs legislation. If a state cannot refuse to buy from a particular rogue foreign
country or companies active in that rogue country, it is unlikely to
decrease the chances of a project going forward.
D. Reduced Risk to Constitutional Values
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, it is argued
that when a state acts as a market participant and favors its own residents, there is less risk of harm to the unified market intended to be
307
constitutionally established. This is so because other states will see
favoritism to in-state residents by another state as less hostile when
done through a procurement preference rather than through a tax
308
or regulation.
The argument continues that because other states
309
will find such actions less hostile they are less likely to retaliate. It is
not necessary here to debate and resolve whether this is indeed an
accurate assessment of how other states will view such actions in the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause context. It does not appear,
however, that a state acting as a market participant in foreign affairs
will lessen the risk to the constitutional values at issue under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. First, the offense or hostility engendered in a foreign nation is not likely to be any less because a
310
state acts as a market participant.
This is all the more so because
procurement sanctions are, as previously mentioned, traditional tools
311
Second, the injury to foreign policy is not lesof foreign policy.
sened because such enactments will change the U.S. federal govern312
ment’s chosen manner or degree of pressure or support.
The other argument as to why a reduced risk to Commerce
Clause values exists when a state acts as market participant relates to
313
the inherent costliness of such measures.
Protectionist procurement preferences are relatively expensive and have a direct link to
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313

See Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 430–35.
See id. at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
See Spiro, supra note 222, at 846.
See WRIGHT, supra note 127 at 302–03.
See Spiro, supra note 222, at 845–46
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan supra note 30, at 1194.
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314

the state treasury.
Procurement sanctions for foreign-policy purposes will, however, likely be significantly less expensive than pro315
curement preferences for protectionist purposes.
The reason is
simple: a procurement preference targeted at suppliers from a particular nation, or even suppliers active in a particular foreign nation,
will exclude less low-cost bidders than a preference that discriminates
against all foreign bidders, as in the case of state “Buy-American” legislation.
E. “Sowing and Reaping” or Investment Capture
Others have suggested a “sow and reap” rationale to justify the
316
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
Put in other terms, it is argued that in-state residents should be able
to capture the benefits of their investments (i.e., programs created
through their tax payments) to the exclusion of out-of-state persons,
317
at least in some instances. The argument is that if a state’s residents
have invested in a particular enterprise, then they should be able to
318
reap the rewards.
For example, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the citizens
of South Dakota, through their tax payments, invested in the creation
319
of a cement plant.
Thus, the citizens should be able to choose to
reap the rewards, namely be “first in line” to purchase cement from
the plant during times of shortage. The “sow and reap” rationale involves a distinction made between investors (i.e., residents) and noninvestors (i.e., non-residents) in a particular enterprise. Using the
“sow and reap” rationale for a distinction between buyers or sellers of
goods and services based on a foreign-policy purpose makes little
sense. Moreover, some foreign policy legislation prevents those who
have “sowed” from “reaping.” For instance, Massachusetts Burma law
denied procurement opportunities to Massachusetts firms active in
320
Burma.

314

See id.
See Regan supra note 30, at 1193–95.
316
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421–26.
317
See Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and
the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (2008).
318
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 423; Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 523 (1981).
319
447 U.S. 429, 430 (1980).
320
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
315
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The Inapplicability of the Market-Participant Exception in
Numerous Cases

Even if the market-participant exception were theoretically available under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is unlikely that
many state foreign policy actions would fit within its confines. In
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska only sold
timber from state lands to those buyers willing to agree by contract to
321
process the timber in-state. Alaska claimed that as a seller and as a
market participant, it could choose to whom to sell, and thus, the
322
measure was valid under dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The
Court, however, invalidated the provision, holding that the marketparticipant exception only allows a state “to impose burdens on
323
commerce within the market in which it is a participant.” The market-participant exception did not allow the state to “impose conditions . . . that have a substantial regulatory effect outside . . . [the]
324
market.”
Alaska, the Court found, was “attempting to govern the
325
private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners.”
Thus, for example, it is likely that the Massachusetts Burma law would
not fit within the market-participant exception’s confines because
even if the exception were theoretically available under the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, Massachusetts was seeking to control the relations and transactions of those companies from whom they consi326
dered purchasing. Indeed, in South-Central Timber, the Court noted,
referring to a previous case, that a state could not impose a residency
requirement with respect to the work force of all projects (both pub327
lic and private) of a contractor doing business with a state. It might
be possible, however, for Massachusetts to reject buying Burmesemade goods under the market-participant exception since the state
would not be imposing restrictions outside of the particular transaction involved. Additionally, divestment statutes may fall within the
exception; the state has a continuing relationship with those companies in which its pension fund invests, and once it divests and no
longer has a relationship, it no longer cares whether the company is

321
322
323
324
325
326
327

South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 99.
See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 2001).
South Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 97–98, n.10.
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328

active in the targeted country.
Thus, rejection of the marketparticipant exception under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
still relevant to some possible state-foreign-policy measures.
VI. FURTHER DISTINGUISHING THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE FROM THE DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
As discussed briefly in Part V, scholars are split as to what type of
analysis courts are or should be undertaking in the dormant Com329
merce Clause context.
The language of courts’ opinions seems to
indicate that courts are balancing the effect of the state measure on
330
commerce with the achievement of a legitimate local purpose.
There is an exception for facially discriminatory measures which are
331
virtually per se illegal, although even in such cases a particularly
high showing of the need for the discrimination to achieve an impor332
In the course of
tant legitimate local purpose might save the law.
the analysis, courts ask whether the state could achieve its legitimate
333
objective through a less trade-restrictive means. This question indicates that courts may actually be attempting to flesh-out a protectionist motive. If a state can achieve its purported objective by a less
trade-restrictive means, then the state probably has a different or additional motive, namely protectionism. Those scholars supporting
purpose review believe that courts are striking down state actions that
have a primary purpose of protectionism or, in certain cases, isolating
334
out-of-state interests, even though not competitors. How might the
Massachusetts Burma law fare under the dormant Commerce Clause
with a balancing or purpose-review test? The Massachusetts Burma
law would survive purpose-review scrutiny because the purpose of the

328
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750–52
(Md. 1989).
329
See supra Part V.
330
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
331
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“Where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, [there exists] a virtually per se rule of invalidity. . . .”).
332
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 148-50 (1986) (upholding a state law banning
the import of live baitfish, and noting that “Maine’s fisheries are unique and unusually fragile.”).
333
See, e.g., id. at 146.
334
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1143.
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law is not protectionism and it does not isolate out-of-state interests.
Indeed, the law applies to both Massachusetts companies active in
336
Burma and non-Massachusetts companies. Under a balancing analysis, however, the law may very well be invalidated. While the extent
of the law’s effects on commerce may be debated, the objective the
337
law seeks to achieve is not a legitimate one for the state. But even
under a balancing analysis, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
not superfluous because a portion of the law may be protected by the
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
Specifically, Massachusetts could refuse to purchase Burmese-made
goods. The discussion above has ignored the additional analysis that
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires for state actions affecting foreign commerce. Yet, this is the most important part of the comparison between the two constraints because the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine is most analogous to one of the additional inquiries the
court undertakes when state action affects foreign commerce, as op338
posed to simply interstate commerce.
As described earlier, when foreign commerce is implicated by a
state measure, the Supreme Court has launched two additional inqui339
ries. First, in tax-related measures, the Court has asked whether the
340
state action risks multiple taxation.
Second, the Court queries
whether the state action interferes with federal uniformity in an area
341
where federal uniformity is essential. This second additional prong
of analysis is paraphrased by the Court as a question of whether the
state prevented the federal government from “speaking with one
342
voice.” If any part of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is analogous to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is this second prong
of the additional tests under the dormant Foreign Commerce
343
Clause.
Indeed, several lower courts have acknowledged the similarity between the two inquiries and even transferred results from one

335

See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367–68 (2000) (describing the Massachusetts law).
336
Id. at 366.
337
See id. at 370; see also supra Part IV.D.2.
338
Compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), with Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty.
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see supra Part IV.C. and infra Part VI.A.
339
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451; see also supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
340
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
See, e.g., Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 221, at 164; Goldsmith, supra
note 12, at 1637.
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344

context to the other.
But, of course, the states can never prevent
345
the federal government from “speaking with one voice.” The problem with leaving the control of state-level foreign policy to federal
preemption is that the states can prevent the federal government
from speaking with “no voice” or a “quiet voice,” or more generally,
change the voice that the federal government would otherwise
choose. If the federal government, for example, chooses quiet diplomacy to address a situation, then a state enactment sanctioning the
foreign government, if not challenged under a dormant doctrine,
leads the federal government into a Hobbesian choice: say nothing
about the state law and thus risk undermining its preferred strategy
of quiet diplomacy, or preempt the state law and thus risk sending a
message that the foreign government’s behavior is not so objectionable. Therefore, the “one voice” paraphrase is inappropriate. So what
really lies beneath this second prong, and what are its implications
for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? An examination of the line
of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases is necessary to answer these questions.
A. Examining the Line of Supreme Court Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause Cases
346

The 1979 case, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, was the
first Supreme Court case that enunciated the additional prongs of the
analysis when a state measure implicates foreign commerce. Japan
Line involved a challenge to a California tax on cargo containers that
347
would have disturbed an almost-uniform international custom. The
custom almost assuredly did not rise to the level of a customary inter348
national law rule, perhaps due to a lack of opinio juris. The Court
believed retaliation would be the inevitable result of allowing the Cal349
ifornia tax. Moreover, the nation as a whole would feel such retalia350
tion.
Additionally, “if other States follow[ed] California’s exam344
See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d. 903, 912–13 (3d Cir. 1990)
(keeping the two doctrines separate in its opinion but using a similar analysis for
each); Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752
(Md. 1989) (“[T]he concerns which underlie the Foreign Commerce Clause are
closely related to concerns underlying the limits on a state’s authority to affect foreign policy.”).
345
See discussion infra Part VIII.A.
346
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
347
See id. at 452–53.
348
See id. at 438.
349
Id. at 453.
350
Id.
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ple, . . . foreign-owned containers w[ould] be subjected to various
degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports
351
they enter.”
The Court believed this “would make ‘speaking with
352
one voice’ impossible.”
In the 1983 case, Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board, a domestic corporation with foreign subsidiaries challenged
353
California’s system of unitary taxation. California’s unitary taxation
354
scheme had led to actual multiple-taxation as in Japan Line. Nonetheless, the Court, in a 6-3 ruling, found that the taxation scheme did
355
not violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Based on prior
rulings, the Court explicitly found that the tax satisfied the tests ap356
After this initial finding, the Court
plied to interstate commerce.
proceeded to examine the two additional prongs of analysis laid out
357
in Japan Line. With respect to the second prong of Japan Line, the
Court iterated the two formulations of the tests: (1) whether the state
action “may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential;” and (2) whether it “prevents the Federal Gov358
ernment from ‘speaking with one voice’ in international trade.”
The Court held that “a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear
359
federal directive.” It noted that the latter half of this test is essen360
tially a preemption analysis. The Court then found that “[t]he most
obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat it might
pose of offending . . . foreign trading partners and lead[ing] them to
361
retaliate against the Nation as a whole.” The Court acknowledged
that it had little competence in determining when a foreign nation
351

Id.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)).
353
463 U.S. 159, 163 (1983).
354
Id. at 187 (“[T]he tax imposed here, like the tax imposed in Japan Line, has resulted in actual double taxation.”).
355
Id. at 197.
356
Id. at 169−84.
357
Id. at 185 (“Given that [unitary business here] is international, however, we
must subject this case to the additional scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce
Clause.”); see also id. at 185−97 (outlining the Court’s examination of the additional
prongs).
358
Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
359
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
360
Id. (“The second of these considerations is, of course, essentially a species of
pre-emption analysis.”).
361
Id.
352
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would be offended by particular acts and “even less competence in
deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as
362
they please.” Nevertheless, the Court attempted to “develop objective standards that reflect very general observations about the impera363
tives of international trade and international relations.” Ultimately,
the Court did not develop general objective considerations for determining the risks of retaliation and instead identified “three distinct
factors . . . [which] weigh[ed] strongly against the conclusion that the
tax imposed by California might justifiably lead to significant foreign
364
retaliation.”
First, the Court noted that the tax at issue did not
365
create an automatic asymmetry.
Second, the tax was imposed not
366
on a foreign entity but rather a domestic entity. Third, foreign nations would have less of an interest in the tax burden of domestic
367
corporations than corporations based in their particular nations.
Further, foreign nations would realize the domestic entity was amenable to be taxed in California and the amount of the tax it paid was
368
more a function of the tax rate than its allocation method.
While
the Court did note that a state tax might have foreign policy implica369
tions other than the threat of retaliation, it did not discuss any other potential implications and instead observed that unlike in Japan
Line, the executive branch had decided not to file an amicus brief in
370
opposition to the state tax. The Court made clear that the lack of a
submission was not dispositive, but it did “suggest that the foreign
policy of the United States—whose nuances . . . are much more the
province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this court—is
371
not seriously threatened by California’s unitary taxation scheme.”
There are several important conclusions to draw from these first
two Supreme Court cases addressing the second additional prong of
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. First, the Court appears to
establish a threshold-effects test under prong two of Japan Line that is

362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371

Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
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arguably similar to the test established in Zschernig. Second, despite
establishing such a standard, the Court admitted that it was ill-suited
to perform an analysis of the standard, and, in fact, was unable to develop any objective criteria other than the “automatic asymmetry”
373
standard that can be applied to the limited field of state taxes.
Third, while the Court preserves its independence in making judgments on constitutional questions, as a result of its lack of competence, the Court is predisposed to give weight to the views of the ex374
ecutive branch expressed in amicus briefs.
In short, the Court’s
ability to analyze prong two of Japan Line suffers from many of the
same difficulties that led to this article’s conclusion rejecting a threshold-effects test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. These
concerns are heightened in subsequent cases.
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue followed Container Corp. in the line of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Com375
Wardair involved a challenge by a Canadian
merce Clause cases.
airline company to a Florida state tax on the sale of aviation fuel with376
in Florida. The tax at issue applied even if the air carrier used the
377
fuel to fly outside the state. The Canadian charter airline challenging the tax conceded that the tax met the all the dormant interstate
378
The airline also conceded that the state
Commerce Clause tests.
tax did not violate prong one of Japan Line because there was no risk
of multiple taxation since the tax was imposed on a discrete transac379
tion occurring within Florida. Instead, the airline’s claim relied exclusively on prong two of Japan Line and argued that the tax threat-

372

See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
The most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat
it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading
them to retaliate against the nation as a whole. In considering this issue, however, we are faced with a distinct problem. This Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be
offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how
to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of
the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
374
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
375
477 U.S. 1 (1986).
376
Id. at 3.
377
Id. at 4.
378
Id. at 8 (“[I]t is not disputed that if this case did not involve foreign commerce,
the Florida tax on the sale of aviation fuel would not contravene the Commerce
Clause.”).
379
Id. at 9.
373
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ened the ability of the federal government to “speak with one
380
voice.”
The airline argued that “a Resolution . . . [of] an international organization of which the United States is a member . . . [and]
more 70 bilateral agreements, including the U.S.-Canadian Agreement,” established a federal policy of reciprocal-tax exemption for
381
aviation fuel.
Disagreeing with the airline, the Court first noted
that the multilateral convention and the bilateral treaties did not
382
prohibit the taxation of the sale of fuel by political subdivisions.
The resolution was more broadly worded than the treaties and it
sought to prohibit sales taxes by “any taxing authority within a [na383
tion].”
The Court determined, however, that since the United
States never formally agreed to the resolution, neither approving it as
a treaty nor implementing the resolution through legislation, it was
“untenable to assert . . . that th[e] resolution represents a policy of
the United States, as opposed to a policy of an organization of which
384
the United States is one of many members.” Finding the resolution
inapplicable, the Court thus found through negative implication in
the conventions that the “United States has at least acquiesced in
state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international tra385
vel.” Indeed, the Court stated that “the facts presented by this case
show that the Federal Government has affirmatively decided to per386
mit the States to impose these sales taxes on aviation fuel.”
The
Court continued:
Accordingly, there is no need for us to consider, and nothing in
this opinion should be understood to address, whether, in the absence of these international agreements, the Foreign Commerce
Clause would invalidate Florida’s tax.
. . . [Nothing in Japan Line’s prong two] suggest[s] . . . that the
Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government
387
speak with any particular voice.

Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that the negative implication
relied upon by the Court was not enough to remove a state tax or
388
regulation from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Previous cas-

380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388

Id.
Wardair, 477 U.S. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12–13.
Id. at 18−19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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es required that the intent of the federal government to permit state
389
activity “must be unmistakably clear.”
Thus, Wardair signals a difference between the dormant interstate Commerce Clause and the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause’s additional prongs. In the former, the approval of the federal government must be unmistakably
clear; by contrast, inferred acquiescence in the latter is enough to
remove a state measure from scrutiny. But this inferred acquiescence
is only relevant once it has been determined that the state measure
satisfies the tests under the dormant interstate Commerce Clause.
Once these tests are satisfied, acquiescence is enough because the
need for uniformity becomes the sole, or key, consideration. The
Court cannot demand uniformity between a state’s actions and foreign nation’s actions where the federal government has considered
the need for uniformity and failed to require it or adopted instruments in which it could have preempted state action and failed to do
so. It is important to emphasize the strength of the negative implication in Wardair, which involved over seventy conventions—including
one between Canada and the United States—that did not prohibit
the state taxation in spite of an awareness that such taxes were being
imposed.
Justice Blackmun also stated in his dissent that “Florida’s actions
may also hamper the United States’ position in negotiations designed
to achieve the federal policy of reciprocity because the Nation cannot
390
speak with ‘one voice.’”
This argument lacks merit, however, because the federal government can always speak with “one voice”
through legislation or treaty. Further, maintenance of the state taxes
might create desirable “negotiating leverage” for the U.S. federal
government. Therefore, one might argue that the Court need not
even find implied acquiescence through numerous instances of federal failure to preempt despite addressing a particular matter (e.g., a
tax on the sale of airline fuel) in treaties in order to uphold a state
law under the “one voice” prong of analysis with a threshold-effects
test.
The next in the line of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases
is Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance,
which involved a statute that discriminated on its face against foreign
391
commerce.
Facially discriminatory state measures are virtually per

389
390
391

Id.
Id. at 20.
505 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).
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392

se illegal. Finding facial discrimination, the Court did not proceed
393
to examine the additional prongs from Japan Line. The Court did
note, however, that because the statute discriminated against foreign
commerce it was unnecessary to find that the purpose was to benefit
394
local corporations. In other words, the singling out or discrimination prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause is not only singling
out or discriminating against out-of-state interests but also singling
out or discriminating against non-U.S. interests.
In the 1993 case, Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,
the Supreme Court sustained a Tennessee sales tax on the lease of
containers owned by a domestic corporation used in international
395
shipping.
The lower court found, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed, that the tax at issue satisfied the four-part test for taxes merely
396
affecting interstate commerce. Interestingly, the Court added that
meeting the four-part test for interstate commerce “has relevance to
our conclusion that the state tax meets those inquiries unique to the
Foreign Commerce Clause” because it confirmed a legitimate state
interest and the absence of an attempt to interfere with foreign
397
commerce.
As to the additional prongs of Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis, the Court found, for several reasons, that the analysis
398
and holding in Container Corp. controlled. First, there was no risk of
multiple-taxation because the tax was upon a discrete transaction
within the state and, in any event, gave a credit against its own tax for
399
a tax paid in another jurisdiction.
Additionally, regarding Japan
Line prong two, the Court found that the Tennessee tax did not
create foreign policy problems because the federal government had
acted on numerous occasions on the subject of taxing cargo containers, and the state tax at issue was not prohibited in any of the pre400
vious international conventions or federal legislation.
Finally, the
401
Court noted that the U.S. amicus brief defended the Tennessee tax.

392
See id. at 81 (“Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign commerce.”).
393
Id. at 79.
394
Id.
395
507 U.S. 60, 63 (1993).
396
Id. at 73.
397
Id. at 73–74.
398
Id. at 74.
399
Id.
400
Id. at 75.
401
Itel, 507 U.S. at 75−76.
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Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, criticized the two considerations the Court relied upon under
402
prong two of Japan Line. As to the implied acquiescence from the
conventions, Justice Scalia stated this was indistinguishable from Ja403
pan Line. Indeed, one might argue the Court moved away from imposing uniformity requirements on the states, at least where the political branches considered imposing uniformity and declined. As to
the government-filed amicus brief, Justice Scalia admitted it distin404
guished the case from Japan Line.
He complained, however, that
reliance on the amicus brief made the constitutionality of the law
turn on the position of the executive branch despite the fact that the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign com405
merce. Ultimately, the Court was responsive to Justice Scalia’s criticism in the subsequent case, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
406
Board.
Barclays is the last significant dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
case that the Supreme Court decided. In Barclays, the Court once
again examined the constitutionality of California’s unitary taxing
scheme, this time as applied to domestic corporations with foreign
parents and to foreign corporations with either foreign parents or
407
subsidiaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court upheld application
408
of the California tax as applied to such entities. First, although the
risk of multiple taxation increased, multiple taxation was not an inevitable result, and the alternative arms-length method of allocating
409
income would not eliminate the risk. The Court also noted that international practice, which was uniform with respect to the armslength method of allocation, did not have such force to “dictate” a
410
dormant Commerce Clause holding. As in Container Corp., Wardair,
and Itel, the Court only turned to prong two of Japan Line after find411
ing the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional.
The
Court found that with respect to Japan Line’s prong two, “Congress
may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not ‘impair
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411

Id. at 81 (J. Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id. at 80–81.
Id.
512 U.S. 298 (1994).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 318−20.
Id. at 320.
Id.
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federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.’”
Stated differently, Congress need not convey its intent “with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that . . . falls
413
short under [interstate Commerce Clause] inspection.” The Court
found by negative inference that Congress had indicated its willing414
ness to tolerate state unitary taxation. The Court reached this conclusion after noting Congress’s failure to preempt state unitary taxation despite considering such a step in several bills, as well as the
exemption of sub-federal governments from tax treaties requiring the
arms-length method despite congressional awareness that foreign
governments were greatly displeased with state unitary taxation sys415
tems.
The Court refused to consider arguments of likely retalia416
tion, finding these were directed to the wrong forum.
Indeed, actual retaliation had already occurred prior to the case reaching the
417
Court. The Court, following Justice Scalia’s suggestions in Itel, also
rejected executive branch statements that the taxation interfered with
foreign affairs because Congress was the preeminent speaker in regu418
lating foreign commerce.
B. The Status of Japan Line Prong Two and Its Implications for the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
What does the rest of this line of dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause cases tell us about Japan Line’s prong two, and what are the
implications for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? To begin, the
Court will only consider prong two of Japan Line after concluding the
419
Additionally, a
state law passes the test for interstate commerce.
state law that facially discriminates against foreign commerce will be
virtually per se illegal without ever reaching prong two of Japan Line
420
As to prong one, multiple taxation is not
as was seen in Kraft.

412

Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
413
Id.
414
Id. at 324−28.
415
Id.
416
Id. at 328.
417
Id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citing a brief for Government of United Kingdom as establishing that “[a]t
least one country has already enacted retaliatory legislation”).
418
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329−30.
419
See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 83
(1992).
420
Id. at 79.
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421

enough to violate this prong.
The multiple-taxation must be an
422
“inevitable result.”
In other words, multiple-taxation must result
423
from the application of the state tax in all instances. Additionally,
even if multiple-taxation is an inevitable result, it must be the case
424
Thus, it will be
that the alternatives would not eliminate the risk.
very rare that a state tax is invalidated under prong one. As to prong
two of Japan Line, it is less clear what remains. If a court is truly looking for purposes under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is looking
for a protectionist or a singling out purpose and it will have made a
finding on this prior to reaching prong two of Japan Line. So what is
the Court actually looking for under prong two? The Court appears
to be examining whether the state action has an effect on U.S. for425
eign relations or foreign policy.
The central effect the Court at426
tempts to assess is the risk of retaliation by foreign trading partners.
The Court, however, admits it is not competent to ascertain this
427
risk. It is also clear that the Court is not balancing this risk against a
428
A certain threshold
state’s interest in a legitimate local purpose.
level of risk or, more generally, effect on U.S. foreign relations is what
429
the Court tried to ascertain in its early cases.
421

Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 438 (1979).
Id. at 447.
423
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329-30.
424
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447–48.
425
See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979) (stating that “California may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies”); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (concluding that “a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’
standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal
Government or violates a clear federal directive”).
426
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450–51.
427
See, e.g., Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
This Court has little competence in determining precisely when a foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax
as they please.
Id.; see also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 505 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1993).
But given the strong indications from Congress that Tennessee’s method of taxation is allowable, and with due regard for the fact that the
nuances of foreign policy ‘are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of the Court,’ we find no reason to disagree with the United States’ submission.
Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196).
428
See id.
429
See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
422
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In these early cases, such as Japan Line and Container Corporation,
the Court purportedly sought to establish objective criteria and rely
upon views of the executive branch to support its conclusions, al430
though declaring that such views were not dispositive. Unfortunately, the court failed at its attempt to establish objective criteria. The
only objective criteria the Court developed was whether the state tax
431
created an automatic asymmetry or inevitable multiple taxation.
432
This criteria, however, is identical to prong one of Japan Line. The
Court in its latest case, Barclays, also decided that executive branch
views were irrelevant, at least when the congressional posture, based
433
Thus, in exon a strong negative inference, was to the contrary.
amining a state measure under the dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court will likely find that the measure has an insignificant effect on
U.S. foreign relations or foreign policy if it finds congressional acquiescence as a result of a failure to preempt after congressional consideration of the state measures. The cases described above, including Wardair, Itel, and Barclays, all suggest that it is only where
Congress, while aware of the state measures, has repeatedly focused
its attention on a policy matter and yet, declined to preempt the state
434
measures, that an inference of approval will be made.
In the absence of implied approval, what will a court do now that it apparently
has eschewed reliance on executive branch views under prong two of
Japan Line? For instance, how would the Court handle a case like Barclays minus the implied acquiescence from the legislation and treaties
that failed to preempt the state laws? The Court could look for evidence of a uniform international practice or custom. But this would
seem to elevate such practice or custom to the state of customary international law without proof of opinio juris or a sense of legal obligation. Moreover, the Court seemed to indicate in Barclays that an international practice that is not incorporated into federal legislation
or treaty applying to the states would not dictate a dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause decision, although such uniformity may remain
435
peripherally important to prong one.
The Court could also look
for evidence of foreign dissatisfaction through diplomatic protests,
amicus briefs, or actual retaliation. It would seem, however, rather
strange that the Court would reject executive branch views deferring
430
431
432
433
434
435

See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; see also supra Part VI.A.
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
Compare Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95, with Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329.
See, e.g., Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 70–71.
See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328–29.
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to Congress’s special role in foreign commerce only to place particular weight in the views and protests of foreign nations. Indeed, the
Court ignored an instance of actual retaliation by the United King436
dom in Barclays. Reliance on retaliation measures to determine the
validity of state measures challenged under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine would have the perverse effect of encouraging foreign
retaliation because foreign nations would know that retaliation could
achieve results in U.S. courts. Additionally, the success of a challenge
would hinge on the timing of a suit. A challenge might fail prior to
foreign retaliation and succeed if filed after some form of foreign retaliation occurred.
Ultimately, it appears that the Court is gradually moving towards
giving up the entire exercise of engaging in analysis under prong two
of Japan Line. Lower courts applying Japan Line also seem to simply
437
be avoiding an examination of the risk of retaliation. State statutes
seeking to either protect in-state producers from out-of-state producers or to protect in-state and out-of-state producers from foreign pro438
ducers are caught prior to prong two of Japan Line. Instead of asking whether a state measure prevents the federal government from
speaking with one voice, which can never be the case, or attempting
to assess the effects on U.S. foreign policy, which it can never do
competently and independently, the Court could continue to give
heightened scrutiny to measures affecting foreign commerce by simply being extra careful in searching for a protectionist, or isolationist,
purpose vis-à-vis foreign states in cases involving foreign commerce.
If courts are not engaging in purpose review but are in fact balancing,
then courts could give extra weight to the effects on foreign commerce in balancing those effects against the state’s legitimate local
purpose.
What does this understanding of Japan Line prong two tell us
about the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? All of the above leads,
once again, to the conclusion that the threshold-effects test is a tough
task that courts are not particularly competent at undertaking. The
trouble the Supreme Court has encountered in Japan Line prong two
analysis indicates that purpose review is in fact the most appropriate
standard under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. One could argue, however, that courts could give greater weight to amicus briefs in
dormant foreign affairs doctrine cases because Congress’s special role
436

See id. at 312.
See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 402 S.E.2d 666, 667 (S.C. 1991); NCR
Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86, 95 (Minn. 1989).
438
See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979).
437
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in regulating foreign commerce is not at issue. In the field of foreign
affairs generally, the President and Congress share powers, whereas
439
in the foreign commerce area Congress has control.
But if courts
are searching for purpose rather than effects, the executive branch
has no greater, or perhaps lesser, competence in assessing the purpose behind a particular state action, and thus, the courts should not
give any particular weight to executive branch amicus briefs. The
dormant foreign affairs doctrine should only capture those state
measures enacted with a foreign policy purpose. If a state measure
has an effect on foreign relations despite not having a foreign policy
purpose, the federal political branches may always preempt the state
measure.
Could prong two of Japan Line still be saved if the Court turned
to purpose review under that prong? If the Court did so, it would be
looking for one of two purposes: either a protectionist purpose or the
purpose of changing or criticizing the trade, tax, or other policy of a
foreign government. The Court, however, will already have searched
for a protectionist or singling out purpose prior to reaching Japan
Line’s prong two, at least if those scholars promoting purpose review
440
under the dormant Commerce Clause are correct. If the Court instead searches for whether the purpose of the state law is to change
the trade, tax, or other policy of a foreign government, then Japan
Line prong two becomes repetitive of, or a subset of, the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. Thus, if the Court readdressed the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine and clarified that purpose review is the appropriate standard under that doctrine, the Court could additionally
dispense with Japan Line prong two—which it appears only to give lip441
service to as time has passed —and relieve itself of the complications
it has faced in applying it. Accordingly, the market-participant exception would apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, thus reduced to facial discrimination and balancing tests, and not apply to
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which would subsume the old
prong two of Japan Line.

439

Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Japan Line, 441 U.S at 452; see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986) (arguing that the Court should be concerned with “preventing purposeful
protectionism”).
441
See supra Part VI.A.
440
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VII. CAN FEDERAL ACTORS (AND IF SO WHICH ONES) AUTHORIZE STATE
ACTIONS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE RUN AFOUL OF THE DORMANT
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE?
The last distinction to draw between the dormant Commerce
Clause generally, and Japan Line prong two specifically, on the one
hand and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine on the other is whether federal actors can authorize state actions that otherwise run afoul
of these doctrines. It is well-established that Congress can authorize
actions that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause, but the Supreme Court has never addressed whether federal
actors, or which federal actors, can authorize state action that violate
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The Court has stated that congressional intent to permit state activity that would otherwise run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause “must be ‘unmistakably
442
clear.’” Yet, it appears with prong two of Japan Line that the unmistakably clear intent can come from a particularly strong negative in443
ference rather than affirmative authorization.
As seen in Wardair,
Itel, and Barclays, with respect to Japan Line’s prong two, the courts
have been willing to infer authorization for the state taxes at issue
when the federal government has failed to preempt those state taxes
444
on numerous occasions despite an awareness of them. In essence,
the Court has refused to declare that uniformity is essential in an area
when the federal government has considered the state actions on
numerous occasions—and not been prevented from doing so because of a busy legislative calendar, more pressing priorities, and the
like—and declined to preempt. Again, if the state action runs against
the central value sought to be protected by the Commerce Clause
(e.g., protectionism, broadly defined as either protecting purely local
industry or even the broader U.S. industry), it will not be necessary to
examine it under these additional prongs. It is only where state actions clear this first hurdle that the additional consideration of uniformity comes into play.
442

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994) (holding
that “Congress must be ‘unmistakably clear’ before we will conclude that it intended
to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause”) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(plurality opinion)).
443
See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452 (explaining how the need for federal uniformity
is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’s power to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” under the Commerce Clause).
444
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1994); Itel
Container Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1993); Wairdair Can., Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
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It is important to keep in mind that the bar for permission by
negative inference is incredibly high, given that Wardair involved inferences from seventy agreements failing to preempt, and that Barclays involved numerous, specific attempts over a period longer than a
decade in which Congress turned its attention to preemption but ul445
timately declined to do so.
Should Congress’s failure to preempt,
even when it actively considered doing so, be given the same credence under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as Japan Line’s
prong two? Or should we demand unmistakably clear and explicit
authorization as with the dormant Commerce Clause generally? Either way, it is apparent, given Wardair and Barclays, that a simple failure in one federal sanctions enactment to preempt prior state sanctions legislation against the same country should not be sufficient.
Moreover, several arguments caution against such an approach and
indicate that the Court should require the federal government to be
either explicit in its authorization or at a minimum require an ex446
tremely high bar for negative implication authorization.
If the
Court truly moves to a pure purpose-based test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, then one might argue that explicit authorization should be required, thus eliminating any possibility for a highbar negative inference authorization. The reason for this is that if effects are the standard, the federal political branches are in the best
position to assess the effects of a state action on foreign relations, and
if the political branches have turned their attention to possible
preemption of a state law multiple times and rejected doing so, then
the Court might understandably wish to infer authorization in such
instances. If purpose review is the standard, however, a court is in a
better position than the political branches to assess the purpose. In
this instance, the federal political branches’ failure to preempt means
little in terms of inferring authorization, since they may very well be
rejecting preemption because they believe the state action to already
be barred due to its illicit purpose. Hence, the Court could, and indeed should, require the same unmistakably clear level of authorization to permit a state to take action otherwise running afoul of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine as that which it requires under the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause.
The next question is what federal body should give the states
permission to take actions otherwise running afoul of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine—Congress, the President or both? The answer to this question depends on whether the state action is intruding
445
446

See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324–27; Wairdair, 477 U.S. at 10–12.
See supra Part IV.D.
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on a largely presidential area of foreign relations (e.g., power to recognize foreign governments and new nations), a largely congressional area of foreign relations (e.g., foreign commerce), or a shared
area. The Supreme Court has established a framework for analyzing
447
if a presidential action in foreign affairs is constitutional.
The
framework was first enunciated by Justice Jackson in a concurring
opinion in the Steel Seizure case and was subsequently adopted by the
448
Specifically, where the
entire Court in the Iranian Hostages case.
President acts with the express or implied approval of Congress, his
power is at a maximum, and his action will only be invalidated where
the federal government as a whole lacks the requisite power (e.g., a
449
Bill of Rights violation). Where the President acts with the express
or implied disapproval of Congress, his power is at its “lowest ebb,”
450
and his action can only be upheld by disabling the Congress.
Where the President acts in the face of congressional silence or acquiescence, he can only rely on his own constitutional powers, but
congressional inertia can, as a practical matter, invite presidential ac451
tion in the area.
The analytical framework in the Jackson concurrence can be
useful for analyzing authorizations or permissions of state actions that
452
would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Where the President and Congress both authorized the state activity,
the authorization would be considered valid except where it violated
an explicit constitutional prohibition (e.g. an Article I, Section 10
prohibition that does not allow for the possibility of congressional
approval or a Bill of Rights provision) or if the power was an exclusive
but non-delegable power of one of the federal political branches, a
453
topic discussed shortly below.
The Barclays case makes clear that
congressional authorization is the key in matters core to the Foreign
454
Commerce Clause.
Thus, if Congress attempted to approve state
actions that would run afoul of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, and the President vetoed the legislation, but Congress over447
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
448
Id. at 637–39 (Jackson, J., concurring); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
668–69 (1981).
449
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
450
Id.
451
Id.
452
Cf. Sapna Desai, Note, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment
Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 701–02 (2009).
453
See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
454
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. at 336.
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rode the veto to pass the law, it would seemingly be unproblematic
that the President did not agree in the authorization. Additionally, if
Congress overcomes a Presidential veto to passes an authorization of
any of the actions specifically listed in Article I, Section 10, Clauses 2
and 3, the authorization would certainly be sufficient to authorize the
state action. In matters touching upon core Presidential powers,
however, such as the recognition of a foreign state or foreign government, or diplomatic approaches or outreach to particular countries in times of crisis, presidential permission would be necessary.
Moreover, in the vast shared area, approval by both Congress and the
President would be necessary. Thus, in a shared area, even if Congress was able to override a presidential veto, this might well be insufficient because the President would not have joined in the authorization. Indeed, for simplicity’s sake, one might wish to eschew utilizing
the Jackson concurrence analysis and create a fixed rule that under
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine authorizations must come from
both the President and the Congress. Perhaps as a middle road, a
presumption could be created in this regard.
State procurement sanctions and divestment requirements seem
to fall most closely in the foreign commerce realm, but because they
target specific nations and seek changes in the non-commerce related
behavior or policies of a foreign nation, they also implicate the President’s communication and diplomatic powers with foreign governments. Thus, state sanctions legislation that would otherwise run
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must receive permission
from both the Congress and the President under this framework.
This could happen through congressional legislation authorizing
state procurement sanctions or divestment requirements signed by
the President and perhaps further buttressed by a presidential signing statement supporting state measures of this kind. In practice,
Congress has only attempted once to explicitly authorize or permit
state divestment requirements targeting a particular foreign country.
A federal district court struck down an Illinois banking and divest455
ment sanctions law targeting the Sudan in 2007.
Congress responded within months by authorizing the state divestment sanctions
456
in a federal act that ratcheted up sanctions against Sudan.
The
President signed the bill into law, but in a signing statement, he ques-

455

NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121
Stat. 2516.
456
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457

tioned the constitutionality of the congressional authorization.
Should the authorization be considered as coming from both
branches since the President signed the legislation? Or should the
President’s signing statement objecting to the authorization be given
weight? Recently, many have debated whether and what level of
weight can be given to presidential signing statements in determining
458
the scope of legislation. But Presidents have long declared a power
459
to refuse to enforce unconstitutional elements of legislation. If we
believe presidential as well as congressional authorization is needed
for the state action, then the signing statement should be accorded
weight under this rationale but not under the rationale that the President can limit the scope of the legislation or the interpretation of
460
the legislation.
As a prudential matter, it is also advisable to allow the federal
government to authorize state actions, such as sanctions legislation,
that would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and
the dormant Commerce Clause because the federal government’s
sanctions regime will potentially have a greater impact if it involves
state procurement markets and divestment requirements which will
give the federal government more bargaining leverage. Often sanc461
tions are ineffective unless enforced on a multilateral basis. Multileveled sanctions within the United States can make up for some of
the unwillingness of foreign nations to join sanctions regimes, particularly when one realizes the market size and power of many U.S.
states in comparison to many foreign nations.

457
Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007,
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007).
458
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Symposium, The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements: The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2007) (arguing that the concerns
over the use of presidential signing statements is exaggerated).
459
See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger on Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes to the Honorable Abner Mikva, Counsel
to the President (November 2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
nonexcut.htm.
460
See Marc N. Gurber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretation of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
363, 378–81 (1987); A.B.A., TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recom
mendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
461
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 905, 917–18 (2009); Sean D. Murphy, International Law, the United States, and
the Non-Military ‘War’ Against Terrorism, 14 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 347, 349 (2003).
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The above discussion leads to the conclusion that certain foreign
affairs powers are not only exclusive but sometimes delegable in the
sense that the federal government can authorize the states to engage
in them. Other foreign affairs powers should be considered exclusive
but non-delegable, such as the Commander-in-Chief power, although
it is highly unlikely that federal actors would seek to delegate these
powers in any event.
VIII. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS THIS CENTURY:
CROSBY, GARAMENDI, THEIR PROGENY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
RELYING ON PREEMPTION
The above analysis indicates that limits on state-level foreign pol462
icy are justified as a policy matter, that the existence of a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is fully justified under a multi-modal interpre463
tation of the U.S. Constitution, that a purpose-based test under the
doctrine would better suit the capacity of courts and state-level offi464
cials, that no market participant exception should be available un465
der the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, that the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause’s additional “one voice” prong should be sub466
sumed within the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, and that the
federal government can in many instances authorize state actions
467
If stateotherwise violating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
level foreign policy is not wise as a matter of policy, however, the
question remains as to whether a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
necessary as a practical matter because the federal government always
has a readily available constraint through the enactment of preemptive federal legislation or executive branch regulation (perhaps in
part relying on congressional delegation) if a state-level foreign policy
468
is judged to be unwise from the national perspective. The Supreme
Court has seemingly shown a preference in its two state foreign affairs
469
related cases this past decade, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
470
and American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi, to rely on preemption

462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part IV.D–E.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra Part VII.
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1682–88.
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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471

rather than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But it should be
noted that the Court approvingly cited to Zschernig in its Garamendi
472
The Court’s choice of preemption has had negative imopinion.
plications for restricting state-level foreign policies. Moreover, the
Court’s choice to rely on preemption grounds to the exclusion of
dormant foreign affairs grounds is not required by the court-created
rules of judicial restraint, the rules imploring the Court to determine
cases on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds,
since the preemption doctrine resolves a constitutional question.
Further exacerbating the situation, the Court’s analysis in Crosby and
Garamendi has unnecessarily confused preemption analysis with dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis. Lower courts applying Crosby
and Garamendi reflect some of this confusion, but fortunately, in large
part, these courts do not read the opinions as undermining or elimi473
nating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Nevertheless, Supreme
Court clarification would certainly assist state officials in conscientiously applying the doctrine to proposed actions in advance of litigation.
A. Preemption Overview
The Supreme Court has established the doctrine of preemption
based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which makes
474
federal law the “supreme Law of the Land.” In preemption analysis,
475
the intent or purpose of Congress is the “ultimate touchstone.”
Preemption analysis can be divided into three sub-types: express, con476
The first type, express preemption, occurs if
flict, and implied.
Congress expressly declares that it intends to wholly occupy the field
477
(i.e., leave no room in the field for the state to operate). Conflict
preemption occurs where state law conflicts with federal law, either
because it is impossible to comply with both (“direct conflict preemption”) or the state law is an obstacle to achieving the full purposes
and objectives of the federal policy (“obstacles conflict preemp-

471

See infra notes 583–93 and accompanying text.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 398.
473
See infra notes 583–93 and accompanying text.
474
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
475
Retail Clerk Int’l Ass’n v. Schermehorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
476
I have borrowed the preemption terminology in this paragraph from Eugene
D. Cross, Preemption of Member States Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis, 29 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 447 (1992). The U.S. Supreme Court
uses identical or similar terminology. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 477–482.
477
See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85. 95–100 (1983).
472
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478

tion”).
The last type, implied or field preemption, occurs where
the federal occupation of the field is so thorough and extensive that
Congress’s intent to wholly occupy the field can be inferred (“occu479
pation of the field preemption”). The Court, until recently, generally applied two additional, and potentially competing, factors in its
analysis: first, preemption can also be implied where the federal interest in the field is clearly dominant or superior (“dominant interest
480
preemption”), and second, the Court is generally reluctant to infer
preemption, particularly in fields that the states have traditionally oc481
Thus, the Court insists that Congress’s intent to preempt
cupied.
482
must be “clear and manifest.” Crosby and Garamendi left murky the
strength of these potentially conflicting presumptions in foreign affairs related cases.
B. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council involved a challenge to a
Massachusetts law that imposed a negative ten percent preference
483
against companies active in Burma. In other words, companies that
found themselves on the restricted list of companies trading with or
investing in Burma had ten percent added to their bids for state contracts prior to the state determining the lowest bidder. The Massachusetts law was passed three months before a comprehensive federal
484
sanctions law.
The federal law imposed several sanctions against
485
The federal law eliminated certain bilateral assistance, reBurma.
quired the U.S. Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Director of each international financial institution to vote against loans
to Burma, and denied entry visas to the U.S. for Burmese government
officials except as required by treaty obligations or to staff the Burmese mission, until the President certified to Congress that Burma is
making measurable and substantial progress in improving human

478

See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141–43
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
479
See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De is Cuesta, 485 U.S. 141, 153
(1982).
480
See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309 (1983); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
481
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
482
Id.; see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985).
483
Crosby v. Nat’l. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–88 (2000).
484
Id.
485
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 570
(1996) (also called the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment (Burma)).
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rights practice and implementing democratic reforms. The bill also
required the President to prohibit U.S. persons from making new investments in Burma “if the President determines and certifies to
Congress, that after the date of the enactment of this act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts,
or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi [the head of the pro-democracy movement] or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against
487
the Democratic opposition.” President Clinton issued an Executive
Order on May 20, 1997 making such findings and prohibiting new in488
vestments in Burma. The statute also granted broad waiver authority to the President to waive sanctions if he found it in the national interest, and also directed the President to develop a comprehensive
multilateral strategy with other nations to address the human rights
489
problems within Burma.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, struck the Massachusetts law down under obstacles conflict preemption finding the
state law an obstacle to achieving the full purposes of the federal act
490
in three ways. First, the state law changed the careful calibration of
491
sanctions chosen by the federal government. Second, it interfered
with the presidential flexibility desired by Congress in granting broad
492
waiver authority to the President. The President might elect to lessen sanctions at the same time states were ramping up sanctions.
Third, it interfered with the direction to the President to establish a
comprehensive multilateral strategy because trading partners pre493
ferred to talk about the state law than conditions in Burma.
The
Court pointed to a WTO dispute settlement case lodged against the
United States by the European Union and Japan concerning the Massachusetts law as well as diplomatic protests lodged by these governments as proof that developing such a strategy was made more diffi494
cult by the state law. Importantly, the Court expressly declined to
rule on the additional grounds of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, which the First

486

Id.
Id.
488
Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,299 (May 21, 1997) (Executive Order
Prohibiting New Investment in Burma).
489
Pub. L No. 104-208, § 570(c).
490
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000).
491
Id. at 380.
492
Id. at 376.
493
Id. at 390.
494
Id. at 382.
487
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495

Circuit had relied upon.
The Court also stated that they found it
496
unnecessary to rule on the field preemption claim.
In refusing to
rule on these additional grounds, the Court relied on the principle,
497
expressed in Ashwander v. TVA, that the Court should decide a case
based on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds
498
if it had the option. As analyzed more fully in Part X of this Article,
however, the application of this principle to validate applying the
preemption doctrine rather than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine can be criticized because the preemption doctrine is also a con499
stitutional doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause.
The Court’s choice of preemption grounds had two negative
consequences. First, the opinion’s failure to rely upon or approvingly
cite Zschernig lead some to conclude that maybe the dormant foreign
500
affairs doctrine was on insecure ground.
Second, because the
Court relied on the narrowest grounds possible, some state officials
read the opinion as only preventing Burma sanctions or, at most,
preempting state sanctions where a specific federal law targeted the
501
same foreign country as the state law.
Academics have criticized
502
reading the opinion in such narrow fashion. Additionally, the one
case decided by lower courts in the post-Crosby and pre-Garamendi
timeframe—not involving matters eventually resolved in Garamendi—
503
did in fact indicate that Zschernig was alive and well.
C. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi involved a challenge
by the American Life Insurance Association against the California
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) that required any insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about all pol495

Id. at 374.
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74.
497
297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
498
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374.
499
See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1266–68 (arguing that “the general approaches the Court employs to resolve preemption issues are more properly regarded as interpretations of the Supremacy Clause than as statutory interpretation”);
see also infra Part X.
500
See supra Part IV.C.
501
See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 754 (2000).
502
See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1323 (“Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that Crosby is a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise.”); see also Golove, supra
note 38, at 156.
503
See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 2003).
496
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icies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945. The HVIRA allegedly
conflicted with the German Foundation Agreement entered into between the United States and German governments under which
Germany agreed to establish a 10 billion dollar fund administered by
the Foundation to compensate all those who suffered at the hands of
505
German companies during the Nazi era. The Foundation agreed to
work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
506
Claims (ICHEIC) to determine outstanding insurance claims. In its
agreement with Germany, and similar ones entered into with Austria
and France, the United States promised to urge its courts and state
and local governments to respect the foundations as the exclusive
507
means for resolving WWII-era claims against private companies.
The Supreme Court had previously ruled in the 1940’s that presidential executive agreements could preempt state law if valid just as treaties could. Defenders of the California law argued that the German
Foundation agreement was distinguishable from prior agreements
because it attempted to settle claims against private foreign compa508
nies rather than foreign governments The Court declared the dif509
ference immaterial and held the agreement valid.
The Court, however, seemed troubled by the fact that the German Foundation Agreement contained no express preemption
510
clause. While this conclusion is contentious, given language in the
agreement that the executive branch considered the agreement to be
the “exclusive forum” for resolving Holocaust-era claims, both the petitioners and the U.S. amicus brief acknowledged no express preemp511
tion. Regardless, the Court did not immediately apply other strands
of preemption analysis (i.e., field and conflict preemption) or cite to
familiar cases in those areas. Interestingly, the Court also did not
consider whether the executive agreement was self-executing, although it is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence that only selfexecuting provisions of treaties preempt state law because non-self512
executing provisions are not a part of the domestic legal system.
Instead, the Court said that the petitioners left “their claim of
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 416–17.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17.
See id. at 417, 422.
Id. at 413 n.7.
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preemption to rest on asserted interference with the foreign policy those
513
agreements embody. Reliance is placed on our decision in Zschernig.”
While the Court acknowledged that both the majority opinion and
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Zschernig spoke in terms of
federal exclusivity in foreign relations, and thus relied on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the Court also gave considerable attention to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Zschernig, which expressed concern with finding state regulation preempted in
514
traditional areas that had some modest impact on foreign relations.
Of course, Zschernig’s dominant threshold-effects test cured Justice
Harlan’s most significant concern, that field preemption or the dormant foreign affairs doctrine threatened state actions in traditional
515
areas that somehow had an incidental impact on foreign relations.
The Court then stated, “it is a fair question whether respect for the
executive foreign relations power require a categorical choice between contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident in
516
the Zschernig opinions.” At this point, however, the Court seems to
have reduced Zschernig to a field preemption case, which is not the
truest, or, at a minimum, not the fairest way to read Justice Douglas’
517
Returning to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, the Court
opinion.
stated that “it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the
state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state
518
law preempted.”
In short, the Court seems to have applied a presumption against preemption in areas of traditional legislation, thus
519
Moreover,
requiring a stronger showing of conflict in such cases.
the Court mischaracterizes Zschernig as a field preemption case, and
turns its threshold-effects test into a balancing test that balances the
strength of the state interest with the degree of conflict with federal
520
policy. On the other hand, the Court cited approvingly to Zschernig
513
Id. at 417 (emphasis added). Additionally, as Professors Denning and Ramsey
point out, the Executive Agreement did not cover certain countries whose insurers
might be harmed by the Act anyway. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey,
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 908 (2004).
514
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418–19.
515
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 457–58 (1968).
516
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419.
517
Id. at 420.
518
Id.
519
Id.
520
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 925–26 (“We begin by describing, as
best we can, the new test articulated by the majority. It apparently balances the
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and, in footnote eleven of its opinion, the Court acknowledged—in
contrast to the analysis in its opinion—the presence of a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, even though the Court mislabeled it field
preemption:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine,
whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree of any conflict, the principle having
been established that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy ex521
clusively to the National Government.

Ultimately, after mixing the two doctrines, the majority chose to
rely on conflict preemption, specifically obstacles conflict preemp522
tion, citing approvingly to Crosby. The Court even relied on several
523
factors from Crosby to find obstacles conflict. Specifically, the Court
found that the California law was changing the calibration of sanctions decided upon by the federal government, namely the U.S. Pres524
ident.
The Court was untroubled that, unlike in Crosby, the President acted without Congressional authority because the President
“possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act
on behalf of the United States on international issues . . . and conflict
with the exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to
525
find preemption of the state law.”
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent stated the following about Zschernig:
We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided and I would
not resurrect that decision here. The notion of “dormant foreign
affairs preemption” with which Zschernig is associated resonates
most audibly when a state action “reflects a state policy critical of
foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in judgment’ on
them.” . . . The HVIRA entails no such state action or policy. It
takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and
requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime. It is directed solely at private insurers doing business in California and it
requires them solely to disclose information in their or their affil-

strength of the state’s interest against the degree of conflict with federal policy. Neither prong of the new test is adequately explained or easy to apply. . . .”).
521
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, n.11.
522
Id. at 414.
523
Id. at 424.
524
Id. at 423.
525
Id. at 424 n.14.

SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

296

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/8/2011 3:50 PM

[Vol. 41:201

iates possession or control. I would not extend Zschernig into this
526
dissimilar domain.

Thus, even the four justices subscribing to the dissent recognized the
continuing viability of Zschernig, though they did not believe it would
527
The conclusion that the HVIRA does not
invalidate the HVIRA.
run afoul of Zschernig, when properly understood as a dormant foreign affairs doctrine case, is questionable. Although directly targeting private insurance companies, the disclosure law could be read as
seeking to criticize or change the behavior of the German government and other European governments regarding their failure to
adequately compensate insurance beneficiaries or the failure of those
governments to require compensation be given by the private insurers or both. Although the dissent refers to “dormant foreign affairs
preemption,” and, thus, unnecessarily mixes the labels of the two
doctrines, the dissent appears to more accurately characterize Zschernig as a dormant foreign affairs doctrine case rather than a field
528
preemption case. The dissent’s treatment of Zschernig also seems to
support a purpose-based standard under the doctrine, because it focuses on criticism of foreign governments and sitting in judgment of
529
them, rather than the threshold-effects test.
As to the obstacles conflict claim, which the majority ultimately
appears to rely upon, the dissent states that executive agreements
530
must expressly preempt state law. It is not clear why other strands
of preemption would not be applicable to executive agreements if
they are valid. The dissent notes that some executive agreements involved in prior decisions of the Court expressly preempted state law,
but the dissent does not show that all prior executive agreements did
531
so. The dissent also states that if HVIRA-type laws were a threat to
the operation of the mechanism created in the Executive Agreements, then “one might expect to find some reference to laws like the
532
HVIRA in the later-in-time executive agreements.”
The same argument could be made, however, about any legislation enacted subsequent to state sanctions legislation. Of course, the Court has never
required express preemption in cases in which the federal act occurs
subsequent to the state act. Moreover, an international agreement is
526
527
528
529
530
531
532

Id. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 439–40.
Id.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
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less likely to address domestic matters, such as preemption, than legislation. The court dependably applies all strands of preemption
analysis to federal legislation, regardless of the timing, and Crosby is
533
but one example of this.
It is not clear why valid executive agreements should be subject to a different analysis, assuming they are selfexecuting and thus part of the U.S. domestic legal system.
Thus, Garamendi further muddled the situation. As the following
analysis of lower court cases indicates, the majority and dissenting
opinions in Garamendi are generally read by lower courts as confirming the continued vitality of Zschernig—perhaps even giving some ad534
ditional support for purpose review under Zschernig. Yet, in light of
the majority’s seeming mischaracterization of the Zschernig case as a
field preemption case, its positive comments towards Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Zschernig, and its ultimate reliance on obstacles con535
flict preemption, the Court in Garamendi once again did not provide the degree of clarity desired by state and local actors and lower
536
courts. A few lower courts have suffered from this confusion.
Indeed, we might summarize the pros and cons for Zschernig and the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine found in the Garamendi opinion as
follows:
Favorable Elements for Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and
Zschernig
The majority cites to Zschernig and
placed emphasis on it early in its opi537
nion.
Footnote 11 of the opinion recognizes
DFAD at least in concept, if not by la539
bel.

533

Unfavorable Elements for the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
(DFAD) and Zschernig
The majority seems to characterize
538
Zschernig as field preemption case.
The majority cited approvingly to Justice Harlan’s concurrence from
540
Zschernig.

See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–74 (2000).
Lower courts have generally read the case in this manner. See Hartford Enters.
v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95, 102–03 (D. Me. 2008) (applying both Garamendi and
Zschernig to review the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act’s effect on Canadian employees); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (applying Garamendi and Zschernig, along with explicit purpose-review, to
review the Illinois Sudan Act).
535
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79 (2006) (indicating that by choosing obstacles conflict, the
Court has “gone out of its way not to endorse Zschernig”).
536
See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
537
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417–18.
538
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 877.
539
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11.
534
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Favorable Elements for Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and
Zschernig
The policy reflected in the executive
agreement was interfered with, not
the executive agreement itself, and
since the Court does not examine if
the executive agreement is selfexecuting, our normal understanding
of preemption, requiring an affirmative federal act with legal effect in the
U.S. domestic legal system, is not
541
present.
Four justices in dissent seem to believe
that the majority relied on Zschernig
and that the doctrine exists, but that it
just should not be applied to these
543
facts.

540
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Unfavorable Elements for the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
(DFAD) and Zschernig
The majority ultimately seems to say
executive branch policy, as long as it
is consistent, can preempt state laws
even without an affirmative federal
act. The majority arguably creates a
new type of preemption or expands
what we normally consider necessary
for preemption to occur (i.e., an affirmative federal act with legal ef542
fect).

Id. at 418–19.
See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUPREME CT. REV. 153, 208–09
The Garamendi Court did not reject Zschernig. On the other hand, it also did not extend Zschernig ‘s endorsement of an independent federal
court power to supervise foreign relations. . . .
Thus, the Garamendi Court neatly sidestepped the main criticism of
Zschernig, which attacked Zschernig’s empowerment of federal courts to
preempt independently state laws in the complete absence of any input
from (or indeed in opposition to) the wishes of the President or Congress. By relying on executive “statements” of national policy, the Garamendi Court avoided the problem of unchecked federal courts by
empowering the executive branch to settle future disputes over state
interference with foreign affairs by issuing statements of national policy.
Id.
542
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 830, 901–02
The Garamendi decision gives the President the power to decide which
state laws affecting foreign affairs survive and which do not. This executive preemption concentrates foreign affairs power in the President
in a way not countenanced by the Constitution’s text nor contemplated
by its Framers, who emphasized the importance of separating executive
power from legislative power. Previously, if the executive branch
wished to pursue a foreign policy with which a state law interfered, the
President usually had to seek the support of Congress (or the Senate
via a treaty) to override the competing state law through Article VI of
the Constitution. This procedure assured that state laws would not
stand as obstacles to federal foreign policy, as they had under the Articles of Confederation.
Id.; see also Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign
Affairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 465, 477–79 (2004).
543
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
541
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Perhaps this merging or muddling of the two doctrines was inevitable. Scholars have increasingly expressed concerns as to the
544
“muddling” occurring in preemption cases generally. In Crosby, the
Court explicitly stated that the line between field and conflict
545
preemption was not a rigid one. The Court’s threshold-effects test
under Zschernig, asking if there is more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign policy—perhaps even as only expressed in
an executive branch amicus brief—starts melding into a preemption
analysis by asking how substantial a conflict there is between the state
law and a U.S. policy, one that does not, according to Garamendi,
necessarily have to come in the form of a federal act with legal binding effect. For this reason, we have seen a lower court ruling postCrosby and post-Garamendi referring to “incidental effect in conflict”
546
in its preemption analysis. This reference was apparently borrowed
547
from both Zschernig and Garamendi.
If the Court had more clearly
adopted a purpose-based test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
in Zschernig, the muddling between it and preemption analysis would
likely never have occurred.
548
Finally, the Supreme Court’s 2008 opinion in Medellin v. Texas
may suggest that the Court is backtracking from the proposition that
preemption can occur through executive branch policy statements
549
alone. In Medellin, the Court found that the International Court of
Justice’s judgment, requiring review and reconsideration of sentences
544

See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000).
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, n.6 (2000).
We recognize, of course, that the categories of preemption are not “rigidly distinct.” Because a variety of state laws and regulations may conflict with a federal statute, whether because a private party cannot
comply with both sets of provisions or because the objectives of the
federal statute are frustrated, field pre-emption may be understood as a
species of conflict pre-emption.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
546
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
547
Id. at 1185–87.
548
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (“The Executive’s narrow and
strictly limited authority to settle international disputes pursuant to an executive
agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.”).
549
See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259,
333–34 (2009); Jeremy K. Schrag, A Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing International Presence of the Several States, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 452–57 (2009). Professor
Van Alstine argued that Garamendi should not be read in a manner that allows Executive Branch preemption through mere policy statements prior to the Supreme
Court issuing the Medellin opinion. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 350 (2006).
545
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and convictions by judicial bodies of foreign nationals not notified of
their rights to meet with a consular official at time of arrest, was not
550
self-executing and thus did not bind Texas state courts. The Court
in Medellin also found that the President’s memorandum, which attempted to implement the ruling into domestic law, and thus
551
preempt state procedural default doctrines, was invalid.
Medellin is welcome in that it helps recreate a solid distinction
between the dormant foreign affairs and preemption doctrines. Under Medellin, the preemption doctrine would be based on legally
binding federal acts having effect in the U.S. domestic legal system,
and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, with the proper purposebased test, would not require courts to pay heed to policy suggestions
that do not have legal effect domestically. As discussed earlier, a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test not only
avoids the potential muddling of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
with the preemption doctrine, but it also respects the non-selfexecuting nature of certain international obligations that a threshold552
effects test potentially would not.
D. The Supreme Court’s (Apparent) Reliance on Preemption Comes
with Many Drawbacks
The Court’s apparent preference to rely on preemption rather
than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has many downsides. First,
there are significant practical problems with relying exclusively on
the federal government’s ability to preempt unconstructive state-level
foreign policy measures. The federal government may be overburdened in serving this policing function. The legislative calendar is often too busy to allow Congress to actively police state-level foreign
policy. Therefore, a failure to preempt should not necessarily be
read as implied approval. At most, one could claim that the state
measure is not as important or as damaging to the national interests
as other legislative issues being addressed. Scholars have argued that
the executive branch is quite able to police state-level foreign policy
activities, and this should distinguish the policing problem that justi553
fies the dormant Commerce Clause.
It is clear that the executive
branch has greater time and resources to police state measures than
Congress and that the President maintains greater constitutional
550

Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
See id. at 532; see also Reinstein, supra note 549, at 333–34; Schrag, supra note
549, at 452–57; Van Alstine, supra note 549, at 350.
552
See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
553
Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1684.
551
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power over foreign affairs generally than interstate or foreign commerce. But Congress could delegate to the President the power to
preempt state laws that interfere with interstate and foreign commerce to eliminate any policing problem under the dormant Com554
merce Clause.
Yet, the dormant Commerce Clause still persists.
Moreover, it is not clear that the President’s foreign affairs powers,
combined with existing statutory delegations of power from Congress, are sufficient authority for the President to preempt by execu555
tive order any and all state-level foreign policy activity.
Thus, further congressional legislation or delegations of power may be
necessary in particular instances. Lastly, even if the President can police any and all foreign policy actions of the states, politics, particularly in the current environment, may prevent him from doing so. The
Constitution may not have left the “resolution of so fundamental a
constitutional issue” to “the shifting winds” within the executive
556
branch.
Second, congressional intent, the crux or the “ultimate touch557
stone” of any preemption analysis, is not always so clear. For example, in the case of Baltimore’s divestment requirements targeting
businesses active in South Africa in the 1980s, Congress sent conflicting signals on its intention regarding preemption. On the one hand,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution at the same time it
passed the law stating it had no intent to preempt state anti-apartheid
558
measures. Of course, the resolution did not have the force of law.
On the other hand, the so-called D’Amato Amendment, which was
incorporated into the statute, stated that the federal government
would not penalize a state by, for example, withdrawing federal funds
utilized in certain projects as a result of application of state antiapartheid procurement laws for ninety days after the entry into force
559
of the federal statute. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in examining the Baltimore ordinance, concluded that the provision would be
superfluous if state and local anti-apartheid procurement laws were
560
already preempted by the Act. The court agreed with a memoran-

554

See discussion of Justice Jackson concurrence in Steel Seizure, supra, notes 448–

51.
555

Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
557
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
558
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 743
(Md. 1989).
559
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 5116 (1986).
560
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 742.
556
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dum prepared by Professor Tribe that the D’Amato Amendment
“leaves the negative implication that investment decisions are not
561
preempted nor are disbursements not using federal funds.” Yet the
amendment could be interpreted as providing an exception to the
preemption that would otherwise occur. Other parts of the legislative
history also lead to potentially conflicting views on the intent of Congress with respect to preemption. For instance, an amendment that
562
would have expressly preempted states was withdrawn.
Its supporters argued that the federal law would already preempt state law and
563
thus there was no need to go forward with the amendments. Other
Senators believed that the express preemption amendment was with564
drawn due to its poor prospects for passage. In sum, it may be less
intellectually honest to find preemption of state laws in situations in
which there are such widely conflicting views of congressional intent.
Third, to the extent Garamendi suggests balancing, the degree of
the state law’s conflict with the federal act or policy against the state’s
interest, it encourages the very type of analysis state officials would
find difficult to engage in independently and dispassionately. State
actors are likely to underestimate the degree of conflict with federal
law and are also likely to overestimate the strength of their interest in
the matter.
Fourth, while it is true that a broad notion of field preemption
may be effective at curbing disruptive state foreign policy actions,
even such an approach has significant downsides. Courts could claim
that the federal government has occupied the entire field of foreign
policy or of foreign policy sanctions by citing to all the presidential
and congressional acts in the area, including broad delegations by
Congress to the President to sanction foreign governments in framework statutes, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers
565
Act. But this may have adverse consequences for preemption analysis generally. Courts are reticent to define fields so broadly in field
566
Purpose review under the dormant foreign afpreemption cases.
fairs doctrine will be more capable of providing guidance to state and
local officials and lower courts.
561

Id.
Id. at 741.
563
Id. at 742 n.44.
564
Id. at 741.
565
See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1292 (discussing a similar argument based on obstacles conflict); see also Golove, supra note 38, at 153.
566
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 544, at 227; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 623 (2008).
562
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Fifth, if state and local officials continue to read Supreme Court
opinions narrowly, as only preempting state laws when there is a specific federal law targeting the same country, and if they continue to
enact sanctions legislation, the federal government may be tempted
to expressly preempt. Yet attempting to preempt state action
567
through express clauses has its dangers.
In short, the inclusion of
an express clause can imply that matters beyond the express statement are not preempted, although implied preemption is still possi568
ble even with an express clause. Thus, there is a significant risk that
Congress will mistakenly draft an under-inclusive express preemption
clause. Additionally, there is some indication that court interpreta569
tions of express clauses lead to unpredictable results.
E. Litigation in the Lower Federal and State Courts in the Post-Crosby
and Post-Garamendi Era
Since state sanctions legislation is the most prominent and problematic form of state and local foreign policy, it is appropriate to begin an analysis of the impact of Crosby and Garamendi in lower court
litigation by focusing on that form of state and local foreign policy.
The third major wave of state and local sanctions legislation, this time
targeting Sudan, followed on the heels of Crosby and Garamendi and
570
numerous federal acts sanctioning Sudan.
Thus, it appears that
numerous state and local governments read those opinions quite narrowly, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s choice to rely on preemption grounds did not curb the state and local appetite for targeting
countries other than Burma. Additionally, states shifted to divestment and banking measures since Crosby only dealt with a procure571
ment measure.
Part of this shift and reading of Crosby may have
been created by the executive branch’s amicus brief in Crosby indicat-

567

See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992) (holding that
claims not explicitly contained in the express-preemption clause in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoke Act of 1969 were not preempted).
568
Id.; see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289–90 (1993) (noting
that express clauses do not entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption).
569
See, e.g., Greg J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Pre-Market
Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 254–57
(2004).
570
See Bush Signs into Law Sudan Investment Measure, REUTERS, Dec, 31, 2007,
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3156518420071231 (“Some 20 U.S. states have
initiated divestment efforts because of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region” by the
end of 2007).
571
See, e.g., 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01 (West 2010); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1110.5 (West 2010).
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ing that divestment sanctions might be constitutional. The amicus
brief hedged on this, claiming it was unnecessary to decide the issue,
and it also indicated that divestment measures targeting other states
573
would be more problematic than those targeting foreign countries.
The latter statement, of course, conflicts with long-standing Supreme
Court precedent that those measures affecting foreign commerce are
subject to greater scrutiny than those affecting interstate com574
merce. The occurrence of this third major wave of state and local
sanctions legislation might serve as some evidence that the Court’s
choice of preemption as the grounds for its rulings, with confusing
references to Zschernig, was not the best choice.
Recently, however, businesses acting through the same trade association as in the Crosby litigation, the National Foreign Trade
575
Council (NFTC), challenged an Illinois law sanctioning Sudan.
The case is the most prominent post-Crosby and post-Garamendi case,
and serves as an example of the impact the Supreme Court’s rulings
in Crosby and Garamendi have had on lower court analysis.
1.

National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulis

In 2007, the NFTC was one of several plaintiffs to file suit challenging the Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan
576
(“Illinois Act”). The 2005 Illinois Act prohibited the state from depositing state funds in any financial institution that maintained cus577
tomers defined as forbidden entities.
Forbidden entities included
“[a]ny company who has failed to certify under oath that it does not
own or control any property or asset located in, have employees or
facilities located in, provide goods or services to . . . or invest in i) the
Republic of Sudan; or ii) any company domiciled in the Republic of
578
Sudan.” The Illinois Act also prohibited state and local government
pension funds from maintaining investments in businesses with Su579
danese ties or contacts. The federal government had imposed various sanctions against Sudan pursuant to an Executive Order and leg-

572

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 28,
Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
573
See id. at 29 n.24.
574
See Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
575
See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
576
See id.
577
Id. at 733.
578
Id. at 734.
579
Id. at 733.
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islation beginning in 1997 and continuing through the time of the
580
litigation. These federal sanctions prohibited most transactions by
U.S. companies with Sudan, other than humanitarian and medical
efforts, and ultimately included travel restrictions on Sudanese offi581
cials involved in the genocide in Darfur.
The federal laws also
granted the President broad waiver authority similar to the Burmese
582
sanction law.
In Giannoulias, the federal district court struck down the Illinois
Act’s banking provisions on preemption grounds, relying primarily
583
on Crosby. The court highlighted the fact that the Illinois Act contained no exceptions and targeted foreign subsidiaries of U.S. com584
panies that were not covered under the federal act. Further, the Illinois Act applied to companies operating anywhere in the Sudan
even though the federal sanctions were loosened to exempt certain
585
geographic areas in the Sudan. Thus, similar to Crosby, the Illinois
Act changed the calibration of sanctions determined to be appropri586
ate by the federal government.
Illinois attempted to rely upon
Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System v. Mayor of Baltimore,
which upheld divestment legislation aimed at South Africa in the
587
588
mid-1980s,
to support the law.
But the court rejected the approach of Board of Trustees because the case was decided prior to Crosby, and it believed that Crosby had either strongly questioned or expli589
citly rejected two key elements of the Board of Trustees opinion. The
first element the Supreme Court strongly questioned in Crosby was the
presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regula590
Second, the Court explicitly rejected the validity of laws not
tion.
directly targeting a foreign government but merely private companies
591
trading with a foreign government. Nonetheless, the district court
in Giannoulias ruled that the impact of the divestment provisions was
too attenuated to be considered an obstacle to achieving the full

580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591

Id. at 735.
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 738–39.
562 A.2d. 720 (Md. 1989).
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 740.
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592

purposes of the federal act. The court’s analysis seems to be based
on conjecture or perhaps a lack of evidence of the impact of the di593
vestment measures.
The court reached similar conclusions under its dormant for594
Interestingly, the court cited both
eign affairs doctrine analysis.
595
Zschernig and Garamendi in this section of its analysis.
It also ultimately adopted the traditional threshold-effects test (i.e., “more than
an incidental or indirect effect”) as the appropriate test, after earlier
complaining that neither case clearly laid out what test to apply to determine if a state or local law ran afoul of the federal government’s
596
foreign relations powers.
The court found the banking section of
the act ran afoul of the threshold-effects test because it singled out a
597
particular foreign country. The court also relied on evidence that
banks had lost $275 million in state deposits for failure to comply
with the Illinois Act’s requirements, and this loss of business could ultimately cause the banks to cease doing business with prohibited enti598
599
ties. Thus, the Illinois Act impacted Sudan. In contrast, the court
found the divestment measures did not have more than some inci600
dental or indirect effect on Sudan or U.S.-Sudan relations.
Interestingly, much earlier in its opinion, the court found from
the Illinois Act’s title, preamble, and legislative history that the purpose of the state law was to criticize or change the behavior of the
601
government of Sudan.
While the court did not tie this purposefinding back into its dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis, the
court probably would have invalidated the banking and divestment
provisions of the law if it had exclusively employed this Article’s preferred purpose-based test. Moreover, it seems likely the court’s analysis gave at least some weight to the Illinois Act’s purpose, otherwise

592

Id.
See id. at 742 (“The Court has been presented with no evidence suggesting that
these pension funds’ inability to purchase the securities of such companies would be
in any way likely to affect their decision to do business in that country.”).
594
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
595
Id. at 742.
596
Id. at 745 (citing Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
597
Id. at 745.
598
Id.
599
Id.
600
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
601
Id. at 734.
593
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there would have been little reason to delve into such analysis at the
602
start of the opinion.
The Giannoulias case is an example of a lower federal court following the Crosby and Garamendi lead in relying first on obstacles con603
flict preemption grounds. It is also an example of how a court can
find wiggle room to uphold, under preemption doctrine, portions of
state laws singling out a particular foreign nation for criticism, even
though such laws would not survive under the dormant foreign affairs
604
doctrine.
Giannoulias also suggests that lower courts will read
Zschernig as still alive but that a threshold-effects test may also permit
states to take actions singling out particular foreign countries for criticism. Importantly, and regrettably, the Giannoulias court did not
seek to hypothetically aggregate similar actions being enacted by other states and localities in deciding whether the threshold-effects test
was met. The fact that the court struck down the divestment provisions under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause does not minimize the court’s failures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
given that the court came to its finding because the state was directing local pension funds to divest, and thus, under Seventh Circuit
case law, acting in a regulatory capacity, not a market participant ca605
pacity.
If the state had merely required divestment of Sudanese
connected companies by state pension funds, the court might have
found that the market-participant exception protected the divestment provision from challenge.
2.

More Post-Crosby and Post-Garamendi Lower Court
Treatment of Zschernig-Based Claims

The Giannoulias opinion provides an example of the types of
problems that can arise in a post-Garamendi examination of state
laws—Zschernig is alive, but not preferred, and a threshold-effects test
is employed more prominently than a purpose-based test. But are the
types of problems present in Giannoulias widespread among lower
courts?
Over a dozen other lower court cases, all but one of them federal, have significantly addressed Zschernig claims since Crosby and Ga-

602
See id. at 745. (acknowledging that the very purpose of the Illinois Act was to
enact economic sanctions on Sudan).
603
Id. at 738.
604
See id. at 742.
605
See id. at 748.
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606

ramendi. The bare majority of these cases (summarized in the chart
below) indicate that indeed Zschernig is alive, the doctrines of
preemption and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine can be kept distinct, and an act’s purpose frequently plays a key role in analyzing
state measures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, even if
fealty is paid to the threshold-effects test. Nevertheless, many lower
court cases also indicate some confusion and mixing at times of
preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine claims in the postCrosby and post-Garamendi era.

Case Name

Law or Action at
Issue

Test Under
DFAD & Order
of Analysis

Condon v. Inter-Religious
Foundation for
Community
607
Organization

Commissioner of city
school district’s special investigation
into whether travel
to Cuba by students
chaperoned by
school employees
violated federal law.

The court used the
threshold-effects test
but gave some commentary on the act’s
purpose as well.
This was the first and
only doctrine analyzed.

ABC Charters,
Inc. v. Bron608
son

Additional bonding
requirements on
travel agencies arranging travel to
Cuba, which created
two classes of travel
agencies, those that
do business with Cuba and other terrorist states and those
that do not.

The court used the
threshold-effects test
but with the act’s
purpose (“design
and intent”) considered as the first
sub-factor. This was
the first doctrine analyzed (prior to
preemption).

Faculty Senate
of Florida Internationals
University v.
609
Winn

Restricted state universities from spending both state and
“non-state” funds on
activities related to

The court used the
threshold effects test,
but the act’s purpose
was the first subfactor (and the court

606

Type of
Preemption
Analysis

None.

The court
used Crosbystyled obstacles conflict preemption analysis,
Hines-styled
field preemption analysis,
and did not
cite to Garamendi.
The court
used a Crosbystyled obstacles conflict preemp-

Result

No violation
of DFAD.

Violation of
DFAD,
preempted,
and a violation of the
dormant
Foreign
Commerce
Clause.

Violation of
DFAD and
preempted.

Additional cases, other than those analyzed in the chart, cite to Zschernig in the
post-Garmamendi era, but the chart is limited to those cases that involve a significant
discussion and analysis of Zschernig.
607
Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2008).
608
ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
609
Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. Fla.
2007).
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Law or Action at
Issue
travel to a “terrorist
state,” as designated
by the U.S. Department of State as a
state sponsor of terrorism.

Test Under
DFAD & Order
of Analysis
almost seems to declare the act unconstitutional based on
purpose alone).
This was the first doctrine analyzed (prior
to preemption).

Type of
Preemption
Analysis

309
Result

tion analysis.

The court
stated that
Garamendi
stands for the
proposition
that traditional field
preemption
requires
greater conflict.
The court
mixed DFAD
and preemption (Zschernig
and Garamendi).
The court
used a Garamendi-styled
analysis but
required an
express policy
(presumably
in legal measures such as
an executive
agreement).

Hartford Enterprises Inc., v.
610
Coty

Maine Workers’
Compensation Act
applied to Canadian
employees who came
into Maine for only
restricted purposes
and limited times.

The court used the
threshold-effects test
but the act’s purpose
was the first subfactor. This was the
second doctrine applied
(after preemption).

Central Valley
Chrysler-Jeep v.
611
Witherspoon

California greenhouse gas (GHG)
limits.

The court mixed
DFAD and preemption analysis (Zschernig and Garamendi).

Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge
Jeep v. Crom612
bie

Vermont GHG limits.

The court used the
“disruption and embarrassment” test,
rather than threshold-effects, but
hints at purposereview. This was the
first doctrine analyzed
(prior to preemption).

In re Nat’l
Security Agency
Telecommunications Records
613
Litigation

Investigation by state
officials of telecommunications companies that turned over
records and information to the NSA.

The purpose-based
test was applied first,
but a thresholdeffects test was also
applied. This was
the first doctrine analyzed (prior to
preemption).

None.

No violation
of DFAD.

Republic of Irac
614
v. Beaty

Suit under the FSIA
Act against the state
of Iraq by children
of Americans impri-

The court seems to
mix Garamendi and
Zschernig into a

The court
used a Garamendi-styled

No violation.

610

No violation
of DFAD
and no
preemption.

No violation.

No violation
of DFAD or
preemption
doctrine.

Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D. Me. 2008).
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
612
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295 (D. Vt. 2007).
613
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D.
Cal. 2007).
614
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183 (2009).
611
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Law or Action at
Issue

Test Under
DFAD & Order
of Analysis

Type of
Preemption
Analysis

soned and tortured
by the former regime for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under
tort laws of Oklahoma and Florida.

preemption analysis
(although it makes a
late reference to
there being no intent to criticize the
foreign government).

Mujica v. Occidental Petro615
leum Corp.

Columbian nationals
sued an oil company
and a private security
firm under the Alien
Tort Statute and
state law to recover
for their personal
injuries and for
deaths of family
members caused by
the bombing of a
village by the Columbian military.

The court largely
merged preemption
and DFAD analysis
(late in the court’s
opinion it speaks of
“incidental conflict”).

Cruz v. United
616
States

Mexican nationals
who worked in the
United States during
and after WWII
brought action
against Mexico, Mexican banks, the
United States, and
American bank for
failure to pay wages.
California enacted a
statute removing
statute of limitations
for actions such as
the one brought.

The court applied
Zschernig, describing
it as a field preemption case, although
the test applied focused on criticism of
foreign government
(close to purposebased test). The court
analyzed Zschernig
second (after preemption).

In re Agent
Orange Product
Liability Litiga617
tion

Application of state
tort law concerning
products liability in
ATS by Vietnamese
non-profit and nationals against manufactures.

The court cites
Zschernig focusing on
minute inquiries and
criticism concerns in
the case, and found
no such risk in ordinary application of
New York tort law

analysis (noting that since
tort law is a
traditional
area of state
law, the conflict with U.S.
foreign policy
would need to
be significant).
The court
used Garamendi but
gave weight to
a State Department
statement of
interest, rather than insist on express
policy (further indication of some
merging of
DFAD with
preemption).
The court
used a Garamendi-styled
analysis (finding no
preemption
based on executive
agreements
with Mexico
since the
agreements
seemed to
envision possibility of such
suits).
The court
used a Garamendi-styled
analysis and
found no
preemption,
noting that
plaintiff’s

Case Name

615

[Vol. 41:201
Result

Violation of
DFAD.

No violation
of DFAD or
preemption.

No violation
of DFAD or
preemption.

Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
617
Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
616
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of Analysis
were it applicable.

Saleh v. Titan
618
Corp.

Movsesian v.
Victoria Versi620
cherung AG

618

2/8/2011 3:50 PM

Application of state
tort law to claims by
Iraqi nationals of
abuse by U.S. military contractors in
Iraq.

The court gives little
attention to Zschernig
(only in a string cite
with other preemption cases for the
general proposition
that states have no
role in war time policy making).

California Statute
extending statute of
limitations for claims
arising out of life
insurance policies
for Armenian geno621
cide victims.

The court only once
cited Zschernig (for
the proposition that
“courts look past
superficial legislative
intent to ascertain
true legislative intent”).

Type of
Preemption
Analysis
domestic law
claims were
already
barred by the
government
contractor
defense.
The court
mixed its
analysis. It
relied on
Crosby and
Garamendi as
obstacles conflict-type
preemption
(changing the
calibration of
sanctions),
but since
there was no
affirmative act
of the federal
government
that
preempts, the
case may be
considered a
619
DFAD case.
The court
finds Garamendi allows
preemption
by executive
branch statements alone
(no formal
affirmative
legal act is
required).
The court
balanced the
degree of
conflict
against the
state interest.

311
Result

Preempted.

Preempted.

Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Indeed, this is what the dissent suspected. See id. at 17 (Garland, J., dissenting)
(arguing no precedent to strike down facially neutral generally applicable law under
dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
620
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
621
See id. at 1054 (internal quotations omitted).
619
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Law or Action at
Issue

California statute
extending statute of
limitations for claims
seeking recovery of
Holocaust-era art.

[Vol. 41:201

Test Under
DFAD & Order
of Analysis

Type of
Preemption
Analysis

Result

The court examined
the purpose (or aim)
of the law first and
then examined ef623
fects. This was the
second doctrine analyzed (after preemption).

The court
initially kept
preemption
(citing Crosby
and Garamendi first) and
the dormant
foreign affairs
doctrine (citing Zschernig)
distinct. Later, in its opinion, Garamendi creeps
into the
DFAD analysis, and there
was some mixing of the
doctrines.

Not
preempted
but conflicts
with DFAD
(or more
specifically
dormant
War Powers
624
doctrine).

As displayed in the above chart, seven of the thirteen lower court
opinions analyzing Zschernig-based claims were able keep their dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis separate and distinct from a
625
preemption analysis. Of the seven cases that kept the doctrines distinct, six placed considerable emphasis on purpose in their dormant
626
foreign affairs doctrine analysis.
As also displayed in the above
chart, however, a large minority of lower courts did not escape the
622

Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2010).
623
See id. at 965 (“California ‘seeks to redress wrongs committed during the
second World War’—a motive that [is] fatal.”) (citing Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324
F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003)).
624
Id. at 965–66 (“The District Court held that [the California statute] intrudes on
the power to make and resolve war, a power reserved exclusively for the federal government under the Constitution. We agree.”).
625
The seven cases are the following: Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art
at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010); Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp.
2d 95 (D. Me. 2008); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892
(N.D. Cal. 2007); Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198
(S.D. Fla. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).
626
These cases include the following: Von Saher, 592 F.3d 954; Hartford Enters., 529
F. Supp. 2d 95; ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272; Condon, 850 N.Y.S.2d 841;
Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892; Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198.
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potential confusion arising out of Garamendi. Thus, a need exists for
further clarification by the Supreme Court.
IX. THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS
OR IN STATE CAPITOLS?
U.S. courts cannot be relied upon as the sole, or perhaps not
even the primary, forum for applying the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. Private parties affected by state-level foreign policy legislation must weigh the benefits of bringing a successful claim under a
doctrine with an uncertain test against the risks of bringing a suit, in627
cluding potential consumer boycotts from those supporting the
state’s incursion into foreign policy. Therefore, because of the ambiguity of the doctrine, the uncertainty of success, and the risks to private parties, the courts cannot serve as a comprehensive forum of
constraint.
Accordingly, self-imposed constraint by state legislators and gov628
ernors is necessary, at least to some degree.
State legislators and
governors have a duty to impose constitutional constraints upon
629
themselves. Both take oaths to uphold and support the U.S. Consti630
tution.
The Constitution, in fact, requires such “oaths or affirma631
Maditions” by all state government representatives and officials.
son opined in the Federalist Papers No. 44 that “the members and
officers of the State governments . . . will have an essential agency in
632
giving effect to the federal Constitution.” It is part of the “conscientious” state official’s duty to analyze the constitutionality of proposed
633
legislation, executive orders, and other formal acts. Legislators and
governors, however, do not have complete independence in interpreting the U.S. Constitution for purposes of reviewing proposed
acts. Legislators and governors are bound to follow, or at least give
extreme deference to, the decisions of the highest court of the land,
634
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court has established a dormant for627

See Fenton, supra note 34, at 591.
Thus, while I agree with Professor Fenton that cases will rarely be brought, I
disagree that judicial invalidation is the only realistic option for correction of the
problem. See Fenton, supra note 34, at 592.
629
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975).
630
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
631
Id.
632
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 133 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981).
633
See Brest, supra note 629, at 587.
634
In the context of federal legislators, see Brest, supra note 629, at 587. On the
debate as to whether non-judicial officials must follow the Constitution as interpreted
628
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eign affairs doctrine.
The better reading of Crosby and Garamendi,
as supported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution and
lower court opinions in the post-Crosby and post-Garamendi era, confirms the vitality of the doctrine and the importance of purpose in
analyzing state actions under the doctrine. Thus, state legislators and
governors should not interpret the Constitution so as to deny the ex636
istence of such a doctrine. Nevertheless, because the Court has not
addressed every issue related to the doctrine, for example, the existence of the market-participant exception, some independent interpretation of the doctrine must occur. The Court could facilitate and
ease the difficult interpretational task state legislators and governors
currently face by clearly adopting a purpose-based doctrinal test and
rejecting a market-participant exception under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. Clarification by the Court would provide far greater
guidance to state officials than the current threshold-effects test.
Such action would also allow lower courts to serve a greater role as a
forum of constraint since private parties would be less hesitant to
challenge state measures without the ambiguity over the doctrinal
test. However, one might hope that in time the faithful application
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test will
eliminate the need for even infrequent litigation.
X. MAY THE SUPREME COURT RELY ON
THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE WHEN
PREEMPTION COULD ALSO BE RELIED UPON?
637

In Crosby, the Court cited Ashwander v. TVA as a reason why it
chose not to address the First Circuit’s additional grounds for invalidating the Massachusetts Burma law, including the dormant foreign
638
affairs doctrine. Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander is frequently cited to as laying out the rules on Supreme Court judicial re639
straint. The fourth principle in Ashwander relied upon by the Court
to rule exclusively on preemption grounds in Crosby states:

by the Supreme Court, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); see also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
635
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
636
See Matthew Schaefer, Conscientious State Legislators and the Cultures of Compliance
and Liberalization Relating to International Trade Agreements, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
52, 54 (2001).
637
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
638
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000).
639
See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 341.
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The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
640
Court will decide only the latter.

It is immediately apparent that if the application of preemption doctrine is considered to involve a constitutional question—as it rightfully should be, given the doctrine involves interpretation of the Supremacy Clause as well as statutory construction to glean congressional
intent—then Ashwander is not a sufficient reason to chose preemp641
tion grounds over dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds. It appears the Court, prior to Crosby, never before relied on Ashwander to
rule on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine (i.e., either
dormant foreign affairs doctrine or dormant Commerce Clause), so it
was a novel application of the rule rather than long-standing prac642
tice. In fact, while Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Zschernig argued
that the Court should rule on preemption grounds in part based on
643
Ashwander, the six Justices in the majority rejected the argument
644
and relied instead on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. To be
fair, relying on preemption grounds would have required revisiting
the interpretation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany established ear645
lier in Clark v. Allen, something the majority was unwilling to do.
Therefore, there was not an explicit rejection by the Zschernig majority
of the application of the fourth principle of Ashwander in their decision to rely on dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds rather than
preemption grounds.
The strength of Ashwander’s fourth principle, however, as applied to situations involving a choice between preemption grounds or
dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds is further lessened when its
640

Id. at 347.
See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1265-68; see also Garrick Pursley, The Structure of
Preemption Decisions, 85 NEB. L. REV. 912, 957 (2007) (“Preemption issues should be
treated like any other constitutional issues for purposes of Pullman abstention and
the rule that courts, where possible, should decide issues in the order that avoids
constitutional questions.”).
642
The court, however, chose preemption grounds over other constitutional doctrines, such as the Equal Protection Clause in certain cases. See Pursley, supra note
641, at 913.
643
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
644
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 47.
645
See supra Part IV.B.
641
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origins are considered. In laying out the fourth principle, Justice
646
Brandeis cited to two cases: Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
647 648
and Light v. United States . Neither of these involved a decision to
rely on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine. Indeed, the
cases involved a choice between local law and federal constitutional
649
doctrines to resolve the case at hand.
Moreover, neither Siler nor
Light speaks in terms of any obligation that a court must, or indeed
certainty that a court would prefer, to resolve questions on a local law
basis, rather than a federal constitutional question. In Siler, the Court
stated that it can “if it deem[s] it proper, decide the local questions
650
only, and omit to decide the Federal questions.” In Light, the court,
citing to Siler, stated that “where [a] case in this court can be decided
without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution
that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without im651
portant reasons.”
Thus, it appears that in certain situations, the
presumption against deciding on constitutional grounds can be overcome. Eliminating unnecessary confusion and uncertainty over a
significant constitutional doctrine might be sufficient grounds to
overcome the normal rule of judicial restraint, even assuming that it
applies in the context of choosing between two constitutional doctrines: preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
XI. CONCLUSION
U.S. state involvement in foreign affairs continues. Sanctions
legislation for foreign-policy purposes, namely to change or criticize
the behavior of foreign governments, is perhaps the most significant
and problematic manifestation of this increased involvement. Yet the
existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine that invalidates certain state actions in foreign affairs, even when such actions have not
been preempted by federal enactments, is increasingly criticized and
652
questioned.
The plenary preemptive powers of the federal government over foreign affairs, it is argued by many scholars, are suffi-

646

213 U.S. 175 (1909).
220 U.S. 523 (1911).
648
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538
(1911)).
649
See Siler, 213 U.S. at 191; Light, 220 U.S. at 538.
650
Siler, 213 U.S. at 191.
651
Light, 220 U.S. at 538 (citing Siler, 213 U.S. at 193).
652
See supra note 12.
647
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653

cient to eliminate any negative effects of state-level foreign policies.
Yet sole reliance on preemption analysis does not allow the federal
government to pursue quiet diplomacy with respect to a foreignpolicy matter. Moreover, there will always be questions of congressional intent to preempt when uncertainty over the existence and
scope of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine persists. For example,
congressional representatives believing that such a doctrine exists
may not explicitly preempt state sanctions activity in a federal sanctions law because they believe such state activity is already prohibited
by the Constitution.
The existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is supported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution. While
there are conflicting signals of the appropriate test to be utilized under the doctrine in the Court’s 1968 Zschernig opinion, purpose review is the most appropriate standard. Specifically, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine should prohibit state actions that have a foreign
policy purpose. A foreign policy purpose is evident when the primary
purpose of the state action is to criticize or change a policy of a foreign government. Such a test best suits the competence of the courts,
can be more consistently applied by courts, prevents the executive
branch or—even worse—foreign governments from serving as the de
facto judges of the validity of state legislation, and provides the greatest degree of guidance to state government officials.
Importantly, purpose review also respects traditional areas of
state regulation and federal government views on whether certain international agreements are self-executing to a much greater degree
than a threshold-effects test. Such review also will not prevent many
activities states currently engage in that some broader definitions of
foreign policy may include. For instance, state trade missions and
overseas investment offices do not, as a general matter, violate the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine since their primary purpose is not to
change foreign government policies but rather to facilitate private
business contacts and private investment. Similarly, state activities
that create foreign controversies such as imposition of the death penalty will not violate a purpose-review-based dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. States do not take such actions with the primary purpose of
changing foreign government policies. A purpose-review test further
refined, such that it is both limited to measures with legal effect and
respectful of prior precedent, might be preferred. It would allow
state governments to voice their views on foreign policy matters to the

653

See discussion supra Part VIII.A.
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federal government, just as a state can on any other federal matter,
through non-binding resolutions and allow states to maintain reciprocity-inspired legislation. Additionally, a market participant exception should not be available under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, and the additional “one voice” prong of analysis under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should be eliminated because
the concerns that led to the creation of the “one voice” prong are
cured through faithful application of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
While the Court’s decisions in the early 2000s in Crosby and Garamendi have arguably created some confusion over the status of, and
test to be used under, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, a majority—bare as it may be—of lower courts continue to treat the doctrine
as alive and well, and place significant emphasis on purpose in their
analysis. Yet, because state officials must engage in a review of their
actions even in the absence of litigation, it would be preferable for
the Court to eliminate any confusion it has created. The Court appears to have the flexibility to do so in a future case, given its own
rules on judicial restraint do not absolutely require otherwise. Even if
the Court elects not to do so, state officials have plenty of reasons to
independently apply a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with purpose
review playing a key role as they assess the constitutionality of their
own actions.

